It determines the moral status
of nonmoral goods and it furnishes the ultimate basis for the assessment of practice.
In short, if those dissatisfied with the classical account
of nonmoral evil currently under discussion are not able to present a better world, «the (classical) theist does not have to show that it was impossible for God to create a better set of world - constituents or natural laws, or even that this is the best of all possible worlds» (IPQ 179 - 98).
Not exact matches
It is one thing to grant that a moral world must contain natural regularities and that some
nonmoral evil is an unavoidable by - product
of such regularities, but quite another thing to grant that we must have the exact types and amount
of natural evil which we in fact experience in the actual world.
Plantinga, in positing «Satan and his cohorts» as the «explanation» for
nonmoral evil is admittedly only attempting to defend the consistency
of belief both in God and
nonmoral evil.
Given the above analysis,
nonmoral evils do not have to be seen as incompatible with the goodness
of the classical God.
The classical response to
nonmoral evil we have been discussing begins by affirming «C» omnipotence in relation to humans and then argues that there do exist good reasons to believe that such a moral world would include instances
of genuine
nonmoral evil and plausible reasons for assuming that such a world would have the types and amount
of genuine
nonmoral evil we presently experience.
A
nonmoral economic system tends to create a society either
of acquisitive or
of collective automatons, depending on the principles relied upon to regulate economic behavior.
«The meta - ethical character
of every claim to moral validity» designates the common character
of all such claims in distinction from
nonmoral claims.
it is one thing to grant that a moral world must contain natural regularities and that some
nonmoral evil is an unavoidable by - product
of such regularities, but quite another thing to grant that we must have the exact types and amount
of natural evil which we in fact experience in the actual world.
We can not convene the symposiasts to respond to Mr. Baer's questions, but we suspect that some
of them would note that it is confusing to call knowledge
of foreseeable consequences «intention,» and they might ask for clarification
of, inter alia, what defines «
nonmoral evils.»