Sentences with phrase «of objects in nature»

Joseph Stashkevetch comes closer to Welliver, accruing near abstraction out of objects in nature.

I am thinking of objects in nature such as rocks, water, branches or a big fat sun / moon - as part of the narrative in these paintings and acting as metaphor for human interaction and strength of feeling.

It is a style based on the reduction of every object in nature to the cone, the cylinder or the cube.

Not exact matches

There are parents who object to the «Battle Hymn of the Republic» because they either see it as «religious» in nature, or because they are from south of the Mason - Dixon line and are still fighting the War of Northern Aggression.

In succeeding endeavors, however, he proposed that they are, and that they also are constituted as a pattern (SMW 174) in the manner of a non-uniform object, a non-uniform object being one which requires an extended locus to show its complete nature, that is, it can not be found in any situation less than the whole situation (SMW 183In succeeding endeavors, however, he proposed that they are, and that they also are constituted as a pattern (SMW 174) in the manner of a non-uniform object, a non-uniform object being one which requires an extended locus to show its complete nature, that is, it can not be found in any situation less than the whole situation (SMW 183in the manner of a non-uniform object, a non-uniform object being one which requires an extended locus to show its complete nature, that is, it can not be found in any situation less than the whole situation (SMW 183in any situation less than the whole situation (SMW 183).

In considering passage Whitehead assumes that a structure of events «provides the framework of the externality of nature within which objects are located» (PNK 80) and that «space and time are abstractions expressive of certain qualities of the structure» (PNK 80).

If every object in the universe, and event in your life is the results of past events and the laws of nature, how could «love» even come into the equation?

But his insistence that» [t] he envisaging creativity, the continuum of extension, B's anticipatory feeling of C, the disjunctive plurality of attained actualities, the multiplicity of eternal objects, and the primordial nature of God are all alike involved in the creation of C's dative [i.e., purely receptive] phase» (326) would lead one to believe that some sort of objective medium must he present to facilitate the transmission to the new occasion of so many non-objective factors in its self - constitution (e g creativity, the anticipatory feelings of B and other past occasions, the multiplicity of eternal objects, the divine primordial nature, etc.).

If, as the Scriptures and experience tell us, all men are by nature in a state of guilt and depravity from which they are wholly unable to deliver themselves and have no claim whatever on God for deliverance, it follows that if any are saved God must choose out those who shall be the objects of His grace (Boettner, Predestination, 95).

«And to focus more precisely on the issue of «scientific evidence,» the sciences, ordered by their nature and method to an analysis of empirically verifiable objects and states of affairs within the universe, can not even in principle address questions regarding God, who is not a being in the world, but rather the reason why the finite realm exists at all.......

In the primordial nature, taken in abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.&raquIn the primordial nature, taken in abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.&raquin abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.»

From the lack of a final and necessary order of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God it follows that there is no final order of nature.»

It now becomes clear that God's envisagement of the eternal objects is necessary, not only to secure definiteness of outcome in nature but to secure any agency whatsoever for them.

The Kantian heritage in this conception can be discerned in the following, obviously approving, account Hegel gives of the nature of the Kantian object of experience:

By the «ontological principle,» the system of eternal objects, or possibles, must be grounded in some actual existent, in this case God's mental pole, or God's primordial nature.

«His ultimate explanation is that each factual entity] in its initial phase prehends God,» as it must do, because only through the mediation of the divine nature is there an «envisagement of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects» (cf. IMW 269).

He then utilized terminology that for decades informed the basic stance of process theology on the nature of true power, though, as we shall see, that is open to challenge: God «persuades the world by an act of suffering with the kind of power which leaves its object free to respond in humility and love.»

So the only remaining conclusion is that the «eternal objects» have their ground in a supertemporal entity, in God, who «conceptually» holds within God's «primordial nature» the totality of possibilities for creation.

So God made creation in such a way that it should love, and above all love the divine nature that is the object of love of all the persons in the Trinity.

The distinction among the three kinds rests upon the nature of the objects valued — ideas in the first case, sense data in the second, and acts in the third.

So when Whitehead says it «lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity» (Process 21), he should be referring first of all to (1) transition — the way the incipient whole overlaps the many of the preceding world so they «become» objects or parts of its process.

With a certain simplification of the state of affairs, which however brings out more clearly the decisive factor without falsifying it, we might say that formerly the object and situation of a man's action were simply data supplied by nature with which he was in contact and by simple human realities which recurred from generation to generation again and again.

Our description of value shows that faith is given through the nature of the responses actually generated in the inter-relation of persons with the objects of their loyalty.

Whitehead maintains that, in addition to the «real potentiality» of the given world, there is a «general potentiality» provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects as envisioned in the primordial nature of God's character (PR 65 / 102).

Then a theological passage, «Eternal objects, as in God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas» (PR 73), is translated: God's primordial nature is an abstract structure of mathematical Platonic forms (PW 59/56).

Yet for Aristotle this direction is completely determined in advance by the essential nature of the object, whereas for Whitehead the direction is a function of several variables: the object in relation to its environment (PW 187/206).

Mays takes the statement that «The order of nature, prevalent in the cosmic epoch in question, exhibits itself as a morphological scheme involving eternal objects of the objective species» (PR 447f) and renders it: The order of nature is a morphological scheme of mathematical Platonic forms (PW 58/56).

In the same spirit Santayana and Whitehead agree in objecting, like Nietzsche, to the idea that change in the natural world is controlled by «laws of nature,» viewing the laws rather as simply descriptions of what each unit to which they apply «decides» to do itself (RB 301 - 302In the same spirit Santayana and Whitehead agree in objecting, like Nietzsche, to the idea that change in the natural world is controlled by «laws of nature,» viewing the laws rather as simply descriptions of what each unit to which they apply «decides» to do itself (RB 301 - 302in objecting, like Nietzsche, to the idea that change in the natural world is controlled by «laws of nature,» viewing the laws rather as simply descriptions of what each unit to which they apply «decides» to do itself (RB 301 - 302in the natural world is controlled by «laws of nature,» viewing the laws rather as simply descriptions of what each unit to which they apply «decides» to do itself (RB 301 - 302).

By this distinction of two modes of passivity — of receiving forms - Aristotle sets off the world of conscious experience from the world of nature, but in such a way that not only the objects but the very workings of nature are included as part of what is felt.

Indeed he went to great lengths, grappled with the formidable problem of the nature of light, made incredibly subtle distinctions between various types of change, all to explain the fact that in sight consciousness is consciousness of an object, pure and simple, apart from any feelings of bodily involvement.

We should emphasize the unity of God and see the «natures» as abstractions, descriptions from particular viewpoints of how God as a whole functions in relation to the world and to the eternal objects.

On the face of it Santayana rejects all three of these departures from the tradition, since (1) he makes no very explicit move from a continuant to an event ontology, (2) regards the inherent nature of an object as a matter of the individual eternal essence which it actualizes and (3) regards the distinction between matter and form as at least a virtually inevitable way of expressing the obscure manner in which one state of things takes over from another (see RB 278 - 284).

His doctrine of eternal objects in both his earlier and later philosophy can be understood as a description of the ontological nature of pure logic and mathematics (EWP 14 - 28).

Subject - object, or I - It, knowledge is ultimately nothing other than the socially objectivized and elaborated product of the real meeting which takes place between man and his Thou in the realms of nature, social relations, and art.

«The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings» (PR 134), which «achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects» (PR 48) or pure forms, thereby generating the entire structuring of pure possibility.4 Seen in terms of his everlasting aspect or consequent nature, however, the only way God is directly related to the World, the converse is true.

His object, therefore, the past event, is not only an eternal object but also a necessary object, an object that must be what it is, and is known rationally in apprehending this necessity; Par.39: Applying these results to our knowledge of nature: we regard nature as a self - creative process and therefore creative of eternal objects.»

(a) Hartshorne's objection to my position on truth would be that I assume that there are truths about the past and that truth is real now as involving a relation of correspondence with an object, the past; however, the past on my view is not real now, is not preserved in its full subjective immediacy in the consequent nature of God.

Zen begins with the ordinary individual who is separated from his own true Buddha nature by the false dichotomies of a «Buddha» far back in history, or now in Nirvana; or, more existentially, man as separated from the world around him by a subject - object dualism.

There are differences, thirdly, as to the nature of the object — whether it is material reality, thought in the mind of God or man, pantheistic spiritual substance, absolute and eternal mystical Being, or simply something which we can not know in itself but upon which we project our ordered thought categories of space, time, and causation.

Man is neither perfectible, as idealists in religion and philosophy had supposed, nor the controllable object of nature, as described by materialists.

He had long explored the complexities of human nature in history and society, but in this book he turned the problem around and looked at the subject which was involved, turning from the objective self which most analysts look at to the subjective self behind the object.

The ultimate object of man wherein lies his greatest happiness in future life is to gain knowledge of the realities of things so far as his nature allows, and do what is incumbent upon him.

And this higher and liberating orientation by grace of man's transcendence as spirit, changing as it does in good Thomistic doctrine the very horizon of spiritual activity (the «formal object»), constitutes by the nature of the case a «revelation», even if it presents no new conceptual object to the mind, and therefore, if accepted, is faith.

What is necessary is a philosophical analysis of nature in which the very existence of equational fields of force in the material universe is linked to a metaphysical view of what an object is and how it is related to other objects.

That is to say, man is not, as pure naturalism would have it, merely an object in nature which is acted upon and reacts according to fixed general laws, a passive receiver of prior causes and a non-willing, non-responsible transmitter of future effects, whose consciousness and action are completely caught up in the causal nexus of matter and time.

But if my argument in «The Creation of «Eternal» Objects» (cited in note 5) is correct, and «eternal objects» are not uncreated but are temporally emergent, the primordial nature is absorbed into the divine everlasting expeObjects» (cited in note 5) is correct, and «eternal objects» are not uncreated but are temporally emergent, the primordial nature is absorbed into the divine everlasting expeobjects» are not uncreated but are temporally emergent, the primordial nature is absorbed into the divine everlasting experience.

It is, he further clarifies, by the primarily emotive nature of this relation of subject and object in experience that there arises a «conformity of feeling,» a «sympathetic bond,» between the two relata found in experience.

But the scope, articulateness and reflex clarity of the object before the mind, are not in direct proportion to the direct, immediate, non-reflex clarity and absolute nature of the real decision in the centre of the spiritual person.

He says, «I suggest that the primordial nature of God orders eternal objects in the sense, and only in the sense, that in God's envisagement eternal objects are together.

A common sense approach would have been to say that now that we understood that human thought and feeling are part of nature, we should no longer suppose that nature consists only of material objects in relative motion.