The parent - infant dyad and the construction
of the subjective self.
Not exact matches
The ethical paradigm
of neoclassical economics centers on «homo economicus,» who is driven by
self - interest to seek the maximization
of subjective material preferences — which is shown to be achievable (under highly restrictive assumptions) by competitive markets.
However, your distinction is between those ID proponents who
self - profess as Christians, i.e. Johnson, Minnich, Behe, Meyer, Demski, etc, and those who sufficiently fall within your
subjective criteria and are therefore worthy
of being called Christian.
In speaking
of the process
of constant
self - creation,
of our continuing need to «reconceive ourselves» — a gift
of the Bard to humans — he is echoing phrases that sprout from the lips
of those who insist on a «multiplicity
of subjective positions,» «potential identities,» and the like.
The doctrine
of the philosophy
of organism is that, however far the sphere
of efficient causation be pushed in the determination
of components
of a concrescence — its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases
of subjective aim — beyond the determination
of these components there always remains the final reaction
of the
self - creative unity
of the universe.
When an occasion has appeared, when it has fully come to be, it loses its
subjective immediacy, its process
of decision, its feeling
of self - possession; for the feeling
of self - possession consists precisely in deciding on the appearance
of one's own reality.
In a passage worth pondering, Whitehead explains that the
self - creative contribution
of the freedom
of each actual entity consists precisely in the
subjective emphasis it lays upon the factors which are given it, including its own purposes and
subjective aim:
In the project
of self - creation throughout his life, man must strive to bring these values into aesthetic harmony aiming at intensity
of feeling both in its
subjective immediacy and in the relevant occasions beyond itself to achieve objective immortality.63 And man realizes that to achieve his individual destiny he must create civilizations which embody truth and beauty.
Here once again there is a remarkable similarity between certain emphases in Whitehead as well as in other process - thinkers and the strong insistence
of contemporary existentialism on the centrality
of the «
subjective» feelings and
of self - awareness in human experience.
Hence, in the general sense in which the notion
of actuality is tied to the notion
of self - realization, the superjective existence
of an occasion is as actual as its
subjective existence.
When the citizens
of a republic or a civilization become merely
self - interested (or equally worse, interested in nothing at all) the center fails, and chaos conquers — until a man rides in on a white horse and reestablishes an order based not on nature or on God's will, but on his own
subjective vision
of the world.
The quality
of self - worth catches up and includes the
subjective forms
of the other two physical feelings.
When he [Whitehead] tells us that the process
of an event creating itself is dominated by a
subjective aim which directs its process
of realization, that «This
subjective aim is this subject itself determining its own
self - creation,» he is merely drawing our attention to the «perpetual transition
of nature into novelty.»
A second way in which the transitions
of the
self are disclosed is through the memory
of past
subjective experiences.
I do not know why Whiteheadians should object (PS 6:219) to this monistic theme, since they are committed to think in terms
of a God who supplies the initial
subjective aim
of each actual entity, and
of the completion
of the development
of the actual entity by «the final reaction
of the
self - creative unity
of the universe» (PR 75 — italics supplied).
The initial aim is recognized as the initiation
of subjectivity, and concrescence is understood in terms
of an enlargement
of subjective aim: «The subject completes itself during the process
of concrescence by a
self - criticism
of its own incomplete phases» (PR 244G).
Such actual entities are organisms that undergo growth; they are subjects and have feelings with more or less
subjective intensity; they engage in a
self - creation that is an integration; they make decisions; they have aims; they may or may not accept persuasions; they may entertain propositions; they form societies; they enjoy satisfactions; and some
of them are even conscious.
Still, like any philosophy, it has its dangers, the chief
of which is subjectivism» the view, which soon became prevalent, that there is nothing but
subjective consciousness and that the world is but a construction or projection
of the
self.
I propose that we understand
self - consciousness as the
subjective form characterized by a vivid feeling
of «mineness» as it unifies high - grade multiple contrasts.
Since the reenactment
of subjective form is perfect in God, without negative prehension, my past
self is more fully itself in God than in my present
self.
However, because
of the notorious vagueness
of the term «
subjective,» I prefer the term «agent
self - consciousness.»
If my past
self was conscious, then it is now conscious in God, since consciousness is part
of the
subjective form being reenacted, 7 but it is the consciousness
of that past
self, not my present
self.
For the moment we may restrict ourselves to that portion
of God's
self - creativity reenacting with perfect conformation the
subjective form
of one
of my experiences.
A
self - conscious occasion unifies the contrasts found in the conscious occasion — that is,
of what is and what might be — by means
of a
subjective form characterized by the feeling
of mineness, so that the occasion is aware that it is prehending these contrasts.
There can be no such thing as pure «selfishness since no
self originates or exists in isolation from others and even the most
subjective interest is still
of a social nature.
This final integration
of subjective form does not obviate the role
of the individual
subjective form
of a particular occasion, however, since «the consequent nature
of God is composed
of a multiplicity
of elements with individual
self - realization» (PR 531; italics added).
In the process the narrow confines
of the
self have been lost, but not its
subjective reaction to the universe as a way
of experiencing that whole.
He had long explored the complexities
of human nature in history and society, but in this book he turned the problem around and looked at the subject which was involved, turning from the objective
self which most analysts look at to the
subjective self behind the object.
John Cobb, too, has discussed aspects
of the nature
of man, such as freedom, responsibility, and sin, from a Whiteheadian point
of view.151 Like existentialism, he writes, process thought makes
subjective categories central to the analysis
of man, and it understands subjectivity to be «in a very important sense causa sui,» that is,
self - determinative.
His idea
of a «new synthesis», proposed mainly in his book Catholicism: A New Synthesis and developed in his many theological and philosophical essays, was an attempt to grapple precisely with the issues we have spoken
of: the post-Cartesian «turn to the subject» (that is: the loss
of faith in the objectivity
of knowledge and the subsequent exclusive concern
of philosophy with the
self and the
subjective idea as the norm
of «truth») and the philosophy
of evolution with its implications for a dynamic rather than a static universe.
These two strands
of American religion — the private and public, the soul - competent and civil - competent, the
subjective and objective forms
of witness to God as God or God - in -
self — are sometimes at war, and sometimes they form complementary relations within denominations and in the minds
of most
of us.
The integration
of this experience is essentially determined by God's all - embracing, permanent
subjective aim (his aim for his ongoing
self), which is to realize all possible forms
of definiteness and thus to achieve an absolute intensity
of experience (PR 345 / 523).
Although God assists in determining the nature
of reality by initiating the «
subjective aim»
of each emerging actual entity, because reality is
self - creative the human being must assume responsibility for systemic suffering and social malfunctioning in the world.
He says, «The «
subjective aim,» which controls the becoming
of a subject, is that subject feeling a proposition with the
subjective form
of purpose to realize it in that process
of self - creation.»
Without denying this objective immortality, David Griffin has examined the possibility
of subjective survival more positively, 4 and John Cobb has speculated about the possible interpenetration
of such souls in the hereafter in ways that overcome their possible
self - centeredness.5 Marjorie Suchocki has also explored ways in which we may live on in God which are quite different from these conceptions
of the immortality
of the soul.6
Brock identified agape love with the wrong direction
of classical (patriarchal) theism in championing «disinterested» love, «dispassionate» love that includes no dynamic interrelationship between Lover and beloved and leaves God utterly unaffected by the creaturely response to God's love.21 Erotic love, by contrast, «connotes intimacy through the
subjective engagement
of the whole
self in a relationship.»
The quest for
subjective immortality may simply be a disguised affirmation
of the substantial, enduring
self of traditional thought.
His
self - identity, established by his «
subjective aim» or purpose
of self - realization in all his relationships, is always the same: he is God.
The book Women's Ways
of Knowing identifies the following kinds
of knowledge: received,
subjective (in terms
of the inner voice and the quest for
self), procedural (reason as well as separate and connected knowing) and constructed.
This allows, in turn, the composition
of the
subjective aim
of the concrescing occasion at its own
self - actualization being determined finally by its own modification or shaping
of the various possibilities granted it through the aims at fulfillment for it
of all the actual occasions in its past (CNT 96).
If the inquiry be psychological, not religious institutions, but rather religious feelings and religious impulses must be its subject, and I must confine myself to those more developed
subjective phenomena recorded in literature produced by articulate and fully
self - conscious men, in works
of piety and autobiography.
This
subjective aim determines the tendency
of the becoming and blocks out for the event an ideal
of its own possible
self - existence as differentiated from others.
This experience may in some way be connected with an event
of revelation, and it may be necessary first to extract the distinctive Christian
self - consciousness, but that does not make it any the less
subjective.
The attempt to prove that there is a universe
of objects and forces independent
of my
subjective awareness will be
self - defeating because any evidential statement capable
of taking me beyond my Cartesian subjectivity will presuppose that the world exists.
The genius goes beyond the empirical and delves into the
self that is «necessary,» thus transforming his
subjective existence into one
of the highest objectivity.
It is oblivious
of the cosmic vision according to which human creativity is first
of all a property
of the universe and not simply our own
subjective self - expression.14
From a Buddhist perspective, I was clinging to my past
selves; as long as I was doing this, I could not be fully present in my current moment
of subjective experiencing or to the environment in which I was presently living.
On the other hand, prayer is also
subjective in that it is in the act
of prayer that the person most fully becomes a subject or a
self.
To claim, as process thinkers do, that the
self is the momentary
self in its
subjective immediacy goes not only contrary to the insights
of the inherited tradition and common sense but presents a serious philosophical problem.
There is the freedom
of conceptual innovation in which novel corrective and developmental forms
of definiteness emerge in the mental pole as potentiality for final causation, and there is autonomous
self - causation in which a mutually determined synthesis
of the physical pole and the mental pole modifies the initial ideal aim to become the
subjective aim, which is the final cause.