Sentences with phrase «of temporal things»

This is why Augustine's doctrine has at its foundation the distinction between the two loves, the love of God and the love of the world.10 There is indeed a delicate balance in his thought and he believes he has perceived the right use of temporal things; but he is perilously close to saying that to love God is to turn away from love for whatever is changeable.

This realism stems from what Christopher Lasch referred to as an awareness «that the contingent, provisional, and finite quality of temporal things finds its most vivid demonstration not just in the death of individuals but in the rise and fall of nations.»

Not exact matches

Yet all these things are well taken cared of for God Who is and will always be a God Who give justice to all and in everything, we will just eventually stop and realize that all the things we fought for and thought to be good for us are all passing, even this earthly life is but temporal, all that we are treasuring on earth are but temporal and passing, our health, our riches, our achievements, these are all useless in the next life.

Now, you are telling us that it's about the «proper order» of temporal, natural things here in this world (family, church) which, as far as you know, will cease when we get to heaven.

Ultimately, like a lot of things, intentionally remaining unjaded — even after witnessing multiple failures — shows that our faith isn't in temporal circumstances, but an unchanging God who promises that He is good, and He has the power to restore all things.

To that assessment this essay will contribute modestly by arguing (1) that an account of experience must be compatible with the fact that there is no one thing which is what experience is or is the essence of experience, (2) that no philosophically adequate account of what experience is can be established merely by appeal to direct, personal, intuitive experience of one's own experience, (3) that generalization from features found in human experience is not sufficient to justify the claim that temporality is essential to experience, but (4) that dialectical argument rather than intuition or generalization is necessary to support the claim that experience is essentially temporal.

God's freedom is temporal as well — that is, insofar as God relates himself freely to the things of the temporal world precisely in their individuality.

It is possible to believe in Jesus for eternal life (and of course, receive eternal life as a result), but still not be «saved» from many of the temporal and physical consequences of sin, or from sickness, or from enemies, or from many of the other negative things that can happen in life.

The world is ordered in many ways: by a temporal order, by causal connection, as located, in terms of quantity, with various qualities, the possibility of classification, by the relatedness of things.

If process is a whole with parts, the meaning of «process» as temporal extension can not be a growing together of parts into a whole, or the «concrescence of many potentials» (Process 22), because the «togetherness of things» in the occasion of experience (Adventures 234) is already established as the actual entity begins since «relationship is not a universal.

In the traditional view of God's eternity as timelessness, enormous difficulty is created in explaining how essentially temporal things like the world and the body can participate in God's timelessness without their ultimate destruction.

The reasons for the difficulty in answering what time is are several, including the paradoxes of being and non-being; the experiential and emotional weightiness of the subject (consider, for example, the temporal character of hope, despair, regret, satisfaction, and boredom); and the metaphysical centrality of time in understanding such things as substances, events, causation, and consciousness.

The First Things Junior Fellowship is certainly a place where your temporal tasks will be part of an integrated life of faith, thought, and work.

As Neville recognizes, his own view that God is «beyond the metaphysical categories illustrated in the temporal process» means that he «can not except by devious analogy be called individual, actual, knowledgeable, or a variety of other things Hartshorne attributes to God» (p. 61).

Thus a Platonist might be most impressed with the ravages of time, its continually nugatory effect to make all temporal things transient and thus only half real, existing only in a perpetual process of perishing.

By the time of her wedding, she came to realize that there is no such thing as an entirely original wedding ceremony: «marriage means stepping into an ancient institution marked by hundreds of temporal particulars,» so your wedding's dearth of originality is no shortcoming.

Examples of imaginable worlds that would be incompatible with process metaphysics are: a world in which the elementary units of nature were enduring substances, especially if they were inert and fully determined; a world in which space and other things existed independently of temporal processes; a world in which an absolute gap separated living and nonliving things, or sentient and insentient individuals, or else a world in which there were no sentient things whatsoever.

The second of these passages does not use the term «superjective nature,» but it can be joined with the first since it clearly says the same thing: God's satisfaction qualifies the temporal world.

For one thing, he takes that position to be committed to a temporal beginning of the world, a bringing the world into existence at some moment of time.

As I read Hartshorne, he maintains that «God is not spatially localized» (Schilpp, 545) and the meaning of this phrase is that God is everywhere — «God is not spatially separated from things» he has written (Schilpp, 545), and in a recent book he claims that deity, the universally immanent, is everywhere.5 Given this assumption Hartshorne is then able to say that since God, being everywhere, includes the regional standpoint of every temporal actual entity, he must intuit all occasions wherever they are as they occur» (Schilpp, 545).

Of course, if we are strictly Thomistic and hold that God determines every detail of the world, then we can simply think of a single act of will that handles the whole thing and does not require temporal successivenesOf course, if we are strictly Thomistic and hold that God determines every detail of the world, then we can simply think of a single act of will that handles the whole thing and does not require temporal successivenesof the world, then we can simply think of a single act of will that handles the whole thing and does not require temporal successivenesof a single act of will that handles the whole thing and does not require temporal successivenesof will that handles the whole thing and does not require temporal successiveness.

All measurement is not measurement of lengths on a straight line; there is a second most important measurement of intervals, independent of such measurement of lengths, the estimation of angles, or, what comes to the same thing, of ratios and arcs of circles to the whole circumference, In point of fact, it is by angular measurement that we habitually estimate temporal intervals, whenever we appeal to a watch or clock, and in the prehistoric past the first rough estimates of intervals within the natural day must presumably» have been made, independently of measurement of lengths, by this same method, with the sky for clock - face.

By secularization van Leeuwen did not mean secularism — the worship of worldly things — but rather the separation of religious and temporal spheres.

Created things, at least those that are part of this physical universe, have among themselves spatio - temporal relations; but God dwells in «the sublimity of an ever - present eternity», the «nunc stans» (the now that stands still) and knows and wills all things by a single atemporal act.

When we speak therefore of Creation, of God's purposes, of the times in which God reveals Himself, and when we speak of the end of all things, the coming of the Kingdom, we use temporal terms but we are not speaking of events to which a date can be assigned.

For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the essential unity which may be said to underlie all things is not a complete totality which we can grasp through reason (as it is with Hegel), but an open - ended, incomplete process or chaotic flux which finds expression in the contingent, finite, temporal process of growth and decay which are characteristic of nature.

Whitehead says,»... the initial stage of its -LRB-(an actual occasion's)-RRB- aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God..., he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self - causation starts.»

For all of their advance on Plato, these theologians failed to generalize their results because of an unfortunate presupposition: «The nature of God was exempted from all the metaphysical categories which applied to the individual things in the temporal world....

Such things as time, history and particularity are so necessary to identifying God — the God of Israel who is the one true God — that a systematic disregard of this temporal particularity on behalf of a supraparticular ultimate reality that only some call «God» would be impossible.

The word «history» tends to refer both to the scholarly discipline of describing things by reference to how they come to be and to the actual spatial and temporal process out of which things come to be.

And to be honest, we TRUELY religious people are cherry - pickers of bible because we only follow whatever good things and examples written on it that would strenghten us and improve our lives both in spiritual and temporal aspects.

His all - inclusive functioning is the basic ground of each and every occurrence; he is Alpha and Omega, both the origin — although not necessarily in the ordinary temporal sense — of all things and the goal towards which they move.

On the other hand, the world is the community of those who are occupied with temporal things.

In the faith of the church, the problem is not one of adjustment to the changing, relative, and temporal elements in civilization but rather one of constant adjustment, amid these changing things, to the eternal.

Yes, it is entirely true that this is the way things look in the world, the way they seem in the world, and the way they must seem within the deceptive horizon of the temporal order.

On the other hand, it is not the Christian idea that in the temporal end alone — on this planet where our little mortal lives are lived out — there will come the grand culmination of all things.

Eschatology in this sense does not have to do with the last things in a temporal sense but with ultimacy — with finality, not at the end of time and history, but with what is most real and most vital at all times in human existence.

We may need to repent of anxiety that has gripped us because we were worried about temporal things.

1.300 - 318) called monads, firsts, or «feeling qualities,» are omitted from the account of things found in physics and chemistry, except for the methodological point that we detect the presence of the various magnitudes and spatio - temporal structures by our qualitative human sense perceptions, visual or tactual.

Spatio - temporal - causal properties — the shapes, motions, bodily behavior and interactions of animals, plants, and other things — are not ignored.

So I do believe in a God beyond the metaphysical categories illustrated in temporal process; but such a God is indeed beyond the categories and can not except by devious analogy be called individual, actual, knowledgeable, or a variety of other things Hartshorne attributes to his God.

The two sets [«the things which are temporal» and «the things which are eternal»] are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential.

The notion of «subsistence» is transformed into that of «actual entity»; and the notion of «power» is transformed into the principle that the reasons for things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities — in the nature of God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and In the nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a particular environment.

The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential.

To designate it, we should need the old term «element,» in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio - temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.

Quite clearly, mediating «things which are temporal» and «things which are eternal» (40) is God's main role, and accounting for that mediation was probably the reason why Whitehead mentioned and conceptualized God the way he did at an earlier stage in the composition of Process and Reality.

Now there is much in Augustine about this tendency of the soul to turn toward preoccupation with temporal things, and much in condemnation of the body's lusts.

«O God, the protector of all who trust in You, have mercy on us that with You as our ruler and guide we may so pass through things temporal that we lose not the things eternal; through Jesus Christ, Your Son, our Lord, who lives and reigns with You and the Holy Spirit, one God, now and forever.»

When we are thinking of things seen, it is our occipital convolutions that are active; when of things heard, it is a certain portion of our temporal lobes; when of things to be spoken, it is one of our frontal convolutions.

The coin is a temporal thing that is given to Caesar in exchange for particular «blessings,» but the true blessing of life, of breath, of body, of soul, mind and spirit are from God and should be offered back to God.