Sentences with phrase «of the conscious experience of»

Not exact matches

In my personal experience as an entrepreneur, focusing on finding a unique benefit, setting goals and being conscious of my perspective have proved helpful.

What we will see though is a more conscious effort to bring disparate groups to the table to learn how to collaborate across screens, channels, and moments of truth to deliver ONE experience to customers wherever they are in the lifecycle.

This event will broaden your understanding and deepen your practical application of the principles of Conscious Capitalism with high potency keynotes, immersive experiences with local businesses, multiple tracks of hands on practicums and rich opportunities to connect with and learn from peers.

Both diversity and re-entry are necessary to account for the fundamental properties of conscious experience.»

What she really should have told Oprah: As an atheist I have far more appreciation and awe of the world and beauty around us, because I can understand the immeasurable number of years to bring us to this moment and the rare privilege of being a conscious being at this moment to experience it.

Honestly, the * last * thing I want to be doing when I'm experiencing what will be the last waking, conscious moments of life, is being worried that I didn't worship some imagined diety enough to buy me a ticket to some la - la land in the clouds.

Near - death studies are about the best we have and anecdotally I think that many people do report «conscious» experience whether that's due to anoxia or otherwise there is no substantial evidence suggesting the absence of «consciousness.»

Most of our conscious waking experiences are sunlit, and in some kind of relationship with objects and ideas.

Insofar as the experience of this self is unconscious, its immediacy and directness offer no exploitable advantage: one can hardly claim to be conscious of the essence of experience as exhibited immediately and directly in an experience of which one is not consciously aware.

Insofar as the experience of this self has been made conscious, it fails to provide the process thinker with the desired immediate and authoritative access to the essence of experience.

This contention is not defeated merely by a critic's facile claim not to be conscious of any such nonsensuous perception of one's own «self,» or of anything describable as experience mediating one's experiences of trees, dogs, and fire hydrants.

Compare with James's view, quoted above, the following passage of Charles Hartshorne: «If it be asked how the individual can be aware of this infinite range if his experience is finite, the answer is that it is only the distinct or fully conscious aspect of human experience which is finite; while the faint, slightly conscious background embraces all past time» (Beyond Humanism.

Just as there is a real difference between noticing something already within one's vision and bringing something new within one's visual experience, so there is a real difference between becoming conscious of something already within one's field of experience and introducing something new within the range of one's experience.

Even if the analogy were sound, i.e., even if there were such awareness of the self, the real effect of distinguishing unconscious and conscious awareness is not to preserve the authority of the experience of the self to which the process thinker is appealing, but instead to underscore the philosophical weakness of the appeal to such privileged and direct experience.

The result is basically a «convertive piety» with its call to self conscious conversion, the experience of the «new birth,» and a life of «holiness» that is demonstrably and empirically distinct from the rest of the world in its expression of «actual righteousness.»

I also believe that, in spite of Whitehead's reluctance to concede privileged status to human occasions of experience, the introduction of the wide range of conscious anticipation of the future which humanity represents in comparison to lesser types of existence also introduces justice as a characteristic of the specially human aim at harmonious beauty.

In conscious human experience this becomes a very significant factor, so much so that we hold a human person accountable for the consequences of his acts and do not do the same for microbes.

The objects of vision and hearing dominate our conscious experience, and these are not found within the body.

And it is conscious: that is, it does not stay below the threshold of consciousness and work there unknown to the soul (as, for instance, infant baptism is thought by some to do), but comes within the field of awareness where the man can «know» it as he knows any other fact of experience.

We can examine the results of both in conscious experience.

Introspectively, my position is verified by the shifting nature of conscious attention, with its structure of a central focal awareness surrounded by an horizon of indeterminate yet always accessible oblique experience, upon which the searchlight of attention may at any moment be turned.

One is never conscious of more than a tiny part of the whole of one's experience.

As the living person draws upon a wider bodily experience, so the conscious ego, if there should be one at a particular moment, draws upon a vast ocean of unconscious feeling which sustains it.

The role of spiritual experience and encounter was central; grace is not «hidden» in the recesses of the soul for Pentecostals, but is a dynamic movement of divine power that bursts into the conscious mind.

The within of things we experience as humans is richness of conscious experience.

A traumatic experience prolonged in unconscious memories may be brought up to conscious awareness and thus re-entertained without the shackle of the past.

Scattered widely throughout the history of mankind there have been «somewhat exceptional elements in our conscious experience... which may roughly be classed together as religious and moral intuitions.»

A decline of conscious attention, as in exhaustion, in which the figure - ground structure dissolves into a homogeneous field, illustrates that consciousness is derivative from a more complex experience, which I have located in the overwhelmingly nonconscious occasions in the «nonsocial» nexus.

Roger Sperry's work on the split brain led him to recognize the causal role of conscious experience.

Hinduism, like many religions are not supplanted with pointillistic «facts», that go very far from understanding the greater picture and gestalt of our conscious experience.

I suspect that of the six areas for integrity in mission, the one involving a conscious experience of the presence of God has been taught least in mainline Protestant congregations.

They had inculcated a deep sense of sin and a conscious need of personal salvation; they had overpassed national and racial lines and had made religious faith a matter of individual conviction; they had emphasized faith in immortality and the need of assurance concerning it; they had bound their devotees together in mystical societies of brethren fired with propagandist zeal; and they had accentuated the interior nature of religious experience in terms of an, indwelling Presence, through whom human life could be «deicized.»

An experiential base: i.e., regular and lively use of the means of grace (particularly meditative prayer) that issues in a conscious experience of the presence of God blessing, leading, and empowering the journey of faith.

Monasteries with their dedicated lives, Universities with their search for knowledge, Medicine, Law, methods of Trade — they represent that aim at civilization, whereby the conscious experience of mankind preserves for its use the sources of Harmony.

Clergy and laity will then experience themselves first of all as brothers of the same religious mind and conviction which all have acquired through many sacrifices in a personal decision and in conscious opposition to the mentality of their surroundings.

To learn from the pine tree or from the bamboo in a conscious way is to make effective a kind of «nonobjective knowing» that has been implicit in our experience throughout, and that is central to our true identity (p. 163).

The theory generalizes the repetition of the past that is evident in conscious, mnemonic occasions of human experience into a feature of all actual occasions, human or nonhuman.

At any given moment we are the «little birth and little death» that we are doing or undergoing, including as it does conscious and subconscious memories of the past and future.7 There is no separate person locked within the body to whom the experience belongs, no separate owner or possessor of the flow of experience.

8.1 assumed in IWTP that perception in the mode of CE is necessarily a conscious experience, and that assumption may be mistaken.

(3) Another justification for Whitehead's apparently gratuitous assumption that the experience of CE is accurate requires that the «experience» of CE not always be conscious.

Although «experience» and «feeling» are not necessarily conscious events in Whitehead's philosophy, the use of «private experiences,» «percept,» and especially the fact that the man reports his experience, all make it seem evident that the experiences and feelings mentioned in the above passage are conscious.

If such an eventuality actually took place, experience «would... include in an undivided present the entire past history of the conscious person, not as instantaneity, not like a cluster of simultaneous parts, but as something continually present which would also be something continually moving» (CM 152).

As Ross points out, «Whitehead's examples of causal efficacy in conscious experience are a light flash and the agent's claim that «the flash made me blink» (PR 175).

The personality which develops throughout these cycles of transition is not a substantial «self» but rather a dynamic «nexus» or «pattern» that continually incorporates experiences while gradually expanding its conscious awareness of, and response to, the relational factors which constitute it.

, where Brightman explicitly rejects Kant's approach as non-empirical, and then characterizes his own method, using James» phrase, as «radical empiricism» which «will assume no source of information about the real, other than the experience of conscious persons» (23).

For him, our experience as we experience it is not given in God's conscious experience, it is known indirectly by God, albeit perfectly (since God's reasoning can not fail), and God wants it that way; «When God intuits me, I am not a part of him, but he wills that I should be other than himself, yet known by him.

Just as we find the various conscious states of our experience enter into the constitution of one another, so the units of becoming must be related in this way.

Indeed, finally, for Whiteheadians, the events that make up nature are all occurrences of experience, albeit most of them are not conscious.

Although Sherburne is not entirely consistent he seems to identify the experience of the dominant occasion as exclusively focused, conscious experience.

Phenomenology, at least in its first practitioners and its early stages, was conceived as a conscious rejection of subjectivism and an attempt to recover, without abandoning inwardness, the experienced reality of external things and of the self as well.