conducting an investigation and handling governmental and regulatory issues arising from an offshore
oil well blowout.
It might be
an oil well blowout, it might be an emerging disease, and you don't want to get up to speed then.
«Whether it's
an oil well blowout or an emerging disease, you don't want to get up to speed then,» said Holt.
Not exact matches
On this year's list, robots are going places no human has ever been, «big data» is doing things that weathermen have never been able to master, carbon is being captured from waste and turned into fuel simultaneously, fiber optic cables are searching for
oil, and future
well blowouts are being averted (maybe).
PET scanners and undersea
oil -
well blowout preventers are still pretty different, for example.
Never again, they vowed, would the planet be forced to sit by, powerless, while
oil execs confessed — after the fact — that stopping a leak at such depths is like performing «open - heart surgery at 5,000 feet in the dark,» as BP America's chairman and president, Lamar McKay, told ABC News about the early attempt to plug the
well by triggering the failed
blowout preventer.
On September 30, the U.S. Department of the Interior issued new rules (pdf) meant to upgrade safety equipment and tighten
well control as
well as force
oil companies to show regulators detailed plans of how they will manage risks and prevent
blowouts at offshore
oil and gas sites.
One year after the
blowout at the Macondo
oil well in the Gulf of Mexico and subsequent burning and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon
oil rig, what has been learned?
If the team's estimate is correct, and the flow has been more or less consistent, approximately 1.3 million to 1.5 million barrels, or 53.6 million to 64.3 million gallons, of
oil have emerged from the
well since the April 20
blowout.
Even when BP began pumping
oil and gas through a line from the
blowout preventer to the Q4000
well - servicing ship — at Garwin's suggestion — the flow of
oil into the sea remained undiminished.
Once the cap was in place, BP prepared to conduct a «
well integrity test» — essentially, shutting off the flow of
oil and checking pressure readings to see if a subsurface
blowout would develop.
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The
blowout of BP's Macondo
well didn't just spew some 5 million barrels of
oil into the Gulf of Mexico last year.
In 2000, the US Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) published a report warning that there were several difficulties connected with deep - water
well control, that experience in this area was «limited» and with many rigs having very high
oil production rates, a
blowout could be «a potential show - stopper» for deep - water drilling in general.
Add a host of unknowns — like possible faulty cement jobs in the pipes, which was the cause of the Deepwater Horizon
blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, or hitting an abandoned gas and
oil well — and the potential for danger expands exponentially.
The natural seeps, found in many parts of the Gulf of Mexico, are tiny compared to an
oil -
well blowout.
The safety valves that failed to stanch the
oil leak after the
blowout at BP's Deepwater Horizon
well are used everywhere.
The new prize — dubbed the Wendy Schmidt Ocean Health X PRIZE in honor of its funder, who previously funded the successful
oil spill cleanup prize that offered solutions to disasters like Exxon Valdez or BP's Macondo
blowout in the Gulf — offers $ 1 million to the team that invents the most accurate sensors as
well as another $ 1 million to the team that devises the most affordable and easy - to - use sensors.
On April 20, 2010, a
blowout at the Macondo
oil well in the Gulf of Mexico sank the Deepwater Horizon
oil rig, operated by BP.
News reports on the 1979
blowout of an undersea
oil well off the Gulf of Mexico seem all too familiar today.
Ixtoc I, an
oil well owned by Pemex, Mexico's state - owned
oil company, suffered a
blowout and spewed an estimated 30,000 barrels of
oil per day into the Gulf for nearly 10 months.
Nancy Rabalais, a marine scientist who has spent much of her career probing environmental risks to the coasts and waters of the Gulf of Mexico, sent me some cautionary thoughts on cleanup options based on decades of work, including field studies following the 1979
blowout of the Ixtoc I
oil well in the western Gulf.
Federal oceanographers have released their second report assessing how much of the
oil that gushed from the Gulf of Mexico seabed since the
blowout of the BP
well may have dispersed in ocean depths rather than rising to the surface.
One could
well be the way it chose the basic design of the
well — not just the infamous failed
blowout preventer on the top, but the entire system from the seabed to the
oil source deep below.
It should come as no surprise that experts in avoiding and stopping
blowouts of
oil and gas
wells long ago saw the deep - ocean drilling frontier as particularly dangerous terrain.
blowout - preventer bop34 bp234 congress deepwater - horizon gulf - of - mexico halliburton interior - department macondo -
well oil - leak
oil - spill
(Related: «A Dream Dashed by the Rush on Gas») And at least two serious documented incidents — an EOG Resources
well blowout in a central Pennsylvania forest this summer and alleged faulty
well construction by Cabot
Oil & Gas that the state says allowed natural gas to migrate into home drinking water — have helped feed a backlash.
Although the exact cause of the
blowout remains unclear, activists have used the spill to bolster their argument that the risks of offshore
oil exploration outweigh its benefits, and that the United States would be
better off focused on promoting alternative energy sources.
Even though modern
oil wells contain
blowout preventers that are designed to reduce the risk of a
blowout, these types of accidents still occur.