The question becomes more pressing when we note that much of the best work
on classical theism and Trinitarianism of the last thirty years has been done by Roman Catholic theologians.
Not exact matches
Even in
classical theism, the question of whether God is «above the law» is deeply complex and quite possibly aporetic, since if God has a nature, it seems to follow that God is dependent
on that nature.
As it happens, the Times Literary Supplement gave the book to the philosopher Anthony Kenny to review, perhaps because he could never be accused of any parti pris in this debate, since he has in the past leveled his own severe criticisms against
classical Christian
theism for relying
on an «outdated Aristotelian cosmology.»
In other words, we shall attempt to show that if one desires to pick between process
theism and a coherent form of
classical theism, one must do so
on grounds other than the alleged adequacy or inadequacy of their respective views
on divine omnipotence.
Classical theism,
on the other hand, accepts that only one of any pair of such metaphysical contraries applies to God, and it thereby, in violation of the principle of dual transcendence, produces a monopolar conception of God.
The opposition between black theology and
classical theism,
on the one hand, and the opposition between neoclassical
theism and
classical theism,
on the other, tell us little about the status of black theology in respect to neoclassical
theism.
I am encouraged by his acceptance of a substantial part of my criticism of
classical theism as found in Aquinas; however, he sides with Aquinas and against me
on some issues.
Process theologians can share with other critics in pointing out that
classical theism developed its doctrines
on assumptions derived from Greek rather that biblical thought.
However, those who follow Hartshorne in much of his critique of
classical theism often part ways with him
on the World - Soul analogy.
On its own terms,
classical theism is hardly coercive.
In any event, The Mystery of Existence is not about the clash between
classical and modern / personal forms of
theism («theistic personalism»), a distinction that is anyway not directly
on point in explicating Nothing (our limited mission again), since in either case,
classical or modern / personal, God can be in some sense necessary.
Thus it is not accidental that
classical theism insists
on a concept of God with no real relation to the world, even when this is interpreted as an affirmation of divine transcendence.
She critiques
classical theism for modeling divine being
on the root metaphor of motion derived from the non-personal physical world.
Consequently, I hold that if one is to continue to affirm with the Christian tradition that faith in God is both indispensable and reasonable, it is incumbent
on him to show that such faith may be explicated in other terms than those of
classical Christian
theism.
We may speak by analogy with Hartshorne's «neoclassical
theism» of Whitehead's neoclassical empiricism» precisely because it is a self - conscious revision of the
classical tradition
on the one hand and can be seen to consist in an analysis of the formally possible doctrines regarding the character and content of experience
on the other.
(See the Problem of Evil in Process
Theism and
Classical Free - Will
Theism by William Hasker; Traditional Free Will Theodicy and Process Theodicy: Hasker's Claim for Parity; «Bitten to Death by Ducks»: A Reply to Griffin;
On Hasker's Defense of his Parity Claim by David Ray Griffin (see www.religion-online.org.)
My contention, however, is that attempts such as Farrer's and Morris's to take up a third position between
classical theism,
on the one hand, and neoclassical
theism,
on the other, quite fail to carry conviction.
As Hasker emphasizes, his free will version of traditional
theism differs from the
classical version, held by Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin, precisely
on this point — that this
classical version held that all of our feelings, thoughts, and actions are in reality wholly determined by God, so that we have freedom only in a compatibilist sense — or, otherwise stated, that our feeling of freedom is an illusion.
Now I come close to the theme of this article: one writer, and I have found no other, in the early Middle Ages attacked
classical theism head -
on precisely
on its two most vulnerable points — its affirmation of, or failure definitely to reject, unqualified theological determinism, and its commitment to endless posthumous careers for human persons, making them in that respect rivals to God.