Sentences with phrase «ordinary common sense in»

Carter relies on ordinary common sense in a town full of extraordinary but not always sensible minds.

If the market persists in behaving foolishly, all he seems to need is ordinary common sense in order to exploit its foolishness» Benjamin Graham

Not exact matches

[7] «God» is not in the ordinary sense either a common or a proper name.

«When the plain sense of scripture makes common sense, seek no other sense; therefore, take every word at its primary, ordinary, usual, literal meaning unless the facts of the immediate context, studied in the light of related passages and axiomatic and fundamental truths indicate clearly otherwise» (Dr. David L. Cooper)

These forces are the stuff of everyday life: rates of birth higher for Mexicans and Mexican - Americans than for most other ethnic groups; a chain of entirely legal immigration, as Mexican - Americans bestow residency and citizenship on their spouses, children and parents; and a practice of illegal immigration that is, in the vast majority of instances, born from ordinary people exercising common sense.

It «is no mere extension of ordinary language,» but by its specialized function in a subordinate role intends to be «illuminative of common - sense assertions as a whole.»

We must frankly confess, then, using our empirical common sense and ordinary practical prejudices, that in the world that actually is, the virtues of sympathy, charity, and non-resistance may be, and often have been, manifested in excess.

x) Orthodox (Advaita) Vedanta realizes that substantial pluralism is at best less true than substantial monism; but it fails, in my opinion, to see that the radical pluralism of actual entities and the radical monism of God or Nirvana (however one distinguishes these) are the two poles of the real problem, not the ordinary substantial pluralism of common sense, a compromise which bars the path to the highest ethical and spiritual insight.

I am prepared to admit the ordinary beliefs of common sense, in practice if not in theory.

These may all seem common sense to SLAW readers, but it does not hurt to revisit and reinforce that the warning bells which apply to us in our ordinary lives need to be front of mind even more when dealing with the interests of clients.

The landmark decision in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 WLR 896, signalled the simplicity of the test that in matters of construction the courts were concerned to ascertain the «meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person» (ie an objective test) by applying «the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life».

Conversely, another court (in the same circuit, no less) reasoned that «the plain, ordinary meaning» of the words was sufficient in taking a «common sense» approach to defining the concept.

It was argued on behalf of the landlords that the salvage principle was not restricted to sums falling due only after the date of the administrator's appointment and that the principle required that as a matter of common sense and ordinary justice, the landlords receive payment of the disputed rent and other sums due, in full, for the period in which the administrator occupied the premises for the purposes of the administration.

Between late 1996 and early 2007, Canadian tort jurisprudence formally had, at least based on an (ahem) «common sense», grammatical, ordinary, plain etc. etc. reading of Athey, an alternative method for establish factual causation (cause - in - fact) on the balance of probability.

Causation need not be determined by scientific precision; as Lord Salmon stated in Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475, at p. 490, and as was quoted by Sopinka J. at p. 328, it is «essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense».

Many modern Canadian lawyers and judges are likely more familiar with Sopinka J.'s admonition in Snell v. Farrell against «abstract metaphysical theory» — the claim that causation is «essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than abstract metaphysical theory.»