Not exact matches
A
court might specify that a Charter - compliant scheme would include limiting features such as: (1) approximately 30 - day time limits on separation,
within which the prison can decide whether and how to arrange a transfer, dispute resolution, enhanced supervision protocols, medical treatment or other technique to facilitate return to the
ordinary prison community; (2) a requirement that the prison obtain a
court order for any separation that extends beyond the prescribed time limit; and (3) an independent, external authority to review placement decisions, conduct regular inspections of segregation units, and ensure the provision of
ordinary programming and health care to segregated prisoners.
The
court found that the physical configurations used by Nintendo met the requirements of the act for TPMs as they fall
within the definition of «any effective technology, device or component that, in the
ordinary course of its operation, (a) controls access to a work...»
In granting permission to serve out of the jurisdiction the
court was exercising an exorbitant jurisdiction over those who were not
within its
ordinary reach.
As the
court of appeal commented, defining the parameters of promissory estoppel was a matter
within the purview of the
ordinary courts and outside that of labour arbitrators.
The appellate
court explained that to recover compensation in a premises liability claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known about the danger and that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the danger, in spite of his
ordinary care, due to actions or conditions
within the owner's control.
Constructive Knowledge This can be a little more complicated, as constructive knowledge is inferred by the
court if Landowner puts forth no evidence of a «reasonable» inspection procedure to comply with its statutory duty quoted above) and (2) that, despite the exercise of
ordinary care, Plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard due to actions or conditions
within the Landowner's control.
The
court must construe the plain and
ordinary language
within the meaning of the contract as a whole; and