The German parliament agreed a four - month extension to Greece's financial aid package on Friday (27 January), a move that still needs ratification from
other eurozone members owed money by Greece.
The other Eurozone countries will obviously be on the hook.
If nations are not responsible, it is not the responsibility of
the other Eurozone nations to subsidize them.
Channel 4 News Political Editor Gary Gibbon writes - We now have a draft statement from the French and the Germans which is about to be put to
the other Eurozone countries.
The Greek government tried something similar last summer but ended up effectively accepting the original deal anyway, having recognized
that other Eurozone countries would budge no further.
Unit labour costs in Spain are unsurprisingly well above those of
other Eurozone members.
In terms of public debt one should not forget that Spain's situation is not significantly worse than that of
other Eurozone members (69.3 per cent of public debt to GDP in 2011 in Spain, vs. 82 per cent in Germany, 86.5 per cent in France, 85.7 per cent in the UK, and 120.9 per cent in Italy).
It is the neoliberal stance now demanding austerity for Greece, Ireland, Italy and
other Eurozone economies.
The idea is that deposit flight from Greek banks means that Greek citizens move their money abroad, where it is safe from Grexit, while Greek banks become more and more funded by
the other eurozone central banks, leaving those banks to be the losers if Greece leaves the euro.
The process of this deal wasn't dissimilar to the bailout programmes that have already passed —
the other eurozone governments were a little less sympathetic, partly due to public pressure, and the Greek government was more radical than ever.
Not exact matches
That leaves the U.S. Federal Reserve the best part of a year to widen the gap between U.S. and
Eurozone interest rates still further, a trend that will make the dollar more attractive vis - a-vis the euro (all
other things being equal).
The
Eurozone's economy slipped in the third quarter as the slowdown in China and
other emerging markets more than offset the benefit to consumers from low oil prices.
Some of that is for good reason — the
eurozone's recovery is still extremely modest, China's growth is slowing (along with most
other emerging markets) and investors are uncertain over the ability of the halfway - recovered US and UK economies to sustain higher central bank interest rates.
The leftist leader Alex Tsipras, on the
other hand, had threatened to tear up the bailout agreement (though he had always promised not to leave the
Eurozone).
Coupled with
other bumps on the road (think the
eurozone crisis and slow global growth) the overall effect, he added, «has been economic growth around 2 percent, and only a very gradual improvement in labor markets.»
Since then, savings accumulation shifted from Asia to
other regions — notably Germany and the
eurozone, partly in response to the sovereign crisis.
It was almost exactly a year ago that the E.C.B. set
eurozone precedent by buying government bonds and
other assets.
More importantly, beyond the implications of today's headlines, there are
other reasons to consider raising exposures to the
eurozone, and to Germany, today.
However,
other countries already have complained that voting control remains dominated by the major promoters of arbitrage speculation — the United States, Britain and the
eurozone.
Other recent key U.S. dollar drivers include momentum chasing and a flattening U.S. yield curve not replicated in the
eurozone and Japan.
Some of the things to check out in this section include a comparison of the EU and the
Eurozone, the meaning of EURIBOR, the history of banknotes and many
other topics.
In our view, any decision on monetary policy normalization will have to take into account some of what is happening outside of America's borders, including the hazy economic outlook for China, the slowdown in
other large emerging markets and the uncertainties that continue to plague the
eurozone.
Overall, some
other measures suggest a general improvement in the
eurozone's economic prospects.
Martin Feldstein, a long - time euro skeptic, in this month's Foreign Affairs magazine made the point this way: «During the past year, Germany had a trade surplus of nearly $ 200 billion, whereas the
other members of the
eurozone had trade deficits totaling $ 200 billion.
After all changes in the price of gold, whether due to changes in the «
Eurozone debt crisis premium» or any
other factor, are still changes in price and so impact our gold positions.
Other sources in the
Eurozone warned that the funding gap is still much larger than Greece has suggested.
Admittedly, there has been a visible flight from erstwhile «risk - free» assets in
other areas (such as the
Eurozone) to AAA - rated Commonwealth bonds (see charts below).
Elsewhere, we favor selected
eurozone peripheral debt over
other sovereigns, due to higher yields and European Central Bank (ECB) support.
Against that background, one might justifiably ask whether it makes sense to have one economy (the United States) in a tightening monetary policy cycle, while the
other (
eurozone) presses on with its more accommodative easing program.
Other evidence included a European Commission survey of economic sentiment among
eurozone businesses and consumers, which climbed to its highest level since 2000, and a measure of French business confidence, which registered a 10 - year high.
The
eurozone has undergone a loosening of the traditionally positive correlation between growth and inflation also seen in many
other parts of the global economy.
The potential for a Greek exit also raises a broader question regarding the perceived irreversibility of the monetary union undertaken by the
other 18 members of the
eurozone.
CORPORATE FINANCING NEWS: FOREIGN EXCHANGE By Gordon Platt The euro slumped to a four - month low in the aftermath of the bailout of Cyprus, as market participants worried about the implications for
other countries on the periphery of the
eurozone.
On top of the existing internal problems of «lowflation,» shorthand for ultra-low inflation, weak demand and anemic credit growth, the deterioration in the external backdrop over much of 2014 — rising geopolitical tensions with Russia, and the slowdown of the Chinese economy and many
other emerging markets — has made a rapid return to meaningful growth across the
eurozone unlikely, in our view, despite some positive signs, including the stabilization of many peripheral economies and the boost in competitiveness from the weaker euro.
A key sign: Prices for government bonds of
other heavily indebted
eurozone countries — such as Spain and Italy — are not suffering in sync with Greek bonds, as they did before.
Other major economies, particularly the
eurozone, are decelerating a bit, and that's raising concerns that those economies may be falling back into a recession.
It could cause the euro to rise in value against
other currencies, potentially hurting exporters, and it could bring higher returns on savings as well as stiffer borrowing costs for indebted governments in the 19 - country
eurozone.
Other risks on the list include a sharp slowdown in the Chinese economy, a fracture of the
Eurozone and Britain's possible departure from the European Union.
Not long after the war, West Germans — and
others — began to speak of the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle, that laid the foundations for Germany's unchallenged preeminence in the
Eurozone today.
However, the EU's determination to stabilise the
Eurozone as the Greek debt crisis deepened in 2011 with the treaty - based «Fiscal Compact» caused an early rift, not only with Merkel and
other EU leaders but also with his Liberal Democrat coalition partners.
That includes proposals for a banking union — in
other words, a union that stands behind the stability of
eurozone banks and their deposits in return for common financial supervision.
Northern economies have to accept that they need to provide the necessary resources to help
others in the
Eurozone reform their economies and prosper.
The solution in the
eurozone doesn't have to be a full - blown United States of the Eurozone but if it is to be successful it is likely to include most of the mechanisms that make other currencies work in countries such as the UK and
eurozone doesn't have to be a full - blown United States of the
Eurozone but if it is to be successful it is likely to include most of the mechanisms that make other currencies work in countries such as the UK and
Eurozone but if it is to be successful it is likely to include most of the mechanisms that make
other currencies work in countries such as the UK and the US:
The governance of the
Eurozone will need to concentrate on helping individual member states better internalise their obligations to
other states rather than on creating ever more coercive enforcement mechanisms.
The «optimal currency area» argument should have some traction; but so too will arguments which conclude that the near - collapse of the
Eurozone from 2009 onwards occurred, among
other reasons, because some
Eurozone members were fiscally undisciplined.
The prime minister's comments came after an informal summit of EU leaders over dinner failed to reach concrete conclusions on how to address concerns about Greece's future and high borrowing rates for
other struggling
eurozone countries.
It has now been agreed that when the European Banking Authority votes on banking union matters a double vote will take place: one for
eurozone countries and a separate vote, requiring a simple majority for approval, among the EU's ten
other member states.
That would be an even more dramatic and unprecedented event and there is no reason why Greece would want to do that (on a formal level, neither leaving the
Eurozone nor the EU can legally be forced on a country, what
other members or institutions like the ECB can do is be so uncooperative and make it so costly that the Greeks find themselves forced to take steps that effectively put them out).
Certainly the attitude of the UK government has not helped; on one hand urging the
eurozone to accept the «remorseless logic» of greater economic and fiscal integration, including Germany taking on liabilities for weaker
eurozone states via debt pooling, while on the
other refusing to take part in such measures itself and zealously looking after its own self interest.
David Cameron is in Chicago ahead of this weekend's NATO summit, busy meeting Francois Hollande and
other world leaders to jolly well sort out the
eurozone.