Sentences with phrase «own free act»

My evidence here is purely anecdotal, but I suspect that people generally value being handed the opportunity to engage in small, reasonably pain - free acts of kindness or generosity.

The FREE Act also makes fraud alerts longer and prevents the credit - reporting agencies from selling the data in your files while they are in effect.

That's why I partnered with Sen. Brian Schatz (D - Hawaii) and 11 other colleagues to introduce the Freedom from Equifax Exploitation Act, or FREE Act.

According to the New York Times, «Known as the Freelance Isn't Free Act, the measure requires anyone hiring a freelance worker to agree in writing to a timetable and procedure for payment, and increases the potential awards to freelancers bringing legal complaints against those who have failed to pay them promptly.»

The free act is not wholly describable antecedently, in view of its conditions, nor consequently, as the inevitable outcome of its conditions.

In this sense it is like the act of creation - it is a free act prompted only by love.

The description of a fixed universe is the first and indispensable step of every free act.

Since free acts all occur in individual «heres and nows» matter prevents history from being reduced to adetermined series of events and, without denying causality, leaves room for freedom.

Faithful to it, Vatican I recognised that faith involves a free act which can not «be produced necessarily by arguments of human reason» (DS 3035, 3010); hence the Council added to those external signs the «internal helps of the Holy Spirit» so that the former might be «most certain signs of divine revelation adapted to every intelligence» (DS 3009f, 3033f); as a result faith relies on «a most firm foundation» and «none can ever have a justreason for changing or doubting that same faith» (DS 3014, 3036; 2119 - 2121).

Those are tacked on extrinsically through the free act of the agent.

Faithful to it, Vatican I recognised that faith involves a free act which can not «be produced necessarily by arguments of human reason» (DS 3035, 3010); hence the Council added to those external signs the «internal helps of the Holy Spirit» so that the former might be «most certain signs of divine revelation adapted to every intelligence» (DS 3009f, 3033f); as a result faith relies on «a most firm foundation» and «none can ever have a just reason for changing or doubting that same faith» (DS 3014, 3036; 2119 - 2121).

Hence the Catholic doctrine of justification does not profess a semi-Pelagian synergism according to which salvation would be divided up into God's gracious act and the independent free act of man.

It has to struggle to combine creation by a free act of will with the absence of alternative possibilities for God, and to combine the contingency of the world with the necessity of God's act of creation and with the necessity of God's knowledge of that world.

Creation ex nihilo by a free act of will.

But unless the free act of liberation moves rapidly toward an act of institution or constitution, an act not of throwing off the past but of establishing the future, then even the liberation itself turns into its opposite.

Her «Be it done to me according to your word» was a perfectly free act, and yet a perfectly predictable one.

It can mean what it says by «free act of will,» by «contingency,» by «knowledge,» and so on.

The god of the philosophers sustains the orderliness of the world, but does not give it being in a free act of love, and thus is not personal.

The «Claim» upon God So, does this not undermine the free act of Revelation?

Over against such a view, the biblical perspective stresses the contingency of natural order, as it is dependent on the free act of creation.

Since humanity is the pinnacle of the creative and free act of Almighty God, Christ is the primordial figure in the entire creation.

What Barth is saying is that the transcendent reveals its true power in the free act of humble accommodation to worldly reality.

Man's social character, for instance, relates necessarily to the possibility of truly free acts, but space forbids introducing it here.

John M. Stewart also misinterprets Bergson in regarding the free act as motiveless: A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1911), P. 247.

Since all future movement is theoretically determined, the free act is at best an illusion.

«Two things only are necessary: (1) a gradual accumulation of energy; (2) an elastic canalization of this energy in variable and indeterminate directions, at the end of which are free acts» (CE 278; TSMR 255).

The author reconstructs and explains the necessary conditions of individual free acts treated by Henri Bergson.

Our objective is to reconstruct and explain the necessary conditions of individual free acts treated by Bergson, particularly in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution.

Unsoeld is more correctly in line for saying that in the free act the agent would be responding to the thrust of his true inner self.

As a result, the possibility of a free act by a material being is precluded.

F. Organized Matter Bergson maintains, as should be clear at this point, that matter in general must be of a certain form for free acts to be possible.

For free acts to occur matter and spirit must exhibit certain forms.

As such a horizon God is always encountered in the free act and is present in it.

Again Maritain is one of these writers, maintaining that Bergson has eliminated efficient causality from the free act (BPT 260).

But if a man believes in the omnipotent, omniscient and loving God his life will be destiny in an even deeper sense: for it is wholly borne by the power of God without which nothing, not even man's own free act, can exist; his life as a whole and in all its details is always lived before the omniscient God of love.

Every free act of one person changes the objective possibilities of the free act of his neighbour, it enlarges, changes or limits the sphere of the other's freedom before this latter can freely intervene.

But all this is even today the free act of the individual, for which he must be trained and formed, to which he may not, indeed can not, be compelled.

Certainly, the free act is always also concerned with a finite object which one considers, which one desires, realizes, loves or rejects, destroys, hates and so forth.

Nor is this fundamental act only the moral quality of the final free act before death.

Though every individual free act risks total self - commitment, it always surrenders itself into the whole of the one free act of the one finite human life, because every such act is performed within the horizon of existence whence it receives its weight and proportion.

It is theological by its very nature, since in every free act God is present, though not explicitly grasped, as its fundamental impulse and final goal.

In every free act God is experienced non-explicitly, but truly; and what is meant by God is only experienced in this way, namely the Whither (incomprehensible by knowledge and will) of the one original transcendence of man, which consists in knowledge and love.

Even if God is not known or not expressly visualized in the free act: wherever freedom is really exercised, this happens in silently stretching beyond all individual data into the ineffable, quiet, incomprehensible infinity of the primeval unity of all thinkable reality, in an anticipation of God.

This radical mystery of freedom continues in the free act of the subject as such.

True, the free act by which God's self - communication is accepted is itself the gift of God and can only be realized as grace.

Of course, the one free act of man in which he realizes himself once and for all is dispersed in space and time in his many free actions, in which the one fundamental decision of the one man is enacted.

Freedom would only be the indifferent freedom to this or that, the infinite repetition of the same or the contrary (which is only a species of the same), a freedom of the eternal return of the same Ahasverus, if it were not of necessity the final freedom of the subject to itself that is freedom to God, though this truest «object» of freedom might not be conscious in the individual free act.

Only too easily will the free act appear to them as the origin indifferent in itself of an objective state which might have originated in principle just as well without freedom and must be valued only for what it is.

Freedom is not meant to pass the time but to gain eternity, because God is made present through the Yes of freedom, regard - less of whether this free act knows it or not.

Therefore faith, «precisely because it is a free act, also demands social responsibility for what one believes.»