Sentences with phrase «particular objects in»

These data, if of significance, wouldn't immediately effect values for distances of particular objects in the Milky Way or beyond.

The divisions between these various classes are not well defined, and these terms may well overemphasize the similarities with particular objects in the solar system.

There are harder trophies including the Scaring on Schedule silver trophy for completing the time trial mode in less than 90 minutes and the A Glitchy World gold trophy for activating all of the secret glitched objects which consist of tapping on a particular object in order for it to grow and spin as it is continually tapped to intentionally make the entire screen glitch.

What if a painting didn't have to have any particular object in it?

Not exact matches

When designing products for your line, keep in mind that a product isn't just a physical object made of such - and - such material, weighing so many pounds, and having particular dimensions and colors.

In other words, voters objected to this particular amendment, not the concept generally.

You may object to one or more particular consequences of evolution because they defy the antiquated fairytale you choose to believe in.

By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence and in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced.

There emerges reflection or self - consciousness.23 Reflection is «the power acquired by consciousness to turn in upon itself, to take possession of itself as of an object endowed with its own particular consistence and value: no longer merely to know, but to know oneself; no longer merely to know, but to know that one knows.»

For him, objects have lost their surface multiplicity: in each of them, according to the measure of its own particular qualities and possibilities, God may truly be laid hold on.

If some certain eternal object were actualized [for a particular actual entity], then all other eternal objects would be relevant in some way or other [to that entity]» (IMW 274).

We think not only of objects as self - contained in particular regions of space and related to one another only externally, but we think of human selves that way, too.

Because such enduring objects are more tied to the body, they are more dominated by particular forms of definiteness in their successive satisfactions than the final percipient route, whose sole value to the body, as we pointed out above, is its vivid originality.

Like the Leibnizian monad, the occasion is individuated by its individual essence, its particular perspective; but unlike the Leibnizian monad this essence is not predicated of the occasion as a substantial substratum, but enters into the inner constitution of the occasion as «a vector transmission of emotional feeling» or, in the language of physics, «the transmission of a form of energy» from past occasions via the eternal objects that communicate the emotional form and make possible the subsequent reenactment by the prehending occasion (PR 315 / 479f.).

For example, a simple eternal object, say a «particular shade of green,» can be incorporated in «another eternal object of the lowest complex grade,» say «three definite colors with the spatio - temporal relatedness to each other of three faces of a regular tetrahedron, anywhere at any time» (SMW 166).

Over and above the «special relevance» which selected eternal objects may have in relation to particular, finite actual entities, it is necessary that there be a kind of «relevance in general,» a real togetherness of all eternal objects amongst themselves, effected by an eternal, infinite actuality: «Transcendent decision includes God's decision.

To make an object lesson, one nation in particular is on notice that it is listed as first for destruction.

Instead of eternal objects as «pure possibilities,» what we really need are what are often called «real possibilities,» possibilities so rooted in that particular situation as to be actualizable.

Once launched in a particular direction, participant observers seek occasions that present an object of inquiry and try to uncover the object's function and meaning.

Others, open to the suggestion that some interrelation between discourses is permissible, will object to intruding these particular notions into current theological thinking on the grounds that they are not significant or even legitimate notions in the biological sciences themselves.

They object in particular to the SBC's purported habit of targeting specific groups for conversion.

If one still wanted to know about the knower and the knower's experience, this could be treated in a secondary way as a particular form of the body or a relation of the body to external objects.

Because of God's transcendence it would be mythological to refer to God's action in terms appropriate only to objects available, in principle at least, to ordinary sense perception.13 This especially means that one can not speak of God in terms of the categories of time and space; 14 i.e., whatever is predicated of God can not apply only to some particular time and space, but must apply equally to all times and spaces.15 Thus the implication of Ogden's criterion for non-mythological language about God corresponds to his statement of several years ago, that «there is not the slightest evidence that God has acted in Christ in any way different from the way in which he primordially acts in every other event.

The various particular occasions of the past are in existence, and are severally functioning as objects for prehension....

Relational origination is a holistic process in which there is neither absolutism covering the total metaphysical sphere of existence nor focus on any particular thing or object.

In particular, they may be interrelated indirectly by means of their conceptual feelings of one and the same eternal object.

But in the eighth Category of Explanation we are told that the objectification of one actuality in another is the particular mode in which the potentiality (or capacity) of the former is realized (or exercised) in the latter, and in the seventh Category of Explanation we are told that the ingression of an eternal object into an actuality is the particular mode in which the potentiality (or capacity) of the eternal object is realized (or exercised) in the actuality (PR 34).

As ingressed in a particular actuality, a particular eternal object is just another instance of itself.

But the basic lure of the text is to a faith - response in relation to a particular object, not to any particular conceptualization of that object.

The objects of sense - experience, and in particular those of visual experience, are often passive and bounded in particular regions of space to the exclusion of other regions.

He posits essences characterized in terms mostly the same as Whitehead's eternal objects, but the «pure being» which they possess is not dependant on any home they may find in particular existences.

For example, it is a general or pure possibility that I might win the 100 - meter dash in the next Olympic Games, but this is not a real possibility given my creaky joints, advancing years, etc. «Real potentiality» refers to those possibilities for the ingression of eternal objects which still remain after one strikes from consideration the impossibilities which the conditions of a given, factual world eliminate from the horizon of any particular actual entity or set of actual entities arising out of that world.

We should emphasize the unity of God and see the «natures» as abstractions, descriptions from particular viewpoints of how God as a whole functions in relation to the world and to the eternal objects.

Moreover, Santayana would agree with Whitehead's statement that» [an] eternal object is always a potentiality actual entities; but in itself... it is neutral as to the facts of its... ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world» (PR 44).

The subjective form in a particular actual entity, he tells us, unlike the abstract eternal object, is an «element in the private definiteness of that actuality» (PR 444), and the subjective form can not be torn apart from its particular subject without becoming a mere universal (PR 354, 356).

For Whitehead evidently supposes that it is the value which God apprehends an eternal object as possessing, or its suitability for ingression in a particular context, which makes it a lure for action.

Thus, God's grading of the eternal objects solely in terms of their relevance for one another provides general potentiality, while relevance for particular occasions constitutes real potentiality.

Cf. D. Emmet: «But the doctrine of the objective immortality of actual entities... in the constitution of other actual entities is, as Miss Stebbing points out, a departure from the earlier view of events as particular and transient, and objects alone as able to «be again».

For Whitehead, God is an «eternal object,» but an infinite one: «therefore He is not merely one lure eliciting one particular process but the infinite lure towards which all process directs itself» (IN 169; cf. SCT par 40, 41).

It is evident from these experiments that pigeons prehend certain eternal objects such as «tree» not as pure potentials but as illustrated in a particular type of structured society.

This means, as Whitehead puts it, that «a particular determination can be made of the how of some definite relationship of a definite eternal object A to a definite number n of other eternal objects, without any determination of the other n objects, x1, x2,... x11, except that they have, each of them, the requisite status to play their respective parts in that multiple relationship» (Science and the Modern World 237).

As being can never be studied as an independent object, the history of metaphysical thought can not be without implications for the history of being:» [E] very science goes through a process of historical development in which, although the fundamental or general problem remains unaltered, the particular form in which this problem presents itself changes from time to time; and the general problem never arises in its pure or abstract form, but always in the particular or concrete form, determined by the present state of knowledge or, in other words, by the development of thought hitherto.

Nevertheless, Sherburne, his colleagues, and even the particular Whitehead of Process and Reality, in their devotion to rationalizing the meaning of the world, including the world of art objects, fail to appreciate the aesthetic power of the experienced world.

Its curators» decisions to display particular objects, such as the Artifact, in the Museum are not state actions to which Constitutional protections apply.»

A proposition is not a pure essence; though it does not give information as to how it actually functions in particular instances (like an eternal object) it does gesture towards how it could function in concrete occasions.

I distinguish here the use of the term «epistemology»» from «phenomenology»» in the sense that phenomenology analyzes the givenness of objects to consciousness, an exercise that may be carried our «without particular metaphysical commitments (requiring only a hypothetical ontology), whereas epistemology seeks to analyze how we or any being can know what really is.

The object allows anyone to see it, whereas the word is not for just anyone; it is addressed to someone in particular.

Its object is not simply to understand the world but to respond to the power of God which is recreating it... Christian theology is prophetic only in so far as it dares, in full reflection, to declare how, at a particular place and time, God is at work, and thus to show the Church where and when to participate in his work.6

Had Dr. P. possessed «judgment» in Sacks» sense, he would have had some feeling for the concrete, the personal, the particular, and for apprehending perceptual objects as wholes.

21 In his James Lectures at Harvard in 1940, he abandoned the term «particulars» for «universals» or «qualities» that, based on the examples he cites, functioned somewhat like Whiteheadian «eternal objects»: that is, ordinary macroscopic objects or experiences are to be conceived as a particular togetherness of these qualia at a given locus in spacetime.In his James Lectures at Harvard in 1940, he abandoned the term «particulars» for «universals» or «qualities» that, based on the examples he cites, functioned somewhat like Whiteheadian «eternal objects»: that is, ordinary macroscopic objects or experiences are to be conceived as a particular togetherness of these qualia at a given locus in spacetime.in 1940, he abandoned the term «particulars» for «universals» or «qualities» that, based on the examples he cites, functioned somewhat like Whiteheadian «eternal objects»: that is, ordinary macroscopic objects or experiences are to be conceived as a particular togetherness of these qualia at a given locus in spacetime.in spacetime.22