A second way in which the transitions of the self are disclosed is through the memory of
past subjective experiences.
Not exact matches
The examples given above entail that the subject prehend the
past experience in terms of its content or objective data as well as its emotion or
subjective form.
But in most prehensions of our
past experiences, even the contiguous
past, what is felt is primarily its
subjective form.
Using human
experience as a model to depict the nature of reality, Whitehead argues that every actuality (i.e., every actual event) has both a present
subjective immediacy and a
past objectivity.
Heidegger and Whitehead both see that
subjective experience has wrongly been envisioned in
past philosophy in terms of models derived from objects of sense -
experience.
The hybrid physical feeling of God, which is (on the traditional Whiteheadian account) the
subjective aim for any particular occasion of the young woman s
experience, is also a prehension of the
past from which she inherits — it is, after all, a physical feeling.
If our world were a centered universe, a universe with an all - seeing (i.e., all - prehending) God with the ability to introduce, on his own, new information pertaining to the
past into the
experience of emerging actual occasions by means of their
subjective aims, then our world would be a much more harmoniously ordered world than it in fact is.
This puts Hartshorne where he wants to be, because to intuit (prehend) actual occasions as they occur is to intuit (prehend) them formaliter, as they exist in the immediate subjectivity of concrescence, and since God is everlasting, and
experiences all actual occasions formaliter, actual occasions are preserved everlastingly (in their full, warm,
subjective immediacy) in the consequent nature of God.6 This interpretation resolves the question of the status of the
past, the problem of how the
past is given as datum for concrescing actual occasions, and the question of a ground for truth claims about the
past.
If, however, God perfectly remembers all that has happened, or better, is still
experiencing in his ongoing, everlasting present whatever is
past to us, the values we now cherish will be better preserved in the divine
experience than they would be in any
subjective immortality we might enjoy.
I do not think now that the religious and ideological heritage that I was given as a child and as an adolescent was an entirely authentic version of the American tradition, but the
subjective sense of continuity with the
past is an indelible
experience that undoubtedly colors even my present perceptions.
From a Buddhist perspective, I was clinging to my
past selves; as long as I was doing this, I could not be fully present in my current moment of
subjective experiencing or to the environment in which I was presently living.
Once I would realize that the
past was meaningful, that my
past selves live on in the present, although certainly not in their
subjective immediacy, I could let go, give up my clinging, and be more fully present in my current momentary
experience and to the world.
It is clear, however — and confirmed through an examination of his Harvard lectures from this period (see below)-- that the «evolution» to which Whitehead refers here is not macroscopic biological or geological evolution, but the transition from the immediate
past to the novel
subjective experience of the immediate present.
In its
subjective immediacy every agent - event or
experience constitutes itself in relation to its holons, objects, or
past.
«4 Transition is a togetherness as the unification of
past multiplicity, but it is outside of
subjective experience, which can only be initiated by its completion.
Everyone
experiences it differently as it's tied to personal,
subjective memories of the
past.
Within Living Memory brings together interconnected bodies of work produced by Green over the
past decade that address conditions of residency and displacement,
subjective experience, institutional memory, notions of progress, and the inevitability of decay.
Using examples of artistic clothing and costume design as a starting point to present his own set of models for abstract form today, McElheny investigates the connections between the history of visual abstraction and the clothing created by artists over the
past century, whose work proposed a more
subjective, less universal
experience of abstraction.
Common sense often involves the substitution of the tangible record with a
subjective (and often incorrect) opinion based on
past experience.