Sentences with phrase «perceptions of the world as»

«We do not passively detect information in the world and then react to it - we construct perceptions of the world as the architects of our own experience,» they commented.

Lewontin was satisfied that creationism can not survive because its acceptance of miracles puts it at odds with the more rational perception of the world as a place where all events have natural causes.

They first sought to establish a link between beliefs about scientific progress and perceptions of the world as orderly, predicting that the more people believed, the more order they would perceive.

Priscilla's presence quickly does as much to shake up Rebecca's perception of the world as it does to stabilize her life.

10/11/2017 -11 / 2/2018 Peter Bremers: Looking Beyond the Mirror From a master of the kiln - casting technique in glass sculpture comes two distinct bodies of work in Peter Bremers» abstract style that express his exploration of human existence, from the perspective of the individual's perception of the world as well as an observation of our collective power as a group of individuals.

Not exact matches

But bond investors have continued to flock to the debt of the United States, which as the world's largest economy has retained the perception of a financial safe haven.

The myth is fed by the public's perception of groundbreaking companies as having come out of nowhere to rock the world.

Yes our quality of life is still quite good relative to SOME other countries... that not really what people are thinking though when they use the term «3rd world country» — they are talking about the trending that they see — and the media reflects a perception out there that things are trending in a negative direction... look, if you read my original posts, you will see that they have much less to do with our economy as they have to do with WHY we are involved in the middle east and the SOCIAL impact of that.

Certainly that perception, combined with various corruptions of monasticism so caustically criticized by Erasmus and others, led Reformers such as Luther and Calvin to sharply contrast the monastic call «from the world» with the authentically Christian call «into the world.»

However that may be, there also persisted a widespread perception in medieval Christianity that those who worked «in the world,» as distinct from monastics and clerics more generally, were engaged in a less worthy way of life and, indeed, were second «class Christians.

While cosmology may mean several different things, the theologian's contribution is concerned with «accounts of the world as God's creation,» and, within that broad compass, one specific enterprise especially needed in our time involves «imaginative perceptions of how the world seems am where we stand in it» (Tracy and Lash, vii) 5 In other words.

This biblical inversion of our ordinary perceptions and expectations, shaped as they are by the world's priorities, cures our astigmatism.

We have a basis for a revived sacramentalism, that is, a perception of the divine as visible, as present, palpably present in the world.

«The term can refer to theological accounts of the world as God's creation; or to philosophical reflection on the categories of space and time; or to observational and theoretical study of the structure and evolution of the physical universe; or, finally, to «world views»: unified imaginative perceptions of how the world seems and where we stand in it» (Tracy and Lash, vii).

Part of the difficulties of Cartesian philosophy, and of any philosophy which accepts [presentational immediacy] as a complete account of perception, is to explain how we know more than this meager fact about the world although our only avenue of direct knowledge limits us to this barren residuum.

Although many of those concerned for environmental protection are thinking about the natural world simply as it relates to human beings, the leaders of the environmental movement have been moved to perception and action by deeper changes.

If this world, its inherent physical laws, and one's veridical perceptions are a result of one's consciousness, then that consciousness (as a result of neurophysiology) are nothing but impressions left by external stimuli, a result of that consciousness.

Ingrained perceptions of cultural superiority of one group over others have led to conflicts such as the European invasion of the rest of the world to «civilize» them, and of Hitler Germany's attitude of ethnic purification towards Jews.

For Santayana intent is a kind of felt turning to the world and readiness to take intuited essences as describing it intent and intuition are thus aspects of every sort of perception (and thought), not two types of perception.

Perception is an active process in which a person trains attention on part of the world and struggles to filter out irrelevant detail so as to discern the important features of the «facts» and to locate them in their context of meaning.

As such it is to be distinguished from the perception of an object merely as passively situated in the external world and not experienced as affecting the sentienAs such it is to be distinguished from the perception of an object merely as passively situated in the external world and not experienced as affecting the sentienas passively situated in the external world and not experienced as affecting the sentienas affecting the sentient.

Insofar as it treats the relatedness of prehensions, this has to do with strains which are closely associated with the perception of the con - temporary world in presentational immediacy.

In contrast stands the more basic perception in the mode of causal efficacy; which «is our general sense of existence, as one item among others in an efficacious external world» and «of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future»; its data «are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion.»

This charge, too, must be taken seriously, as we recognize the truth in the perceptions of the peoples of the Fourth World.

As Walter Lippmann said in his groundbreaking book Public Opinion, humans act in the real world on the basis of the perceptions created increasingly for us by the media's pseudo-environment.

Corresponding to Kant's pure intuition of space, Whitehead presupposes the perception of the contemporary world as extensive continuum.

, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1941), pp. 33 - 46, revised as chapter seven of his Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); Wolfe Mays, «The Relevance of «On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World» to Whitehead's Philosophy» in RW; and Paul F. Schmidt, Perception and Cosmology in Whitehead's Philosophy (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

Perception is a complex process of interpretation of «data from the real world» as well as of «proposals» about the past, actual world germane to its possible future states.

Both «symbolic reference» and «propositional feelings» have receptive and imaginative aspects; but, whereas Whitehead emphasized the former, cognitive aspect in his discussion of «symbolic reference,» as a rebuttal to Hume and Kant, he emphasized the latter, creative aspect in his discussion of «propositions,» an emphasis needed to counter «the interest in logic, dominating over-intellectualized philosophers,» among whom «aesthetic delight» is eclipsed by «judgment» (cf. PR 184 - 86 and WH 33) In «symbolic reference» a dim, but indirect, mode of perception («causal efficacy») is combined with a clear, but indirect, mode of perception («presentational immediacy»), which produces a sense of the external world.

First, he distinguishes from classical empiricism a revisionary description of experience according to which sense perception is neither the only nor even the primary mode of experience, but is rather derived from a still more elemental awareness both of ourselves and of the world around us» (PP 78).6 On Ogden's analysis, both the classical and this first type of revisionary empiricism «assume that the sole realities present in our experience, and therefore the only objects of our certain knowledge, are ourselves and the other creatures that constitute the world» (PP 79) 7 With these «two more conventional types of empiricism» he contrasts a «comprehensive» type of revisionary empiricism distinguished from them by its consideration of the possibility (and then also by its claim) that the internal awareness it asserts together with the former revisionary type is «the awareness not merely of ourselves, and of our fellow creatures, but also of the infinite whole in which we are all included as somehow one» (PP 87, 80, 85).

Three emergent theological movements — black theology, feminist theology, and liberation theology from the Third World — challenge traditional ways of doing theology on the grounds that Christian consciousness as it has been» given shape in the modern world is burdened with Western, liberal, male and white perceptions of reaWorld — challenge traditional ways of doing theology on the grounds that Christian consciousness as it has been» given shape in the modern world is burdened with Western, liberal, male and white perceptions of reaworld is burdened with Western, liberal, male and white perceptions of reality.

Even as he's evoking insect life in terms that recall the domesticity of The Wind in the Willows, he wants to write about the natural world as if he had access to it independently of our perception of it in human terms» as if he were capable of seeing the Insect - in - Itself instead of the insect as seen by a man.

In his early research into the child's world - view, Piaget showed that the thing - concept, as Whitehead criticized it, actually appears rather late in a child's development and represents an abstraction from earlier and more concrete perceptions (RME) Not until around ten years of age does the child come to see «things» in reality in the way the adult sees «things» in reality and uses the thing - concept consciously, that is argumentatively.

At the adverbial level of perception the continuity of functions between us and the world is felt as patterned qualities.

Thus perception, in this primary sense, is perception of the settled world in the past as constituted by its feeling - tones, and as efficacious by reason of those feeling - tones (PR 182, 184).

We are often exhorted by scientists and philosophers alike to accept the material given to us by sense perception as though it is the rock - bottom foundation of our knowledge of the physical world, Simultaneously we are told to refrain from coloring neutral sense data over with our subjective wishes and teleological desires.

Because it heeds the contours of the world as it finds them, it creates stable forms of perception, whereas fantasy strives to annihilate all forms.

The pure perception in the mode of presentational immediacy without reference to causal efficacy could result in the experience of the objective world as illusion.

Because of the relative shallowness of the world as grasped in secondary perception our symbols, which borrow their first intentionality from this immediate world of sensation, are never adequate to their second intentionality.

But because the world of sense perception is too shallow to contain the depth of importance resident in the whole of reality the symbols which employ material from this shallow world (as their first intentionality) always remain somewhat off - shore in deeper waters where they appear to us only in a refracted visage.

Schubert Ogden speaks of «nonsensuous perception,» which involves «an awareness of our own past mental and bodily states and of the wider world beyond as they compel conformation to themselves in the present.

A. N. Whitehead (1929) considers the act of perception as the establishment by the subject of its causal relation with its own external world at a particular moment.

A summary of Merleau - Ponty's treatment of ambiguity points to Whitehead's notion of adventure: (i) the irreducible polarity of body - world as the ultimate scheme of existence; (ii) the irreducibility of perception to either pole of the body - world schema; (iii) the affirmation of freedom as both centripetal and centrifugal.

In general, it may be said that Merleau - Ponty's treatment of commitment establishes: (i) the absolute commitment of the body to the world and of the world to the body, as the overarching schema of all perception and of all experience; (ii) the relative, reversible, and replaceable commitments in virtue of which the body realizes its absolute commitment.

Whitehead describes the nature of the universe and of reality as such, while Merleau - Ponty describes the relatedness of the body and the world as perception.

As the occasions of the world - process (including those of our own experience) appropriate the power of a divine ordering principle and ground of novelty at the primary pole of perception, they are not forced into a deterministic response to God's influence.

But, as a material object, the body could expectantly take the form of stimuli «into account» «only if we introduce the phenomenal body beside the objective one, if we make a knowing - body of it, and if, in short, we substitute for consciousness [as Descartes conceived it], as the subject of perception, existence or being in the world through a body» (PP 309).

For example, for the frequently used word «events» (used in describing natural phenomena in space - time coordinate systems) he substituted the term «actual occasions,» which for him gave a more accurate (and richer) picture of «real» or «concrete» happenings in the natural world.11 In this regard, he avoided the use of such commonly employed metaphysical terms such as «sensation» and «perception» — derived from seventeenth and eighteenth philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant — since for him they had a narrow psychological rather than appropriate epistemological meanings.

Indeed, even as early as this writing, he acknowledges his uncertainty about the answer to the question of whether the events grasped by the theoretical language of mathematics can be sufficient «to «explain our sensations» (IM 33), or whether the mathematically formulated theory is even in a position to make an adequate reconstruction of other, unrelinquishable references to the world (such as sense perception).

Whitehead does not yet want to call into question the common sense assumption that the world is an actual unity: «we... endeavor to imagine the world as one connected set of things which underlies all the perceptions of other, unrelinquishable references to the world (such as sense perception»).