Sentences with phrase «performance incentives not»

As Stanford business school professor Jeffrey Pfeiffer notes in «Six Dangerous Myths About Pay,» performance incentives not only «absorb vast amounts of management time and resources,» they often «actually decrease performance in tasks that require creativity and innovation.»

Not exact matches

DiGregorio claims he agreed to be terminated by Stanton and join Canoe, provided the move wouldn't affect his performance bonus and long - term incentive payments.

Implications from deeper understanding of your customers typically involve changes in how you measure sales effectiveness, performance reviews, incentives, product mix, channels and sometimes «addition by subtraction,» or the process of improving performance by not selling to certain types of customers.

The performance goals upon which the payment or vesting of any Incentive Award (other than Options and stock appreciation rights) that is intended to qualify as Performance - Based Compensation depends shall relate to one or more of the following Performance Measures: market price of Capital Stock, earnings per share of Capital Stock, income, net income or profit (before or after taxes), economic profit, operating income, operating margin, profit margin, gross margins, return on equity or stockholder equity, total shareholder return, market capitalization, enterprise value, cash flow (including but not limited to operating cash flow and free cash flow), cash position, return on assets or net assets, return on capital, return performance goals upon which the payment or vesting of any Incentive Award (other than Options and stock appreciation rights) that is intended to qualify as Performance - Based Compensation depends shall relate to one or more of the following Performance Measures: market price of Capital Stock, earnings per share of Capital Stock, income, net income or profit (before or after taxes), economic profit, operating income, operating margin, profit margin, gross margins, return on equity or stockholder equity, total shareholder return, market capitalization, enterprise value, cash flow (including but not limited to operating cash flow and free cash flow), cash position, return on assets or net assets, return on capital, return Performance - Based Compensation depends shall relate to one or more of the following Performance Measures: market price of Capital Stock, earnings per share of Capital Stock, income, net income or profit (before or after taxes), economic profit, operating income, operating margin, profit margin, gross margins, return on equity or stockholder equity, total shareholder return, market capitalization, enterprise value, cash flow (including but not limited to operating cash flow and free cash flow), cash position, return on assets or net assets, return on capital, return Performance Measures: market price of Capital Stock, earnings per share of Capital Stock, income, net income or profit (before or after taxes), economic profit, operating income, operating margin, profit margin, gross margins, return on equity or stockholder equity, total shareholder return, market capitalization, enterprise value, cash flow (including but not limited to operating cash flow and free cash flow), cash position, return on assets or net assets, return on capital, return on invested

The LTIP is intended to supplement our existing compensation program, and, consistent with our compensation philosophy, to further align incentive compensation with long - term performance in a manner that does not encourage imprudent risk taking.

Although the Company's performance for 2007 was in the top quartile compared to its Peer Group and met one of the alternative goals under the Performance Policy, the HRC considered in making its incentive award decisions the fact that the Company did not meet its EPS goal of $ 2.49 (2006 EPS, as originally reported) under the Performance Policy and therefore did not improve upon the EPS results of the performance for 2007 was in the top quartile compared to its Peer Group and met one of the alternative goals under the Performance Policy, the HRC considered in making its incentive award decisions the fact that the Company did not meet its EPS goal of $ 2.49 (2006 EPS, as originally reported) under the Performance Policy and therefore did not improve upon the EPS results of the Performance Policy, the HRC considered in making its incentive award decisions the fact that the Company did not meet its EPS goal of $ 2.49 (2006 EPS, as originally reported) under the Performance Policy and therefore did not improve upon the EPS results of the Performance Policy and therefore did not improve upon the EPS results of the prior year.

There is less incentive for a CEO to push beyond the target, since additional performance improvement doesn't have the same incremental impact on his or her bonus.

These additional metrics are intended to frame performance expectations for the year for the Named Executive Officers but not to assure or preclude payment of an incentive award or to be used in any fixed or specific mathematical formula related to the amount of the incentive award to be paid.

Additionally, except as noted below in certain circumstances, we do not provide cash or equity incentives tied to performance criteria, which could cause employees to focus solely on short - term returns at the expense of long - term growth and innovation.

Not only are these corporate forms a powerful tool in the fight against inequality, but there is evidence that they provide the incentives for greater effort, more cooperation, more innovation and more sharing — all of which contribute to improvements in workplace performance and company productivity.

The Company utilizes no metrics for long - term incentive, which is not performance - based;

Reporting for the Excelsior Jobs Program is a good model to follow because it includes most of the metrics necessary to have a complete picture of recipients» commitments, actual performance, and incentives issued.3 Another good example is the downloadable data on Industrial Development Agency (IDA) projects provided on the Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) website, although quality metrics should include annual numbers, and not just totals.4 See Appendix A for a recommended list of metrics.

And to drive up performance we will not just increase the freedoms and autonomy of our local NHS — giving hospital clinicians and GPs stronger incentives to work together and allowing foundation trusts the freedom to provide primary care services where this is in the interests of patients — but we will also increase accountability of local services to local people.

The study also found that when a company's performance grows, incentive pay does not work as well as when a firm's performance declines.

The team who received feedback comparing their performance to the 75th percentile and did not receive financial incentives achieved their goals only 27 percent of the time.

Reporting only aggregated adherence rates could create an incentive to avoid groups with worse outcomes rather than undertaking interventions to improve their care.41 Some health plans or clinicians may avoid enrolling minority patients, for whom performance rates are typically lower.42, 43 Stratifying performance rates by race, ethnicity, or other demographic characteristics may mitigate such undesired effects by not penalizing organizations that disproportionately treat minority patients.

[8] While Deming and Walters can not disentangle precisely what it is that institutions do with their money that makes the difference, prior research suggests that targeted financial assistance, improved advising, performance incentives, or some combination of interventions may be effective.

Because the other standardized tests are «low - stakes tests,» without any reward or punishment attached to student or school performance, the authors reason that there are few incentives to manipulate the results or cheat, making the low - stakes test results a reliable measure of student performance (although it is also possible that schools and students won't prepare enough for a low - stakes test to demonstrate their true abilities).

The White House «fact sheet» on America's College Promise lists what states and colleges would have to do: participating colleges would have to «adopt promising and evidence - based institutional reforms to improve student outcomes,» while states would have to coordinate high schools, community colleges, and four - year schools to reduce remediation rates and, to create incentives to improve, «allocate a significant portion of funding based on performance, not enrollment alone.»

Given the contentiousness of these policies and the political volatility associated with Mayor Fenty's loss and Chancellor Rhee's resignation, teachers may have reasonably doubted the staying power of IMPACT's performance - based dismissal threats, opting not to respond to its incentives.

However, under group incentive schemes, individual teachers may not have sufficient motivation to improve their own performance if they know that their success in attaining a bonus depends heavily on the efforts made by other teachers.

Performance incentives may cause schools and teachers to redirect their efforts toward the least costly ways of raising test scores, at the expense of actions that do not boost scores but may be important for students» long - term welfare.

Hess questions the pickax approach as a half - measure that can not compel change or «alter the incentives that drive educational performance.»

It is a test for which students can not easily be prepped and, since the performance of individual school districts, schools, or students is not reported, there is little incentive to cheat or even to prepare for the test.

The next round must get to measuring teacher effectiveness based on student achievement, promoting professional development that is based on research and effective practice and improves performance, providing incentives for teachers who are effective, and requiring removal of teachers who, even with solid professional development, can't or don't improve.

A study by researchers at the National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt finds that teachers who were offered rewards of up to $ 15,000 if their students met goals for test - score gains did not outperform teachers who were not offered the bonuses.

She would undo most if not all of the «structural» reforms that have been put in place in recent years — mayoral control, performance - based pay, charter laws and other choice schemes, reliance on entrepreneurship and market incentives, federal efforts to incentivize and prod the system to change in constructive directions, testing - and results - based accountability and more.

However, since such funds are temporary solutions, they do not dramatically reduce the financial incentive for failing schools to remove themselves from voucher competition by improving their performance on the FCAT.

Although it's not possible to attribute these declines to any specific education policy, it's also hard to conclude that incentive schemes and new school accountability arrangements in these countries have had a positive impact on student performance.

The new findings run counter to a spate of recent studies that found that incentives linked narrowly to test scores were not associated with a change in teacher performance.

Yet despite the Promise's incentives for improving performance, students may not respond as hoped.

In the Atlanta case, anti-reformers said something else: that testing and performance incentives are inevitably corrupt, that teachers can't handle performance pressure — making fraud inevitable, that performance measures are deadly, so district and state leaders should avoid using them at all.

Critics like Senator Elizabeth Warren aren't questioning the need for outcome measures and performance incentives.

If this is the case, even strong incentives for higher academic performance may not produce notable improvements in key outcomes.

Additionally, the federal law should have had safeguards in place so that states that were at the beginning stages of implementing accountability systems would not have an incentive to set a low bar on performance to create an illusion of progress.

The NEA criticized the draft for including «no requirement for multiple measures of school or student performance» and for not requiring non-test-based teacher evaluations under the Teacher Incentive Fund, which doles outs competitive grants.

The article, «Incentive Pay Programs Do Not Affect Teacher Motivation or Reported Practices: Results From Three Randomized Studies,» looked at three schools that were testing pay - for - performance programs.

Most teachers are not coming to work every day giving us their «B» game, while leaving their «A» game in the closet just waiting for some kind of pay for performance incentive.

Conversely, a Washington incentive program tied to the district's teacher - evaluation system boosted teacher performance but didn't have a noticeable impact on teacher retention for the most effective teachers.

The largest study of performance incentives based on value - added measures comes from a Nashville, Tennessee study that randomly assigned middle - school math teachers (who volunteered for the study) to be eligible for performance - based pay or not.

[22] Given that performance incentives have little effect on teacher performance in the short run, it may not be worth pursuing them as a means for improvement at all.

Performance - based incentives shouldn't be viewed as a partisan issue.

And a new study from the National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University — although not studying the important question of whether teachers who receive high scores on TAP evaluations tend to produce greater gains in their students» test scores — found that a small sample of secondary schools using TAP produced no higher levels of student achievement than schools that hadn't implemented the TAP program.

But this means the potential of being fired for poor performance must be there too — right now there is very little incentive for teachers to improve their skills, or do their best every day, unless they are super-heroes (and fortunately there are a lot of these in teaching, bless them), because a system with no consequences for poor performance does not inspire greatness.

What we found is that the efforts that have failed either didn't offer a compelling enough incentive or linked bonuses to school - wide results and not individual performance.

A host of factors — lack of accountability for school performance, staffing practices that strip school systems of incentives to take teacher evaluation seriously, teacher union ambivalence, and public education's practice of using teacher credentials as a proxy for teacher quality — have produced superficial and capricious teacher evaluation systems that often don't even directly address the quality of instruction, much less measure students» learning.

Because, for all the progress we have made, we have still not fully addressed the perverse incentives embedded in the structure of public education, which remains primarily driven by inputs and compliance when it should be driven by outputs and performance.

«Incentives will often lead people to find ways to increase measured performance that do not also improve the desired outcomes.»

Related, and on this point we agree, «teacher pay incentives is one area that we know a good deal about, based on analysis of actual policy variation, and the results are not terribly promising... experiments generally show performance bonuses, a particular form of pay for performance, have no significant student achievement effects, whether the bonus is rewarded at the individual teacher level» (p. 89).

... School leaders who can not formulate strategies to improve performance can not be expected to react constructively to incentives to do so.»