I guess I think about stock risk largely as the value investment community does as the possibility
of permanent impairment of capital, not really what overall general business and economic conditions are (rail traffic, ECRI, ISM, etc.).
Second, if there is no evidence
of permanent impairment of capital, Third Avenue averages down by increasing its positions in the common stocks of solid companies at lower and lower prices.
«One of the great lessons on the crisis was learning the difference between volatility, which most people perceive as risk, and
a permanent impairment of capital, which is what we believe is risk» Matt McLennon
I'm not sure, but it would have to be institutions that have suffered a real price setback, where
a permanent impairment of capital is unlikely.
Where a company is poorly financed, a poor quarterly report can often contribute to
a permanent impairment of capital where the issuers are either denied any access at all to capital markets, or can access such markets only at an ultra-high cost.
Whether in his debate against Michael Jensen in 1984, which helped to produce the article, «The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville [PDF, 13 pages],» or in his annual shareholder letters, that risk is not volatility — risk is
the permanent impairment of capital.
We view risk primarily as the likelihood of suffering
a permanent impairment of capital on a portfolio basis.
Fundamental investors try to guard against investment risk; i.e.,
permanent impairment of the capital of the underlying business.
This creates
a permanent impairment of capital.»
When investors violate [this principle] by investing with no margin of safety, they risk the prospect of
the permanent impairment of capital.»
But when the auditors look at the bonds, and ask what the market price is, the challenge is to explain why there is
no permanent impairment of capital.
Even the the old - style «hold - to - maturity» bonds would get marked down if there was a «
permanent impairment of capital.»
The Fund sells in the open market, rather than waiting for a takeover, when management suspects there might be
a permanent impairment of capital.
Needless to say, TAVF will not consciously invest material amounts in any single CERA deal if it appears to me that such an investment entails the risk of
a permanent impairment of capital.
The reduction in drawdowns is especially important in the context of Montier's definition of risk:
the permanent impairment of capital.
In addition, management can make a decision that leads to
permanent impairment of capital.
The idea is to eliminate as many stocks as possible, as objectively as possible by identifying those that have a greater risk of causing
a permanent impairment of capital.