However, this does not mean that atheist
philosophers of science view the actual universe as random.
Not exact matches
Whitehead, another mathematician - physicist -
philosopher, had a similar
view Thus our theological scheme is no longer as seriously at odds with
science or the philosophy
of science as it was in the days
of classical or Newtonian physics.
A
view held by many contemporary metaphysicians is that the problem
of induction, so much discussed by
philosophers of science, arises only because
of mistaken metaphysical
views; in particular
views (deriving from Hume) about the nature
of the causal relation and / or about the internal relations among different entities.1 Contrary to this
view, I will try...
Working with Colin McGinn's ideas on consciousness Charlton illustrates the inconsistencies
of philosophers who
view mind as explainable by
science, while suggesting himself that «the presence
of mind in nature is not something invisible and hidden except to introspection, but the most palpable thing there is.
Modern
philosophers of science are very aware
of the impossibility
of a God's eye
view of the world.
Others, like myself, will decide to learn from his critique
of the world
view of modern
science without wishing to become Whiteheadian organismic
philosophers.
But in
view of the power and tenacity
of the scientistic ideology, which abhors the very idea
of myth, it is not surprising that Whitehead has received so little attention from
philosophers of science, despite his being one
of the most original and creative thinkers
of this century.
The earlier Whitehead was closer to the philosophy
of science; the difficulties in his
views are ones that
philosophers of science can recognize.
I have suggested, however, that
science is not as objective, nor religion as subjective, as the
view dominant among
philosophers of religion has held.
A
view of scientific explanation as metaphorical has been developed as a supplement to the deductive model
of explanation by some contemporary
philosophers of science (Black 1962, pp. 25 - 47 and pp. 219 - 243; Hesse 1966, pp. 157 - 177; MacCormac 1971).
The received
view among
philosophers of science, whether they be
of a regularity or necessity persuasion, is that a statement s is a law statement or nomological generalization if and only if it satisfies the following logically necessary specifications:
There are exactly parallel
views of scientific models that have been held by many contemporary
philosophers of science, namely, that models are purely subjective, psychological, and adopted by individuals for private heuristic purposes.
That seems to be a much better guideline than mutually contradictory
views of philosophers of science (they are often interesting, but not so useful, partly, because they are contradictory without resolution
of the differing
views).