Sentences with phrase «philosophical problems which»

the unchecked speculations of the human mind, an essentially practical instrument, inevitably lead to philosophical problems which are and will remain insoluble because they are presented backwards.

Not exact matches

Many, many great scientists are writing books on their activities, but books which are in fact philosophical works... Science produces metaphysical questions and, in fact, great scientists tend to solve these problems... The problem is to believe that these solutions belong to science, or to believe that a philosophical solution is given immediately by science.
I stated my position on many of the philosophical problems to which my teachers had introduced me, for instance the question of internal and external relations; and I gave arguments for the positions.
Etienne Gilson sees that Augustine is confronted with a problem for which no philosophical answer can be given, for he is working with two modes of being which are absolutely heterogeneous.
The problem then becomes how to reconcile a philosophical anthropology of individualism with the mutuality and interrelatedness of society, and the concept of civil society is that synthesis by which these theses have been bridged.
The problem lies less with the «facts» they are taught than with the philosophical assumptions, the governing worldview, with which they are taught to interpret the various subjects.
Say what one will about the dubious quality of Heidegger's judgment here, the problem for his interpreters seems to remain one of demonstrating that his later philosophical views are any less dubious than his earlier ones — especially as they are rooted in the manner in which he lived.
For instance, we can ask: How did the social / philosophical / religious environment in which a person was raised affect the way in which that individual thinks about tyranny in general, and the problem of abortion in particular?
This question opens up problems of personal biography which can be approached from the perspectives of education, psychology, sociology, philosophical anthropology, and religion.
This insistence that the only thing which exists is material is the key problem with philosophical naturalism.
Buber defines «philosophical anthropology» as the study of «the wholeness of man,» and he lists the following as among the problems «which are implicitly set up at the same time by this question»:
Hence, an unchangeable method by means of which all philosophical problems can be solved is completely out of question.
These questions get to the heart of a philosophical problem posed by Intelligent Design: It supposes that natural law, which is the basis for science, operates most of the time but is periodically suspended, as in the Cambrian «explosion» and the origin of life itself.
To help point the way out of the problem I will turn to the writings of Whitehead (particularly his later works), drawing from his work certain conclusions which, while not explicitly stated by him may nevertheless be said to follow from his overall philosophical scheme.
The problem with Aristotle from Luther's perspective was not that he believed in the eternity of the world and the mortality of the human soul (which he did), but that his philosophical vocabulary was ill - suited for theological use.
This problem of the connection between the physical and the mathematical is one not merely of philosophical interest; it is one of the greatest relevance and importance for science, more particularly at the present time, which is why Whitehead, himself a scientist, made this problem central to his endeavor.
Among the many advantages of Whitehead's solution to the problem of evil is his recommendation that the factuality of real evil be included in the assemblage of data which form the basis of philosophical investigation (MT 70f, 109f).
By systematic we mean not that some traditional set of problems has been covered, but rather that the philosophical product is the deliberate and methodic interrelation of its constituents, viz., its concepts, categories, and principles in a structure which supports broad inferences and extensions or applications of the conceptual scheme.
However, as in the seventeenth century the various later theories were not produced independently of each other but came to be developed by working through, and in divergence from, the first great attempt at a philosophical structure built upon a profound insight into the problems at issue, namely, that of Descartes, so in our time the new efforts which are required in the philosophy of nature will need to come to terms with the pioneering work of Whitehead.
The problem to which this sentence refers is of interest to many besides those who are acquainted with philosophical language.
This is in the main true, but, as I have pointed out elsewhere, Suarez shifts the emphasis in his metaphysics of material substances from the phenomenon of substantial change to the problem of substantial unity, which is precisely the problem that so vexed both Leibniz and Leclerc (For an account of Suarez's metaphysics of material substances, see my article «The Importance of the Concept of Substantial Unity in Suarez's Hylomorphism», in the special Suarez volume of the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.)
Moreover, within the framework of these rubrics, it does not really make sense why Whitehead from 1912 on wrote and published — in addition to studies in natural philosophy and natural science — a series of what may be called contributions to popular philosophy, a genre which the secondary literature usually passes by In our reconstruction of the development of Whitehead's basic philosophical problem the significance of this phase of his activity becomes obvious.
We can ask why Whitehead did not reformulate his basic philosophical problem in the context of an anthropology which takes into account the processes balancing the concrete individual with its own publicity, which it can only simulate --(in connection with which Whitehead's theory of propositions would offer a still completely unexhausted source for such a development).
The regrettable standard manifestations of philosophical designs in the twentieth century are such that they optimize techniques for overcoming problems intellectually, problems which proceed on the basis of no longer convincing assumptions about reality.
As Whitehead's formulation of his program becomes plausible, his basic philosophical problem will become clear: Only a relativistic cosmology, in Whitehead's view, «brings the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science» (PR xii / vi).
Like Wittgenstein, Whitehead is not, of course, opposed to the concept of a «philosophical illness;» the difference lies in the seriousness with which the two thinkers approach traditional philosophical issues: Wittgenstein seems to see no legitimacy in questions that science or common sense can not answer, while Whitehead struggles with classical metaphysical problems, stepping beyond the strict boundaries of the scientific method.
But also quite general problems of human society, such as marriage rules and incest, or even the organization of nature and the universe, may be the subject of [myths];... it is only philosophical interest, both ancient and modern, that tends to isolate the myths of origin and cosmogony, which in their proper setting usually have some practical reference to the institutions of a city or a clan.
I suggest further that many of the problems with which theologians now wrestle arise out of assumptions formed for them by more or less consciously accepted ideas of a philosophical sort.
R. H. Dicke first explained the flatness problem in his 1969 Jayne Lecture, which was later published in «Gravitation and the Universe» for the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia in 1970.
Gray's sky - high ambitions, however admirable, preclude any sense of nuance or ambiguity, a problem shared by Cahill's film, which treats its characters as placeholders for philosophical arguments and spends the majority of its running time trying to «solve» existential mysteries without adequately exploring them.
If his abstractions are «about» anything, they are about resuscitating a pragmatic concept of holistic experience and modifying that naturalistic idea to meet the needs of a dedicated contemporary art practice in which emotion and contingency interact with larger structures of personality, and philosophical problems interact with real production.
If Stella's call for a new sense of space tends too quickly towards a literal - minded interpretation, the problem with Peter Halley's Neo-Geo abstraction was that it moved painting into a philosophical, theoretical, and technological / conceptual space which was literal or literalizing in its very own way (e.g., as geometric abstractions came to serve as the pictorial ««models» of intellectual concepts»).
In general, this essay (which is unfortunately behind a paywall) is worth running down, particularly if you want an introduction to some of the philosophical problems associated with the GDRs approach, and a collection of opinions on the various quantitative / philosophical judgments that are embedded within the framework.
It is one of the fundamental philosophical problems with IPCC (causing much debate already in conjunction with the 4th report) that it refuses to provide an upper limit for sea - level rise, unlike other assessments (e.g. the sea - level rise scenarios of NOAA (which we discussed here) or the guidelines of the US Army Corps of Engineers).
Even if we can address the philosophical and evidentiary problems, a third problem arises in the context of the Rizzo formula, which may be called the doctrinal problem.
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