Auto manufacturers have consistently downplayed the threat of hacker attacks on vehicles, insisting these networked cars are safe or alternatively that the hacking requires actual
physical access to vehicles.
In «Hackers at the Wheel» [TechnoFiles, November], David Pogue incorrectly states that remote hacking of a Jeep described in a Wired article had involved researchers working on the Jeep's software for three years and that such hacks require
physical access to vehicles.
Not exact matches
«The software manipulation addressed by this recall required unique and extensive technical knowledge, prolonged
physical access to a subject
vehicle and extended periods of time
to write code.»
[T] hat it may involve numerous risks and dangers including, but not limited
to: acts of God; civil unrest; terrorism; use of roads, trails, hotels,
vehicles, boats or other means of conveyance that are not operated nor maintained
to customary and usual standards; high altitude; accident or illness without
access to means of rapid evacuation or availability of medical supplies; the inadequacy of medical attention once provided;
physical exertion for which I am not prepared; consumption of alcoholic beverages; or negligence (but not willful, fraudulent, or malicious conduct) on the part of DRI.
In a statement, Fiat Chrysler announced that «the software manipulation addressed by this recall required unique and extensive technical knowledge, prolonged
physical access to a subject
vehicle and extended periods of time
to write code».
Anti-Terrorism Force Protections Specialist (2010 — 2011) • Responsible for force protection and
physical security measures for 6 compounds, 100 Iraq reconstruction projects and 1600 personnel throughout Iraq • Research terrorist activities and conduct trend analysis
to determine safe travel routes and safe havens • Coordinated the detection, prevention, and investigation of security vulnerabilities providing sound low cost recommendations of identified vulnerabilities • Increase
physical security for reconstruction projects and Forward Operating Base • Ensure the effective utilization of
vehicle and pedestrian
access control measures • Conduct ATFP level 1 training and briefings for 500 personnel • Lead
access control procedures
to forward deployed camps • Extract, analyze, and distribute classified SIGACTS from CIDNE database
Anti-Terrorism Force Protections Country Manager (02/2011 — 07/2011) • Responsible for force protection and
physical security measures for 7 compounds, 80 Iraq reconstruction projects, and 600 personnel throughout Iraq • Research terrorist activities and conduct trend analysis
to determine safe travel routes and safe havens • Coordinated the detection, prevention, and investigation of security vulnerabilities providing sound low cost recommendations of identified vulnerabilities • Increase
physical security for reconstruction projects and Forward Operating Base • Ensure the effective utilization of
vehicle and pedestrian
access control measures • Conduct ATFP level 1 training and briefings for 200 personnel • Lead
access control procedures
to forward deployed camps • Extract, analyze, and distribute classified SIGACTS from CIDNE database