Sentences with phrase «physical feeling by»

Since this past occasion is an entity other than the becoming one, this is another physical feeling by the new occasion.
In summary, for human beings, causal efficacy can be considered as the physical feeling by the subject of the world as grouped into nexus (involving a transmuted physical feeling).
Thus the datum for physical feeling by a new occasion consists of some of the constituent feelings of every occasion in its «actual world.»

Not exact matches

By making physical and social improvements in your office, you will find that your employees are more likely to be excited about coming into work, more likely to feel a part of the company, and more likely to work hard on their assigned tasks.
By going deeper and understanding the reward Tad was seeking from his behavior — feeling successful — Perlow was able to engineer an office environment that provided this feeling while sparing Tad the physical and psychological toll that constant connectivity can bring.
Although I feel strongly about making sure clients are protecting their physical energy by eating right, getting enough sleep, taking time for R&R and so on.
To stimulate employees and motivate them to keep a healthy lifestyle, take care of their health by organizing a proper workplace: temperature level, ventilation, light, office furniture - they all influence physical condition, boost spirits, prevent problems with back and neck, and make your employees feel comfortable about the place of work.
Children learn by example, so if they see you struggling with poor body image, they'll almost certainly get the message that they need to meet a certain physical ideal to feel comfortable in their own skin.
Knowing next to nothing about physical gold or the mechanics of buying it, they feel intimidated by the subject.
Hence, we must attribute to God not only the conceptual ordering of the eternal objects by virtue of which he lures the occasions of the world toward order and value; we must attribute to him as to all other actual entities physical feelings as well.
If therefore as Christians we feel obliged to use the reprimand, the argumentum ad hominem, or even physical restraint, we must realize all the time that such things are only a means to an end; by themselves they are both incomplete and ineffectual.
For example, in the above illustration, F is immediately later than G. And E both feels F directly and feels G through the medium of F. Thus, during E's process of concrescence, E's simple physical feeling of G is immediately later than E's simple physical feeling of F. To generalize, the mediatist accepts the following thesis, which follows from the mirroring thesis and the definition of «immediately later»: one simple physical feeling is immediately later than another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the latter is immediately later than the actual occasion felt by the former.
To summarize, the mediatist accepts the following mirroring thesis: one simple physical feeling comes into being earlier than another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the former comes into being later than the actual occasion felt by the latter.15 (It is assumed that the two feelings are in one and the same process of concrescence.)
The physical pole of an occasion is constituted by physical prehensions or feelings (strictly the notion of feelings excludes that of negative prehensions, but that is irrelevant here).
Accordingly, a nontemporalist can revise the mirroring thesis (roughly) as follows: one simple physical feeling (nontemporally) precedes another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the former comes into being (temporally) later than the actual occasion felt by the latter.
There is an order - isomorphism between the following two sets: the set (ordered by later) of the actual occasions in the causal past of a given subject actual occasion, and the set (ordered by earlier) of the simple physical feelings in the process of concrescence of that subject actual occasion.
To answer this question we need to consult the descriptions of nonsocial nexus which Whitehead gives: «The characteristic of a living society is that a complex structure of inorganic societies is woven together for the production of a non-social nexus characterized by the intense physical feelings of its members» (PR 161).
There is still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings... (ii) The «consequent nature» of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe... (iii) The «superjective» nature10 of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.
Its historical aspects have been proved true by historians and physical findings.Do you feel that was just by chance?
Clearly, the A-B nexus — in which B coheres concretely with A by means of a simple physical feeling — is different from the B - C unison — in which B and C come into being independently.
Her discussion here is complicated by its relation to a view of how God redeems the world: «To be actual, God must take on a «body» and in so doing, redeem: i.e. he must have physical feelings of the totality of each and all finite achievements, integrating them into the ongoing unity of his consequent nature» (p. 163).
The complexity introduced by the integration of physical and conceptual feelings is for the sake of the enlarged value of the physical, wherein the complexity is concretely felt.
In summary, my view is that a nexus is composed of actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another.
Let me rephrase this essential point in the language of the fourteenth category of explanation: A set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities does not have a «unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions [i.e., simple physical feelings] of each other» (Process 24).
By this, however, I do not mean to indicate that physical feelings have either a temporal or a logical priority.
Which is another reason why we can share how we feel and why; but can't be impute motives or be dogmatic except for the most obvious predatory acts like murder, rape, physical assault — those things that have been criminalized by enforceable laws, laws that have the support of an overwhelming public consensus.
The sense of the world as a unified whole is not constituted by a separate physical feeling in addition to the causal and transmuted feelings whose data are either single actual entities or a nexus of individuals.
Less obviously, transmuted feelings are the physical and perceptual basis for the descriptive generalization by which Whitehead arrives at the conception of the consequent nature of God.
Because Whitehead himself usually explains this operation by way of a common eternal object which is illustrated in all the actual entities of the nexus, the significance of a transmuted feeling as a feeling of physical community in the actual world is often overlooked.
According to the fourteenth category of explanation, a nexus is a multiplicity of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their simple physical feelings of one another.
The main claim illustrated by the B - A-C nexus is that two actual entities in a nexus may be interrelated indirectly by means of simple physical feelings.
To review, a nexus is constituted by actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another.
The dynamism of the feeling of subjective immediacy is a vectorial tending forward, an appetition toward a «more,» which urges the organism beyond domination by the conformal quality of physical feeling.
My paper can still be read as a discussion of an important type of nexus, namely, those nexus that are interrelated by means of simple physical feelings.
In addition, conceptual feelings would lose their own special generality if they were not carried by physical feelings.
Simple physical feelings were also termed by Whitehead» «causal» feelings»: «A simple physical feeling is an act of causation» (Process 236).
Let us assume that there are two durations that satisfy the following three conditions: (1) One is later than the other; (2) they do not have members in common; and (3) the set containing all of the actual entities from both durations is a nexal set.20 In that nexal set, there are chains of actual entities, linked together by simple physical feelings, that span the entire universe.
The physical prehension as conformal feeling, we have said, reproduces the object by assuming the subjective form of one of its prehensions, but as vector it is, and remains throughout the «life» of the subject, an essential relation to that individual object as other, as there and then.
Hence he thinks Whitehead could only justify his belief that there are hybrid feelings of noncontiguous entities by showing some very fundamental difference between hybrid and physical feelings.
Rather than, as usual, assign the hybrid prehension of God to the first phase, with the conceptual derivation in the second phase (which would deprive the initial phase of simple physical feeling of any guidance by the subjective aim), we should think of these two terms as referring to the same feeling.
If the mental pole were derived from the physical pole, what would be the role of the subject with respect to that pole (or those physical feelings) considered by itself?
The occasions could not be discovered in the way Whitehead is rejecting, i.e., by identifying the subregion correlative with a particular physical feeling.
«A [simple physical] feeling belonging to this special case has as its datum only one actual entity, and this actual entity is objectified by one of its feelings» (PR 245).
The term «physical feeling» seems to be absent from «The Theory of Feelings» (III.1), except for one section (III.1.9), which could be a later insertion.9 Sometime during or just after writing «The Theory of Feelings» we may infer that Whitehead introduced the notion of «causal feelings» (III.2.2), which was then overruled by the more developed theory of «simple physical feelings» (IFeelings» (III.1), except for one section (III.1.9), which could be a later insertion.9 Sometime during or just after writing «The Theory of Feelings» we may infer that Whitehead introduced the notion of «causal feelings» (III.2.2), which was then overruled by the more developed theory of «simple physical feelings» (IFeelings» we may infer that Whitehead introduced the notion of «causal feelings» (III.2.2), which was then overruled by the more developed theory of «simple physical feelings» (Ifeelings» (III.2.2), which was then overruled by the more developed theory of «simple physical feelings» (Ifeelings» (III.2.1).
This problem (intensified by means of «hybrid physical feelings», which have not yet been introduced), permits an elegant and rather extreme solution by Jorge Nobo.
If recent evidence for Lamarckian inheritance (the inheritance of mutations induced by an organism in response to its immediate environment) holds up and is expanded, it would provide a way of showing not only the importance of self - determination and hybrid physical feelings in evolution, but also of how divinely rooted initial aims could be effective.
Now God prehends each occasion by means of one of his physical feelings.
God is the chief actual entity, yet by his reversal of the ordering of physical to conceptual feeling, he maintains a necessary, systematic contrast to all finite actual occasions.
The occasion then begins to put the stamp of its developing individuality on this material: the intermediate phase is «a ferment of qualitative valuation» effected by conceptual feelings, some of them automatically derived from the physical feelings of the first phase, others introduced because of their contribution toward a navel unification.
His discussion of the conformation of physical feeling is dominated by considerations pertaining to finite actualization, where that conformation is always partial, and hence never applies to the total satisfaction.
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