Sentences with phrase «plaintiff suffered harm»

Second, it must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury and that the plaintiff suffered harm from that injury.

3) The plaintiff suffered harm or injury because of the defendant's breach.

When plaintiffs suffer harm through intentional torts, however, there often is no insurance to protect the wrongdoer or compensate the victim.

Not exact matches

The plaintiffs claimed that the harm they suffered could not be addressed by suing as women only, because GM could point out that it had indeed hired women (white women) prior to 1964 and had retained those that were hired after 1970.

To have standing, the plaintiff «has to have suffered an actual harm caused by the defendant's action,» says expert Suzanna Sherry of Vanderbilt University Law School in Nashville.

She ruled that the plaintiff has standing to bring the suit because there is sufficient evidence that three WashTech members, «all computer programming specialists,» in the judge's words, suffered harm from competition with OPT students.

The suit says: «Defendant's conduct is causing and will continue to cause Plaintiff to suffer irreparable harm, and unless restrained, Plaintiff will continue to be damaged because Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing that they were likely to prevail on the merits because SB 302 was clearly unconstitutional and that Nevada's public school children will suffer irreparable harm because the education savings accounts will divert substantial funds from public schools.

Last month, the New Hampshire Supreme Court unanimously ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Granite State's scholarship tax credit law because they also could not demonstrate that they suffered any harm.

For better or for worse, our system is set up as an adversarial one where persons claiming damages for harm suffered (called «plaintiffs») assert these claims against the persons who caused the harm (called «defendants»).

This language appears to require that a plaintiff who has suffered, say, medium harm, or even serious harm that is not «sufficiently» serious, still has their case dismissed.

A defendant could deliberately concoct a falsehood, admit they deliberately made up a lie, cause serious harm, but so long as the comment related to a matter of such public importance that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently serious — case dismissed.

Damages Fourth and finally, a plaintiff must prove damages, or losses, in order to recover compensation for the harm that they suffered.

That is much higher than «technically winning case... if the plaintiff has suffered no harm...».

that the harm the plaintiff has suffered outweighs the harm done to the public interest (especially in freedom of expression) by allowing the action to continue.

In Denver personal injury claims, plaintiffs are allowed to seek compensation for all types of damages suffered, including both economic and noneconomic harm.

If a child has been the victim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and suffers from stomachaches, headaches, skin conditions, or other physical reactions to the severe emotional distress caused by the defendant's actions, for example, the plaintiff - child may recover damages for the emotional harm and any costs associated with the physical harm, as well.

A medical malpractice plaintiff needs to prove that a doctor - patient relationship was in existence at the time of alleged harm, that the healthcare practitioner did not live up to the appropriate standard of care and that the injuries suffered were directly caused by that failure.

When you are a plaintiff in a lawsuit, you have the obligation to prove that another person's actions caused you to suffer harm.

Civil lawsuits are filed so that a plaintiff can recover monetary damages for harm they have suffered as a result of another person's conduct.

This is why the plaintiff's lawyer must put together a strong case with the appropriate documentation to demonstrate the true degree of harm and loss the victim suffered and the length of time that the victim suffered.

For damages, which focused on the harm suffered by the plaintiff, hypothetical scenarios where the defendant used non-infringing alternatives are not to be considered.

[95] The initial question to be asked is whether the plaintiff would have suffered the harm «but for» the physician's negligence.

At Altman & Altman, our drug defect lawyers represent plaintiffs seeking to recover compensation for the harm they have suffered from taking a dangerous or defective medication.

In order to upset an earlier judgment, the fraud must be material, and the plaintiff (victim) must prove that 1) she suffered substantial harm as a result, and 2) she could not have detected the fraud at the time it occurred by using reasonable care.

In order to prove that a defendant breached a duty, the plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant's negligent acts could foreseeably result in the harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.

This means plaintiffs would not need to prove that the defendant's actions caused or materially contributed to the harm suffered, which lawyers say is the biggest hurdle litigants face when trying to bring lawsuits against emitters in Canada today.

This is applicable any time a defendant's alleged conduct was prohibited by a statute, and the harm suffered by the plaintiff is the type of harm the statute was designed to protect against.

Monetary damages are tied to the material harm suffered by the plaintiff.

Thus, where a plaintiff suffers a single injury as a result of the tortious acts of multiple defendants, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that the conduct of each defendant was a substantial factor in the harm.

This requirement makes it very difficult to form a class of plaintiffs and meet the high burden of proof that every individual suffered the exact same harm.

As compensation for her catastrophic injuries, the suit asks the court to award the plaintiff and her spouse damages for the harm suffered, included lost wages and loss of consortium (marital support).

That said, the large damages award, Justice Stinson's specific discussion of the harm that the plaintiff suffered, and the shocking nature of the defendant's actions suggest that this decision will be a powerful precedent.

The plaintiff suffered physical and neurological harm that necessitated surgeries and caused her pain up to and through the trial.

As noted above, a key issue when dealing with causation and preexisting conditions is providing sufficient evidence showing a causal link between the act of negligence and some additional harm suffered by the plaintiff.

These awards are not intended to compensate the plaintiff for any harm they have suffered.

It quoted Campbell's guidelines: «(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized in comparable cases.»

Although that court suggested that any regulation of private property to protect landmark values was unconstitutional if «just compensation» were not afforded, it also appeared to rely upon its findings: first, that the cost to Penn Central of operating the Terminal building itself, exclusive of purely railroad operations, exceeded the revenues received from concessionaires and tenants in the Terminal; and second, that the special transferable development rights afforded Penn Central as an owner of a landmark site did not «provide compensation to plaintiffs or minimize the harm suffered by plaintiffs due to the designation of the Terminal as a landmark.»

Aside from whether the plaintiff can show grounds to believe that he / she / it has a good case and the defendant has no good defence, the court still has to weigh the potential or actual harm suffered by the plaintiff against the public interest in the expression.

Above - market prejudgment interest overstates the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff and already serves a punitive function.

These aggravated damages would go to the plaintiff as compensation for uncompensated dignity harms (separate and apart from pain and suffering).

The personal injury bar's argument against limiting noneconomic damages — that a jury's award of noneconomic damages should not be reduced to an amount determined by legislators because a jury can determine on a case - by - case basis to what extent to compensate a plaintiff for harm suffered — fails to address the difference between noneconomic damages and economic damages, and fails to take into account the intangibility of noneconomic damages awards.

In a case where compensatory damages to the plaintiff are relatively low, such a result might be viewed as constitutionally suspect because of the supposed «disparity» between the «actual or poten - tial harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.»

The court in Rea noted that corporate losses are not shareholder losses, relying on the traditional legal distinction between the two, and further finding that a plaintiff in an oppression action must show some grounds as to why he or she was personally harmed by the defendants, and that a general harm suffered by all shareholders equally for a harm actually done to the corporation can not ground an oppression action.

[13] Second, reviewing courts must also consider whether the «disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award» is constitutionally excessive.

In this particular case, it appeared that the harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the plaintiff was rather low, and suffered before the alleged distribution to third - parties occurred,

Where the plaintiff is engaged in illicit activity, harm it suffers as a consequence may not be compensable.

[59] The primary test to be applied in determining causation is commonly articulated as the «but for» test: a defendant will be fully liable for the harm suffered by a plaintiff, even if other causal factors were at play, so long as the plaintiff establishes a «substantial connection» between the injuries and the defendant's negligence beyond the de minimus range: Farrant v. Latkin, 2011 BCCA 336 (B.C.C.A), at paras 9 and 11; Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458; Blackwater v. Plint, 2005 SCC 58; Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 2007 SCC 7; Clements v.Clements,, 2012 SCC 32.

Even if plaintiffs show they didn't consent to the use of their biometric information, they might still have to show that they suffered concrete harm, based on a recent U.S. Supreme Court case.

As plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim, are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest favor an injunction, the court will grant plaintiffs» request to enjoin Proposition 65's warning requirement for glyphosate.