Sentences with phrase «primacy of national law»

Le Pen is campaigning for a wholesale renegotiation of the EU's treaties, restoring the primacy of national law, declawing the European Central Bank, ending free movement, and effectively killing the Single Market.

Not exact matches

I believe that thanks to the national constitutional doctrines on the «conditional» primacy of EU law (on the «conditional supremacy» of EU law in the UK, see the post by Garner on this blog) as well as to the corresponding EU provisions — the constitutional identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU and the authorisation to apply higher national standards of fundamental rights in Article 53 CFR — national constitutional or apex courts can provide necessary checks and balances on the ECJ enormous judicial power.

We should see the occasional tug of war between national constitutional courts and the ECJ regarding the primacy of national constitutional or EU law not as a pathological condition but as a desirable, deliberative mechanisms aimed at balancing judicial power.

In my view, this saga illustrates a positive side to the «conditional» acceptance of EU law primacy by national constitutional courts as the latter provide checks and balances on the ECJ's enormous judicial power.

In these three orders, the SCC concluded that the constitutional questions did not meet the relevance test because, under the principle of primacy of EU law, a national provision that is found to be incompatible with EU law must be displaced and can not be applied by the national courts when deciding a case.

It did so to anticipate challenges to the primacy of EU law by national constitutional courts and the Court therefore took great care in stressing the autonomous nature of EU fundamental rights protection.

Second, I will explore whether the ECJ can still withdraw from its stance taken in Taricco I without opening the Pandora's box of exceptions to the EU law primacy: either due to national constitutional identity (Article 4 (2) TEU) or higher national standards of fundamental rights» protection (Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).

In conclusion, one can state that the primacy of EU law, as interpreted by the ECJ inTaricco I ruling, does not conflict with national fundamental human rights; indeed, like Italy, even the other EU Member States, together with individual human rights, protect fundamental social rights.

29 That said, where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by European Union law, implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51 (1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised (see, in relation to the latter aspect, Case C - 399 / 11 Melloni [2013] ECR I - 0000, paragraph 60).

Primacy, that is the precedence EU law takes over any national laws in cases of conflict, is one of the most fundamental aspects of EU law.

The essential characteristics of the Community legal order which has thus been established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.»

As a result of all the foregoing, the Labour Court concluded that, given the primacy of EU law over provisions of national law, the national judge is obliged not to apply the new fees.

In conclusion, one can state that the primacy of EU law, as interpreted by the ECJ, does not conflict with national fundamental rights.

It is true that Article 6 (3) refers to the constitutional traditions that are common (emphasis added) to the Member States; however, the reference to this characteristic should not prevent to inject a certain degree of pluralism in the notion of constitutional tradition (s), as the ICC has suggested, that makes it possible to reconcile a higher standard of protection entrenched in the national Constitution and the primacy of EU law.

Only a few days after the Court of Justice of the European Union buried the hatchet in the so - called Taricco saga, the Italian Constitutional Court issued a decision that may inaugurate the most significant shift of its jurisprudence in European affairs since 1984, when the Constitutional Court fully accepted the principle of primacy of EU law and blessed the disapplication of national legislation incompatible with EU law.

It is true that immediately thereafter the ECJ makes reference to Melloni, by clarifying that «in that respect, the national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised».

From his viewpoint, this cooperation is the right way «to move the whole debate [about the relationship between the ECJ and national constitutional courts] forward», which is «actually more important» than these conceptual questions [about the scope of primacy of EU law] that are really only of interest to professors at universities» but that «do not make much of a difference in actual practice».