However, this approach should be rarely used to ensure that the fundamental principles of tort law
for proof of causation are not undermined.
1See Russelyn S. Carruth and Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk of Greater Than Two in
Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 Jurimetrics 195 (collecting cases).
This is because the law
requires proof of causation only on a balance of probabilities, whereas scientific or medical experts often require a higher degree of certainty before drawing conclusions on causation (p. 330).
The Supreme Court's summary of the issues in the appeal suggests that that all the Court was asked to do is clarify the meaning of the Resurfice material contribution test for
proof of the causation requirements in causes of action in negligence and, then, determine the correct result in Clements based on that test.
Those of us who need to know such things know that the SCC granted leave to appeal in Clements v Clements 2011 CanLII 36004 (from 2010 BCCA 581) where the issue will be the meaning of the Canadian material - contribution doctrine (and maybe some other things
about proof of causation in Canadian tort law should the Court deign to go there.)
In order to do so, the plaintiff must
present proof of causation both in terms of actual, factual causation and with regard to «proximate,» or legal, causation.
Where there is reasonable evidence of an impending threat to public harm, it is inappropriate to require
proof of causation beyond a reasonable doubt before taking steps to avert the threat... that reasonable efforts to reduce risk need not await scientific proof.
The Court seems to have provided somewhat of a roadmap for
proof of causation where there are multiple sufficient causes and multiple tortfeasors.
And to draw a link between between real - world interactions based on digital interaction is erroneous — just look at the long - running battle for
proof of causation between gaming and real - world violence.
This post is already too long but, for the sake of completeness, since I've suggested there's a significant problem in the judge's use of «substantial», I'll add a bit more, including a reference to the case that once wasn't quite every Canadian (common law side) judge and civil litigator's favourite case on many aspects
of proof of causation and damages.
It shows that, although there is
no proof of causation, the risk of a correlation between lifetime cannabis use and a single psychotic episode is at worst 0.013 % and probably less than 0.003 %.
Proof of causation of cancer is extraordinarily difficult in litigation.
Like someone already said, if there is
no proof of causation, then the study should say «There is no evidence that video games cause violent behavior.»
(Part of the How to Talk to a Global Warming Skeptic guide) Objection: Correlation is not
proof of causation.
To similar effect the Court said, inSnell v. Farrell, at 327, that
proof of causation requires «a substantial connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct».
There has not in fact been
any proof of causation through these mechanisms, which was the question I originally posed to you.
Proof of causation can be a particularly difficult issue in a medical malpractice case.
(1) The general, but not conclusive, test for
proof of causation is the «but for» test, which requires a plaintiff to show that his or her injury would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendant (paragraph 14).
Ltd. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, 2007 SCC 7, as a doctrine which eliminates
proof of causation as an element of the cause of action in negligence, then where, in either Clements or Resurfice, or any other Supreme Court of Canada decision, do we find the Court explaining why eliminating the requirement of proof of causation was appropriate in light of the principles it had set out in Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co?