Resurfice seemingly declared an entirely different meaning for material contribution or materially contributed which eliminated the need, under that that test, to
prove factual causation on the balance of probability and, in so doing, removed the concept of «material contribution» or «materially contributes» from the but - for lexicon.
I'm trying to gather anecdotal information as to whether the SCC decision in Resurfice v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7 and the «material contribution» doctrine mentioned in the case are helping plaintiffs get before - trial settlements — by using the Resurfice «material contribution» notion to get them past difficulties in
proving factual causation using the «but - for» test — which are settlements that they might not have been able to get before Resurfice.
Not exact matches
[126] The «but for» test is the general test for
factual causation: the plaintiff must
prove on a balance of probabilities that but for the defendant's negligence, she would not have suffered her injuries.
1) Circular
causation involves
factual situations where it is impossible for the plaintiff to
prove which one of two or more possible tortious causes are the cause of the plaintiff's harm;
As with
proving negligence,
factual evidence is important in
proving causation.
In an odd, «O. Henryish» way, they might have been
proven right: but only if it is the case that the SCC is now asserting (see para. 15, and see item 7) that Athey material contribution should never have been understood to be a method of establishing
factual causation on the balance of probability
Did the trial judge make a serious
factual error when she found that Kiskadee had failed to show that the telephone cable servicing its units ran under the basement floor of 216 and hence could not
prove causation?