Sentences with phrase «question on judicial review»

Not exact matches

JUDGING THE JUDGES Patrick McKinley Brennan's review «The Forms Behind the Laws» (April) begs fundamental questions of interpretation, blurs the distinction between legislating and judging, and proposes a mode of judicial interpretation that would, in its practical application, be indistinguishable from judges who make decisions based on personal preference.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court's May 2016 opinion finding that Florida's system of free public schools satisfies constitutional requirements, and opined that plaintiffs» claims «either raise political questions not subject to judicial review or were correctly rejected on the merits.»

This underlying narrative is reflected in the structure of the book, which begins with the most basic of questions about the nature of judicial review (described as the keys to understanding what the court is doing), before moving on to parameters of judicial review (further dominant themes shaping the law and practice) and grounds for judicial review (public law wrongs justifying the court's intervention).

[56] Thus, «On judicial review, the question becomes whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at play.»

To obtain judicial review, a Plaintiff must present the question of the Limitation on Use of Extrapolation along with the history of the legislation.

The Divisional Court quashed the application for judicial review on the grounds that it lacked the jurisdiction to grant some of the relief sought and there were complex questions of fact and law that required a trial.

Two questions arose: (i) whether s 204 contained an express requirement under which the county court was required by an enactment to make a decision applying the principles that were applied by the court on an application for judicial review, thus placing s 204 appeals within the public law category; and (ii) if not, whether there were any other reasons requiring the application of judicial review principles with the result that s 204 appeals fell within the post-LASPO 2012 civil legal aid regime.

Their reformulated reasonableness standard retains key features of its predecessors: (i) applicability to questions that lend themselves to more than one answer; and (ii) judicial review limited to an assessment of the administrative decision - maker's reasons on the basis of its justification, transparency, and legitimacy.

This case raises challenging questions about the proper constitutional role of courts, their appropriate function on judicial review, and the relationship between administrative tribunals and the judiciary.

The secretary of state tends to instruct only public lawyers to represent him on judicial review; but this only begs the question.

On judicial review the chambers justice dismissed the application on the basis that he was bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Ostrensky v. Crowsnest Pass, 1996 ABCA 18 in regards to the effect of a tie vote and that the privative clause in the Teaching Profession Act «insulated all decisions from judicial review except on questions of jurisdiction»On judicial review the chambers justice dismissed the application on the basis that he was bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Ostrensky v. Crowsnest Pass, 1996 ABCA 18 in regards to the effect of a tie vote and that the privative clause in the Teaching Profession Act «insulated all decisions from judicial review except on questions of jurisdiction»on the basis that he was bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Ostrensky v. Crowsnest Pass, 1996 ABCA 18 in regards to the effect of a tie vote and that the privative clause in the Teaching Profession Act «insulated all decisions from judicial review except on questions of jurisdiction»on questions of jurisdiction».

Jonathan Sumption asks the question: «How far can judicial review go before it trespasses on the proper function of government and the legislature in a democracy?»

This clause insulates all decisions from judicial review except on questions of jurisdiction.

The court decided to review Issues 2, 3, 5 and 6 on a «deferential standard of reasonableness,» but applied correctness to Issues 1 and 4: «While I acknowledge that in the administrative law context a tribunal may develop its own procedures as to admissibility without the recognized strictures found in the judicial rules of evidence, whereas issues # 1 and # 4 principally involve specific questions of law and concurrent issues involving breaches of natural justice or procedural fairness, I will apply a standard of correctness.

In many cases of course the shoe is on the other foot and the Crown and other parties urge that these more fundamental questions are best dealt with in the ordinary courts rather than in regulatory, quasi-criminal, or judicial review proceedings: see, for example, R v Lefthand, 2007 ABCA 206, esp per Slatter JA).

While a tribunal's substantive decision - making under its home statute may survive a judicial review merely by being reasonable, a tribunal must still be correct about questions of general law, and must still reach decisions on a foundation of procedural fairness; legislatures do not authorize tribunals to decide matters through unjust processes (Dunsmuir at 128 - 129).

Some juvenile and domestic relations judges got an earful Dec. 8, as legislators holding judicial reelection interviews asked pointed questions based on critical performance reviews.

However, one may question whether the EFTA Court is not going very far here in reviewing the appropriateness of domestic judicial decisions in a field where EEA law expressly gives discretion to EEA EFTA States — in deliberate contrast to the constraints imposed on EU Member States under the preliminary reference procedure.

On judicial review, the Court found the only service in question to be special education.

At a moment at which there are many serious criticisms of liberalism and / or questions about its future, combined with substantial unanimity among legal academics about various progressive values (as seen, to be clear, through an establishment lens) and the routine invocation in current scholarly and public writing of things like «rule of law,» faith in judicial review, and so on, there is a lot of room for interesting and valuable work questioning those assumptions and premises.

Both are classified as questions of law (the former as one of jurisdiction), and hence are matters for a reviewing court to resolve on a «correctness» basis under Australia's judicial review framework.

Deference is about the way in which a court treats an administrative decision, primarily on judicial review but also in other contexts, where the legitimacy of the decision is in question.

In the initial judicial review hearing Justice Rooke concluded the applicable standard to review the Board's decision was correctness on the basis that the Board's determination that it could increase assessed property value was a true question of jurisdiction — one of the established exceptions to the presumption of deference owed by a reviewing court to a statutory tribunal interpreting its home legislation (see Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Limited v Edmonton (City), 2013 ABQB 526 (CanLII) at paras 18 - 31).

Kear - Jodoin J. applied correctness on the basis (at para. 11) that bias is a question of general law of central importance to the legal system — one of the Dunsmuir categories that calls for correctness review — and commented by way of explanation: «Judicial impartiality is pivotal to the integrity of our legal system» (at para. 13).

Consistent with these earlier reports, the Commission strongly favoured statutory appeals over judicial review as a simpler mechanism for legal oversight that can be calibrated to address the particularities of statutory tribunal decisions, and recommended that legislation contain a right of appeal on questions of law (and in certain instances on questions of fact) to the courts from the exercise of statutory power with only a few exceptions.

This also raises an important question for tribunal decision makers: if implicit reasons are important enough to ground a decision on judicial review, why are they not important enough to make explicit in the original decision?

Well, as I suggested last week, your answer to this question probably depends on the sort of judicial review we are talking about, because your assessment of both the costs and the benefits of judicial review probably varies depending on the circumstances — and your legal culture and ideology.

To the extent that it is required by the Rule of Law principle, judicial review of administrative action, including correctness review on questions of law, is a constitutional requirement.

It is, arguably, a specific instance of the broader question of how the law ought to deal with unusual situations on which precedent is lacking; as I observed here, in a post prompted, in part, by prof. Magliocca's musings on the subject of judicial review of unusual statutes, that broader question is not an easy one.

A deferential approach to judicial review requires judges, however, to be satisfied by an answer that is merely reasonable, even on questions of law.

[57] On judicial review, the question becomes whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at play.

Ensuring the Healthy Development of Foster Children: A Guide for Judges, Advocates and Child Welfare Professionals (PDF - 2,430 KB) New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children (1999) Questions that should be asked by a judge, lawyer, legal guardian, or Court Appointed Special Advocate when reviewing cases of children in foster care to ensure that the child's health needs are being addressed.