I was brought up in the church,
a quite conservative church.
In the United States most preaching, even in
quite conservative churches, has a primarily psychological character.
Not exact matches
This way of telling Luther's story is
quite conservative in its effects, even though it presents Luther as a radical, for it makes the present division of the
Church seem normal and inevitable to us.
While the fundamentalist experience on this question has been
quite slow in allowing the ministry of women, lagging far behind the
churches of the mainstream, the Wesleyan
churches have often been the pioneers of this practice, especially in the nineteenth century when the
conservative Wesleyan
churches were far in advance of the more established denominations.
Formed by those who'd left the Evangelical Lutheran
Church of America, a mainline body, and who weren't
quite so
conservative as to join the Lutheran
Church — Missouri Synod, the NALC recently held its third annual convention, and a good time was had by all.
As has already been stressed, here the
conservatives as well as the revolutionaries start from presuppositions which are objectively
quite unjustified, for they regard either the past or the future of the
Church as an ideal state.
The usual assertions are (1) that this kind of religion is today on the defensive; (2) that the defensive posture is occasioned by the flourishing of «
conservative churches» (although the alleged liberal enervation is also seen in more autonomous terms); (3) that the growth in religious conservatism and
conservative churches is itself the result of widespread reaction against «secular humanist» values and against those who hold such values; (4) that our society as a whole has been experiencing a breakdown in moral consensus, a loss of moral coherence somehow connected with a decline in oldline Protestant dominance; and (5) that some or all of these happenings have been
quite sudden, so that the early 1960s can be taken as a kind of benchmark — as a time before the fall.
The first problem here is that, minus signs or not, the fluctuating growth rates for the oldline
churches (
quite healthy growth during the postwar revival; decline during the 1970s; some recovery in the first half of the «80s) tell us little if they are not compared, and compared over a number of decades, with the growth rates for the
conservative churches.
It's actually
quite similar to the
Church of Christ ad that showed gay people turned away from a conservative c
Church of Christ ad that showed gay people turned away from a
conservative churchchurch.
The more
conservative churches are still growing, riding the boom in both authoritarian and experiential religion that the mainliners have not
quite known how to exploit.
You can see that after 1996 the turnout has been
quite low on average, so the referendum of 2005 is not a significant outlier, but I still remember a vast and hard campaign from
conservatives (and especially the
church) that were calling for abstentionism.