Not exact matches
The outlook could
be stabilized if the government's commitment to fiscal consolidation and
debt reduction or its
capacity to do so
was to wane,» the agency added in the same note.
It
's the oldest world lender and it has
been making headlines amid concerns it doesn't have the financial
capacity to cover its bad
debts.
«Japan
is already undergoing rapid population aging, which will likely limit the market's future absorptive
capacity of public
debt,» wrote IMF economist Kiichi Tokuoka in a paper this year.
Carney insisted that Aug. 2
is the drop - dead date for the Treasury's cash flow — «beyond that date we lose our
capacity to borrow» — and expressed confidence that the
debt ceiling would
be raised by the deadline.
A significant share of the corporate
debt in stressed economies
is now owed by companies with weak
debt servicing
capacity and this could negatively affect bank balance sheets and cut into profits, it added.
«We have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the Administration to
be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government's
debt dynamics any time soon.»
«In our view, China's structural growth deceleration
is only half - way through and under the weight of
debt and excess
capacity, weakening investment demand will remain the main culprit.»
It means that it
is proving politically hard to implement reforms as quickly as some in the administration would like, and it also means that we
are getting closer to
debt capacity constraints.
Debt capacity limits
are the major constraint on China's adjustment.
It
is only when credit growth begins to decelerate much more rapidly than nominal GDP growth that we can begin to talk hopefully about China's moving in the right direction, and it
is only when credit growth falls permanently below the growth rate of the economy's
debt - servicing
capacity that China will have adjusted.
Assume, for example, that a disorderly rebalancing occurs because Beijing waits so long to force through the reforms that it runs into
debt capacity limits (i.e. the growth in
debt can not exceed the growth in the amount of bad
debt that must continually
be rolled over).
In that case any credit - fueled increase in investment would likely have resulted in a net improvement in China's
debt servicing
capacity, in which case, with government
debt at well below 25 % of GDP, rising
debt would not
be a concern.
Reported nominal GDP growth
is around 5 %, but the growth in
debt servicing
capacity is probably lower.
Debt, in this case, must be rising faster than debt servicing capacity, in which case Beijing's true debt level is not the nominal debt level but rather the nominal debt level plus estimates of contingent liabilities likely to rise as a consequence of wasted investm
Debt, in this case, must
be rising faster than
debt servicing capacity, in which case Beijing's true debt level is not the nominal debt level but rather the nominal debt level plus estimates of contingent liabilities likely to rise as a consequence of wasted investm
debt servicing
capacity, in which case Beijing's true
debt level is not the nominal debt level but rather the nominal debt level plus estimates of contingent liabilities likely to rise as a consequence of wasted investm
debt level
is not the nominal
debt level but rather the nominal debt level plus estimates of contingent liabilities likely to rise as a consequence of wasted investm
debt level but rather the nominal
debt level plus estimates of contingent liabilities likely to rise as a consequence of wasted investm
debt level plus estimates of contingent liabilities likely to rise as a consequence of wasted investment.
But closing down unnecessary
capacity can pay for itself, even if unemployed workers
are temporarily put on the government payroll (causing
debt to rise, but usually by less than it had before), but only temporarily as Beijing takes other measures to boost household income through wealth transfers from the state and so to boost consumption, a form of demand which
is likely to
be more labor intensive than the demand created in the process of over-
capacity.
But if investment
is being misallocated, if investment levels
are higher than China's ability to absorb and exploit capital stock, then it should not
be surprising at all that
debt capacity is becoming a problem.
The fact that China's
debt is rising much more quickly than China's
debt servicing
capacity is consistent with my implicit model — which claims that the optimal amount of capital stock in China
is a function of China's relatively low level of social capital, and that Chinese investment has far exceeded its optimal level — but it doesn't prove it.
The fact that
debt may
be rising faster than
debt servicing
capacity is not necessarily inconsistent with the capital frontier model.
When this happens and as
debt levels rise relative to
debt servicing
capacity, at some point the major stakeholders — including businesses, creditors, household savers, workers and so on — became uncertain enough about how this gap will
be allocated that they take steps to protect themselves from this uncertainty.
Even massive
debt - financed spending will not help unless the projects
are intentionally designed to durably enhance the long - term productivity of the U.S. economy, to avoid duplicative
capacity, and to relieve constraints that threaten to become binding in the future (personally, I remain convinced that renewable energy should
be central to that list).
When one compares credit growth to growth in
debt - servicing
capacity, not only
is it uncertain how quickly credit
is growing in China but, more importantly, it
is even less certain how quickly the country's
debt - servicing
capacity is growing.
Everyone agreed that
debt in China
is still growing far too quickly relative to the country's
debt - servicing
capacity, but the pace of credit growth seems to have declined in 2017, even as real GDP growth held steady and, more importantly, nominal GDP growth increased.
In my email, I went on to discuss why this matters so much and why it
is incorrect to think of China's GDP growth as growth in China's underlying economy (or in its
debt - servicing
capacity, or its productive
capacity, or however else one prefers to think of GDP).
What I hope happens
is that we never find out how China reaches
debt capacity limits because Beijing reins in credit growth well before this happens.
While the purpose of this activity may
be to generate employment, if the activity
is not productive, the GDP it creates — along with the employment it generates — will
be reversed in the future once
debt capacity has
been reached.
Of course
debt growing faster than
debt - servicing
capacity is unsustainable, so we will set as our first financial sector target the point at which the two grow in line with each other.
The standard proxy for growth in
debt - servicing
capacity is GDP growth, but this
is only valid in economies in which GDP growth data
is a systems output that measures the underlying performance of the economy.
Because the amount of bad
debt in each period
is almost certainly a growing number, it must follow logically that the GDP growth number observers really want, rather than the one they have — that
is, GDP growth as a systems output that can serve as a proxy for
debt - servicing
capacity —
is a declining number, and perhaps even a quickly declining number.
I have usually estimated that it would reach
debt capacity limits around 2016 - 18 but now I think it
is likely to happen earlier.
The information collected by the credit bureau and processed into your business credit profile
is designed to reflect the financial condition of your business and its
capacity to service
debt.
China's public - sector investment, in other words,
is value destroying, and because it
is funded by
debt, additional investment causes China's real
debt servicing costs to rise faster than its real
debt servicing
capacity.
Ms. Caro Diaz
is part of the Organizing and
Capacity Building Team at the Center for Popular Democracy and provides support to social movements in Puerto Rico struggling against the
debt and austerity measures proposed by a Fiscal Control Board.
Essentially what that means
is we've got somewhere between $ 1.5 billion and $ 2 billion of
debt capacity available to us.
Capacity measures your ability to generate income that can
be used to pay back the borrowed
debt and
is also known as cash flow.
As stated in the
capacity section, there
is an element around how your business can help service the
debt, but that alone doesn't get you a loan.
Once banks refined their cash - flow analysis and SME loan - underwriting skills, they
were able to better understand the
debt capacity of individual businesses and structure loans according to cash flows.
The Canadian consumer, meanwhile, might
be benefiting from somewhat cheaper gasoline, but their spending
capacity is stretched thanks to a record high level of household
debt.
The loan
is granted mainly on the basis of the project's
capacity to generate sufficient revenue to service the
debt.
As far as I
am aware, this agreement
is the first since the Young Plan for Germany's reparations
debt to subordinate international
debt obligations to the
capacity - to - pay principle.
In addition, borrowing and lending
are forward - looking decisions: borrowers
are making judgments about their future
capacity to service
debt, while lenders
are making decisions about future returns.
Since the industry consolidated and management incentives changed to
being based on returns on capital rather than growth,
capacity (supply) growth has tracked GDP (demand) growth closely, free cash flow generation has
been significant and consistent, and the companies have consistently paid down
debt, bought back stock and paid dividends.
As an indicator of your creditworthiness how much you owe and how it
's broken up across the different types of loans acts as a signal about your
capacity to manage your existing
debt.
Given the State's limited resources, shrinking statutory
debt capacity and unmet capital needs, it
is critical that the State prioritize its use of
debt and capital resources — including the (windfall) resources deposited in the (infrastructure fund)-- to ensure that they
are used as effectively as possible, and with appropriate levels of transparency and accountability.
Among the strategies for adhering to the
capacity limit will
be transferring and spending up to $ 500 million from the
debt reduction reserve fund, the report said.
The plan, which
is released following the passage of a state budget presenting an analysis of the spending plan as well as out - year projections, shows that the state's
debt capacity is expected to tighten in the coming fiscal years.
New York
is expected to remain under its
debt capacity limit even as it continues to borrow heavily for new capital projects, according to the state Division of Budget's enacted budget plan released on Friday.
«You know that Kaduna
is the second most indebted state in the country and unlike Lagos; we do not have the industrial base or the commercial
capacity to bear the
debt burden that we have.
«Given the State's limited resources, shrinking statutory
debt capacity and unmet capital needs, it
is critical that New York prioritize its use of
debt and capital resources, including the resources deposited in the DIIF and the other settlement resources, to ensure that they
are used as effectively as possible,» the report found.
«There
is a
debt profiling known as ESLA in place, and we ought to
be careful because we
are not out of the woods yet, when it comes to our generating
capacity.
That
was the conclusion of a key Communist Party meeting a decade ago, yet what followed
was more of the same: rapid investment - led expansion, which turned China into the world's no. 2 economy, but left it laden with
debt, environmental damage and excess
capacity.