If the actual occasion is creative, can the theory of prehensions support
a realistic epistemology?
Collingwood's philosophy developed out of an opposition to
the realistic epistemology, which he stigmatizes as the undischarged bankruptcy of modern philosophy (A 45).
How can one simultaneously reject a realistic starting point and approve of the elaboration of a metaphysics based on
a realistic epistemology?
Already in The Idea of Nature, he made a distinction between Whitehead's realism and that of the analytic philosophy.23 In An Autobiography, he radicalizes that distinction, interpreting Whitehead's realism as contradictory to
the realistic epistemology of the neo - positivists.24 Hence, he concludes that Whitehead's cosmology is in fact constructed on an anti-realistic principle (EM 176).
Not exact matches
Third, the implicit
epistemology of the view is naïve, close to common sense or to the natural standpoint,
realistic in one sense of that chameleon word.
The recognition of these two levels of perception distinguishes Whitehead's
epistemology from other
realistic ones.
To underpin this
realistic interpretation, one may refer to Whitehead's magnum opus, Process and Reality, where, on several occasions, he explicitly objects to a Kantian
epistemology, presenting his philosophy of organism as a return to a pre-Kantian mode of thought.22