It is easier to accept that reasonableness is the go - to standard of review and to refocus on the task of assessing
the reasonableness of an administrative decision.
Not exact matches
Specifically, the deferential review
of reasonableness will follow where an
administrative decision - maker interprets its own home statute.
This point goes to a tension in Doré between the duty
of administrative decision - makers to consider Charter values and the role
of a reviewing court which has to assess the
reasonableness of the resulting
decision and whether a proportionate balance was reached.
Their reformulated
reasonableness standard retains key features
of its predecessors: (i) applicability to questions that lend themselves to more than one answer; and (ii) judicial review limited to an assessment
of the
administrative decision - maker's reasons on the basis
of its justification, transparency, and legitimacy.
The majority opinion justifies the need to merge
reasonableness simpliciter with patent unreasonableness on now familiar grounds that: (i) the two standards are impossible to distinguish in application, despite good intentions in selecting a «middle ground» standard where pragmatic factors point both for and against judicial deference; and (ii) patent unreasonableness contemplates judicial endorsement
of an «unreasonable»
administrative decision.
These findings on standard
of review are not only consistent with the overall trend in existing jurisprudence concerning the judicial review
of FOIP
decisions, but are also consistent with the trend towards
reasonableness as the standard
of review generally in substantive judicial review
of statutory interpretation by
administrative decision - makers.
A standard
of reasonableness was applied to the Board's
decision, which makes sense given the tendency to treat
administrative applications
of legal concepts (such as undertakings) with deference (at para. 21).
Abstract In a nutshell, the majority
of the Court in Meadows v. Minister for Justice held that proportionality would be relevant in determining the
reasonableness or unreasonableness
of an
administrative decision affecting rights.
Yes, this looks a lot like the Pushpanathan list
of factors, [14] but the difference is that these factors are being considered not to decide on the standard
of review — correctness,
reasonableness and patent unreasonableness — but rather to determine the extent to which the court should defer to an
administrative decision in the context
of a particular case and a particular question — that is, the range
of options that are legally open to the
decision maker.
Although, as Dyzenhaus has argued, a justification - based approach to
reasonableness is not necessarily more intrusive than the traditional Wednesbury approach, the effect
of Li seems to have been to increase judicial scrutiny
of administrative decisions in at least some cases.
So we've suffered through categorizations into jurisdictional error and non-jurisdictional error, legislative,
administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial
decisions, categories
of correctness,
reasonableness and patent unreasonableness and, now, categories
of correctness and
reasonableness.
and the Court's unanimous
decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, which held that
administrative decisions were not subject to the Oakes test at all, further that discretionary, individualized
decisions (although not
decisions as to the constitutionality
of a law) were to be reviewed for their compliance with «Charter values» on a standard
of reasonableness, not correctness.
[86] The recent
decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 (CanLII) at para. 50 (Agraira) and McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67 (CanLII) at paras. 20 - 21 and 33 (McLean) stand for the proposition that the presumption
of reasonableness set out in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teacher's Association, 2011 SCC 61 (CanLII), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654 at para. 39 extends to any
administrative decision maker (including a ministerial
decision maker) interpreting his or her home statute.
However, because Ktunaxa Nation is a judicial review
of an
administrative decision, the justificatory analysis occurs under an
administrative law approach under the Doré framework where the standard
of review is
reasonableness.
The question to be decided was whether the
administrative decision of the CLP was consistent with the duty to accommodate a disability under the Charter and subject to the
reasonableness standard: did the CLP's
decision balance the right protected by the Charter and the objectives sought under the AIAOD?