Professor Daly, in a 2014 paper, has neatly summarized the possible view of a party faced with the tribunal expanding
its reasons on judicial review by making explicit what was previously implicit:
Not exact matches
An appeal
on the merits is not available for Tribunal merger authorisation decisions, but the ACCC is seeking
judicial review, alleging three reviewable errors, including that the Tribunal erred in its
reasoning that «it could only conclude that the proposed acquisition was likely to result in a detriment if the Tribunal concluded that there would be a substantial lessening of competition».
Read the OSA's decision: https://humanism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/AD2410The-London-Oratory-Hammersmith-Fulham-28August13.docx Read the BHA's previous press release
on the OSA decision: https://humanism.org.uk/2013/08/29/schools-adjudicator-london-oratory-school-must-overhaul-admissions-criteria-after-bha-complaint/ Read the BHA's press release
on the threat of
judicial review: https://humanism.org.uk/2013/11/05/london-oratory-school-challenges-schools-adjudicators-decision-must-rewrite-admissions-policy/ Read more about the BHA's campaigns work
on «faith» schools: http://www.humanism.org.uk/campaigns/religion-and-schools/faith-schools View the BHA's table of types of school with a religious character: http://www.humanism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/schools-with-a-religious-character.pdf The British Humanist Association is the national charity working
on behalf of non-religious people who seek to live ethical and fulfilling lives
on the basis of
reason and humanity.
This kind of landmark
judicial pronouncement is understandably rare in every jurisdiction not excluding the most advanced democracies for the obvious
reason that it has always been considered prudent for the preservation of the state, democracy and the peace to ensure that proactive mechanisms are put in place before, during and after voting day to deliver credible electoral outcomes rather than rely
on costly post electoral
judicial reviews.
Part of the
reason support for Ling - Cohan was so fervent is because the vaunted panel
review process was so flawed and anonymous attacks
on her in the press were so vicious, starting in the New York Post but repeated uncritically by other outlets, requoting the Post «source» — allegedly from the panel but possibly a self - interested operative for another
judicial candidate — who called her «slow» and «lazy,» when even a cursory check of court records shows her output to be above average.
This is yet another
reason why it is good to get legal advice
on the strength of your case before going ahead with a
judicial review.
Two questions arose: (i) whether s 204 contained an express requirement under which the county court was required by an enactment to make a decision applying the principles that were applied by the court
on an application for
judicial review, thus placing s 204 appeals within the public law category; and (ii) if not, whether there were any other
reasons requiring the application of
judicial review principles with the result that s 204 appeals fell within the post-LASPO 2012 civil legal aid regime.
Courts
on judicial review do view expertise as a valid doctrinal
reason for deference, and are willing to put aside their own interpretation of a statute in favour of a decision - maker's.
Their reformulated reasonableness standard retains key features of its predecessors: (i) applicability to questions that lend themselves to more than one answer; and (ii)
judicial review limited to an assessment of the administrative decision - maker's
reasons on the basis of its justification, transparency, and legitimacy.
Secondly, the existence of a statutory process for challenging the correctness of tax assessments should never be a
reason for excluding
judicial review on process grounds, including not only allegations of breach of natural justice but also cases where a taxpayer alleges that its legitimate expectations based
on dealings with the Department have been frustrated.
I focus in this essay
on judicial review of administrative action, looking at the subject «from the inside, trying to make sense of lawyers»
reasons and arguments as they are actually presented and defended».
This takes us to the essence of Justice Stratas»
reasoning here which is that in legal proceedings (
judicial reviews in particular) under our Westminister system of government, an attorney general enjoys a presumptive right to intervene
on the basis that public rights are vested in the Crown and an attorney general enforces those rights and represents the public interest: «Giving Attorneys General a broader right to apply to intervene in order to advance the public interest — as Rule 110 (c) does — is consistent with these foundational principles and constitutional arrangements.
And this type of analysis
on judicial review necessarily requires that adjudicative decision makers provide adequate
reasons, explaining their decisions — and not leave it to the court to fashion possible
reasons [16]-- and that there be a complete record — not just what was considered, but everything bearing
on the matter that should have been considered, in the case of legislative type decisions such as the adoption of bylaws and rules.
It should instead let administrative
judicial review be a matter of practice and the appropriate
judicial attitude, one of respectful attention to any decision - maker's
reasons for a particular decision, while recognizing that judges provide a sober second thought through
judicial review, particularly
on matters of legal interpretation.
On judicial review it is the court that is tasked with finding implied
reasons.
This also raises an important question for tribunal decision makers: if implicit
reasons are important enough to ground a decision
on judicial review, why are they not important enough to make explicit in the original decision?
Justice Stratas noted that there was anecdotal evidence that tribunal members were no longer making oral decisions because of
judicial review decisions
on sufficiency of
reasons.