Sentences with phrase «regulatory act»

(ii) against certain acts of general application, namely regulatory acts which are of direct concern to them and do not entail implementing measures.

However, the country has so far adopted only one regulatory act on cryptocurrency circulation.

Whilst a stagiaire at the Court of Justice of European Union, Jack worked on cases including: Kadi II (the effect of European procedural rights), Pringle (the validity of the European Stability Mechanism), Abdulrahim (continuing interest to bring an action for annulment), and Inuit I (the definition of regulatory acts in Article 263 TFEU for the purposes of standing).

In today's ruling the CJEU confirms the interpretation given to regulatory acts by the GC and AG Kokott earlier.

It has been hailed (and sometimes criticized) as the most sweeping financial regulatory act of the last 50 years.

While she notes that the «purpose of the revision of the former fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC by the present fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU was undoubtedly to strengthen individual legal protection by extending the legal remedies available to natural and legal persons against European Union acts of general application» (para. 33), she nevertheless continues by making three arguments which underline the General Court's interpretation of what regulatory acts entail.

Which level of intervention from Member States is required so that one can speak of «implementing measures» as a result of which it is no longer possible for natural or legal persons to use the more relaxed standing requirements for regulatory acts on the basis of the third limb of Article 263 (4) TFEU?

The ECJ thus explicitly departed from the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón who argued against such a finding «if the objective of relaxing the admissibility conditions for natural and legal persons in connection with non-legislative regulatory acts is not to be wholly frustrated» (para. 31).

The ECJ followed the General Court and defined regulatory acts as «acts of general application other than legislative acts» (para. 60).

Oleg is the author of research publications on contemporary problems in the theory of law and has participated in developing a number of federal and regional regulatory acts.

Regardless of some legislative proposals in the recent period which could significantly limit and slow down the adoption of cryptocurrencies in the country, the Japanese government took a favourable stance and approved a number of regulatory acts permitting banking groups to use cryptocurrencies and offer related financial services.

regulatory acts which are of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures (new under Lisbon Treaty)

First, «regulatory acts» as interpreted by the CJEU in Inuit encompass «acts of general application other than legislative acts».

The seal products cases (I): The notion of «regulatory act» according to AG Kokott Laurens Ankersmit

The seal product cases (III): CJEU confirms GC and AG analysis of the concept «regulatory act» in article 263 TFEU Laurens Ankersmit

The new notion of a «regulatory act» introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has also seen some first jurisprudential developments this year in the seal products cases.

The third limb creates the possibility for persons to institute proceedings against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

the meaning of «regulatory act» for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legislative acts.

This has lead the drafters of the Treaties to change the wording of article 263 TFEU which now no longer requires individual applicants to be individually concerned when challenging «regulatory acts».

The notion of «regulatory act» (the term itself originally stems from the Draft Constitutional Treaty) is thus of fundamental importance, because the broader this term is interpreted, the more acts can be challenged by individuals directly without having to demonstrate the very high threshold of individual concern.

The Advocate General considers that regulatory acts are all acts of general application apart from legislative acts.

Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

If, therefore, an act is to be considered a regulatory act, an applicant no longer needs to demonstrate that he or she is individually concerned under the very restrictive Plaumann formula.

the expression «regulatory act» is difficult to reconcile with the mandate of the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference which negotiated the Treaty of Lisbon.

Consequently, where Article III - 365 (4) of the Constitutional Treaty mentioned a possibility for natural and legal persons to institute proceedings against a «regulatory act», this clearly applied only to non-legislative acts.

In this Opinion the Advocate General endorses the approach taken by the General Court on the notion of «regulatory act» introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.

If the implementing regulation would not qualify as a regulatory act, than the applicants had to prove that they were individually concerned, which is nearly impossible given the strict Plaumann formula (Case C - 25 / 62, Plaumann v. Commission, EU: C: 1963:17).

In the INUIT order the Court concluded that «regulatory act» for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legislative acts.

(i) against a legislative or regulatory act of general application which is of direct and individual concern to them and

-LRB-...) it must be held that the meaning of «regulatory act» for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legislative acts.

It appears that the ECJ regarded the implementing regulation as a regulatory act, as AG Kokott also suggested in her Opinion (para. 26).

This because it considered that the Implementing Regulation was a regulatory act (within the meaning of Inuit I), and that it did not entail implementing measures (the Commission holds that this condition is a test as to whether «the lowest act in the hierarchy of norms is challenged» — a question of judicial economy and the organisation of judicial remedies).

Therefore a regulation does not qualify as a «regulatory act» within Article 263.4 TFEU.

The implicit «finding» of a regulatory act would also mean that the ECJ is of the opinion that the Commission Regulation fulfilled the other locus standi requirements for starting an action for annulment of a regulatory act, i.e. that the regulation is of «direct concern» to the applicants and that the implementing regulation «does not entail implementing measures».

It was in this first judgment that the ECJ for the first time gave its interpretation of the concept of «regulatory act» in the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (Case C - 583 / 11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami I, EU: C: 2013:625, a comment of this judgment can be found here).

Employment laws are fractured in an alphabet soup of statutory and regulatory acts — FMLA, ADA, ADEA, FLSA, OSHA, COBRA, to name a few.

The problem is that the regulatory act is the appendix of a new categorisation of acts (legislative, delegated and implementing) that should have taken place had the Constitution been adopted.

The Court then continues to interpret the Lisbon innovation of «regulatory act».

Although it is relatively clear that the Seal Traders are acting against a legislative act that in the eyes of trias politica could not be struck down lightly, the Court wanders into the realm of the regulatory act by carefully picking its path.

The CJEU first uses a contrario reasoning to stipulate that «regulatory acts» can not possibly imply that all «acts» of general application are «regulatory acts»:

As regards the concept of «regulatory act», it is apparent from the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU that its scope is more restricted than that of the concept of «acts» used in the first and second limbs of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, in respect of the characterisation of the other types of measures which natural and legal persons may seek to have annulled.

What makes the judgment worth mentioning here though, is the more general relevance of the Grand Chamber's interpretation of the concept of a «regulatory act».