Sentences with phrase «reliable measures of valuation»

As Graham and Dodd wrote in Security Analysis (1934), referring to the final advance that led to the 1929 market peak, the reason investors shifted their attention away from historically - reliable measures of valuation was «first, that the records of the past were proving an undependable guide to investment; and, second, that the rewards offered by the future had become irresistibly alluring.»

The recent market cycle has extended much further, but it has also brought the most historically reliable measures of valuation to obscene levels.

Although Wall Street continues to assert that valuations are «reasonable given the level of interest rates,» keep in mind that the most reliable measures of valuation imply negative 10 - 12 year total returns for the S&P 500.

This does not, for even a moment, change the fact that the most reliable measures of valuation are now an average of 3.0 times their historical norms.

Not exact matches

Moderate interest rates were associated with a whole range of subsequent returns over the following decade, and we know that those outcomes were 90 % correlated with the level of valuations at the beginning of those periods (on reliable measures such as market cap / GDP, price / revenue, Tobin's Q, the margin - adjusted Shiller P / E, and others we've presented over time - see Ockham's Razor and the Market Cycle).

There will always be conceptual issues with any single valuation measure, so the best we can do is evaluate valuations from the standpoint of multiple historically reliable approaches.

The economic gains and market returns that emerged during the Reagan Administration began from a starting point of 10.8 % unemployment, a current account surplus, and market valuations that - on the most historically reliable measures - were less than one - quarter of present levels.

None of that would even require the most historically reliable valuation measures to break below their pre-bubble norms.

With the S&P 500 within about 8 % of its highest level in history, with historically reliable valuation measures at obscene levels, implying near - zero 10 - 12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns; with an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of history.

We've long argued, and continue to assert, that the most historically reliable measures of market valuation are far beyond double their historical norms.

The essential thing to understand about valuations is that while they are highly reliable measures of prospective long - term market returns (particularly over 10 - 12 year horizons), and of potential downside risk over the completion of any market cycle, valuations are also nearly useless over shorter segments of the market cycle.

Historically - reliable valuation measures are remarkably useful in projecting long - term and full - cycle market outcomes, but the behavior of the market over shorter segments of the market cycle is driven by the psychological inclination of investors toward speculation or risk - aversion.

Even if the growth rates of nominal GDP and U.S. corporate revenues (including foreign revenues) over the coming 20 years match their 4 % growth rate of the past 20 years, and even if the most reliable valuation measures merely touch their historical norms 20 years from today, the S&P 500 Index two decades from now will trade more than 20 % lower than where it trades today.

These measures include the S&P 500 price / revenue ratio, the Margin - Adjusted CAPE (our more reliable variant of Robert Shiller's cyclically - adjusted P / E), and MarketCap / GVA — the ratio of nonfinancial market capitalization to corporate gross value - added, including estimated foreign revenues — which is easily the most reliable valuation measure we've ever created or tested, among scores of alternatives.

By March 2000, on the basis of historically reliable valuation measures, I projected that a retreat to normal valuations would require an -83 % plunge in tech stocks.

The most reliable measures of individual stock valuation we've found are based on formal discounted cash flow considerations, but among publicly - available measures we've evaluated, price / revenue ratios are better correlated with actual subsequent returns than price / earnings ratios (though normalized profit margins and other factors are obviously necessary to make cross-sectional comparisons).

While we prefer to compare market capitalization with corporate gross value added, including estimated foreign revenues, the following chart provides a longer historical perspective of where reliable valuation measures stand at present.

Recent cycles provide no evidence of deterioration in the relationship between reliable valuation measures (particularly those that aren't highly sensitive to fluctuations in profit margins) and actual subsequent market returns.

Don't criticize historically reliable valuation measures that have maintained the same tight relationship with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year market returns that they've demonstrated across a century of history.

Despite my admitted stumble in the half - cycle since 2009, it's perplexing that the equity market is at the second greatest valuation extreme in the history of the United States, on what are objectively the most durably reliable valuation measures available, but it has somehow become an affront to suggest that this will not end well.

Our actual expectation is that the completion of the current market cycle is likely to wipe out the entire total return of the S&P 500 — in excess of Treasury bill returns — all the way back to roughly October 1997; an outcome that would require a market retreat no larger than it experienced in the past two cycles, and that would not even carry historically reliable valuation measures to materially undervalued levels (see When You Look Back On This Moment In History).

On the basis of the most reliable valuation measures we identify (those most tightly correlated with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns), current market valuations stand about 140 - 165 % above historical norms.

Again, if our measures of market internals were to improve, we would allow for the possibility that reliable measures of market valuations could surpass their 2000 extreme, and we would not place a «cap» on how high stock prices could move.

On a wide range of historically reliable measures (having a nearly 90 % correlation with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns), we estimate current valuations to be fully 118 % above levels associated with historically normal subsequent returns in stocks.

Last week, the most historically reliable equity valuation measures we identify (having correlations of over 90 % with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns) advanced to more than double their reliable historical norms.

Currently, the S&P 500 would have to decline by about 55 % simply to price out at historically run - of - the - mill valuations on the most reliable measures.

As a result, the most historically reliable valuation measures now suggest that the S&P 500 will experience a net loss over the coming decade, while including broader (if slightly less reliable) measures results in projected S&P 500 10 - year annual nominal total returns of about 1.4 % annually (see Ockham's Razor and the Market Cycle for the arithmetic behind these estimates).

Both benefit from solid valuation methods and reliable measures of market action, but investment weighs valuation more strongly, while speculation weighs market action more strongly.

Suppose we measure valuation by comparing price P to some measure of earnings E that isn't distorted by cyclical economic fluctuations, and can be used as a reliable, representative, «sufficient statistic» for long - term cash flows.

Note that on the basis of this measure, expected 12 - year S&P 500 total returns associated with current valuation levels are negative, and even if one was to shift the blue line up somewhat closer to the red line in recent years, the associated return expectation would still be close to zero (which is what I actually expect based on MarketCap / GVA and other historically reliable measures).

That outcome would not even take our most reliable valuation measures below historical norms that they've approached or breached by the end of every market cycle in history.

Despite my admitted stumble in the half - cycle since 2009, it's perplexing that the equity market is at the second greatest valuation extreme in the history of the United States, on what are objectively the most durably reliable valuation measures available, but it has somehow become an affront to suggest that this will not end well.

Our actual expectation is that the completion of the current market cycle is likely to wipe out the entire total return of the S&P 500 — in excess of Treasury bill returns — all the way back to roughly October 1997; an outcome that would require a market retreat no larger than it experienced in the past two cycles, and that would not even carry historically reliable valuation measures to materially undervalued levels (see When You Look Back On This Moment In History).