You have to go back to
religious assertions of «the following tenets are true because this tenet says so and also says you should be burned at the stake if you disagree» to get that kind of accountability.
It must be acknowledged that
religious assertions are not verifiable or falsifiable, at least in the same manner as scientific propositions are.
More recent findings, however, point to more creative and imaginative uses of
religious assertions that move beyond an empirical base.
The concept of language - game is not frivolous, and it may prove of profound importance in the communication of
religious assertions.
Furthermore, because bliks are a basis for self - involving language, we care very deeply about
our religious assertions.
My contention that the propositional element in
religious assertions consists of stories interpreted as straightforwardly empirical propositions which are not, generally speaking, believed to be true has the great advantage of imposing no restriction whatever upon the empirical interpretation which can be put upon the stories.
We take
religious assertions, examine their functions, check the possibilities of testing them in experience, and come to conclusions about the meaning that may be communicated.
Religious assertions, of whatever tradition, include an at least implicit claim to universal relevancy and truth.
The problem of language centers in the logical mapping of
religious assertions and in the further understanding of language - games.
Peter Berger, A Rumor of Angels, Doubleday and Co. 1969, chap.3; Donald Evans, «Differences between Scientific and
Religious Assertions», in Ian G. Barbour (ed.)
(See Donald D. Evans, «Differences Between Scientific and
Religious Assertions,» Ian C. Barbour, ed., Science and Religion [New York: Harper & Row, 1968], pp. 125 - 33.)
This involves some kind of empirical grounding for
religious assertions if the language of faith is to be meaningful Ramsey makes three important points:
When that confidence is absent, many
religious assertions seem to be like shouting in the dark that the light is shining.
As Ogden puts it, «
religious assertions can serve to reassure us only because they themselves are the re-presentation of a confidence somehow already present prior to their being made.»
cit., pp. 223 - 27; also Evans» essay, «Differences Between Scientific and
Religious Assertions,» Ian C. Barbour, ed., Science and Religion [New York: Harper & Row, 1968], pp. 101 - 33.)
So what you are saying is that no one can disagree with you or ask for proof of
religious assertions.
«Logically prior to every particular
religious assertion is an original confidence in the meaning and worth of life, through which not simply all our religious answers, but even our religious questions first become possible or have any sense.»
We have come to see, as a matter of fact, that
religious assertion by its very nature is inevitably couched in such metaphorical, symbolical, if you will poetical, language; and that all deep faith must express itself in this way if it is to express itself at all.
For it is not necessary, on my view, for the asserter of
a religious assertion to believe in the truth of the story involved in the assertions: what is necessary is that the story should be entertained in thought....
Rollins continues: ``... The statement by Karl Marx that the beginning of all critique lies in the critique of religion can be seen as a profoundly
religious assertion — one that is borne witness to in the lives of prophets such as Jeremiah and Amos, in Jesus, and in many of the great Christian leaders throughout history.
Not exact matches
While that may sound like a bold
assertion in and of itself, it really isn't when you consider that every major
religious movement considers Jesus to be an important
religious figure.
Why would you need
religious faith for your «reasonable»
assertion?
So many
religious people whine about «context, context», yet either never give what the context is in their mind, or the «context» is contradictory to other parts of the bible, and it merely turns into excuses and
assertions.
The
assertion that everything that is is constituted by the coming together of other things seems an interesting hypothesis, but quite outside the sphere of
religious meaning.
(continued from 6/1/09) As little inclined as is Charles Taylor to connect the pre-ontological with the metaphysical,
religious «experience» with cognitive
assertions, he can not finally avoid making certain claims about the way things are, or at least the way human things are: We all see....
The
assertion that the law brings life governs the entire
religious framework of the rabbinic community.
As a matter of theology, the word asserts that «whatever is divine» in Jesus, his deity, is as truly and fully divine as very God himself; but as a matter of
religious conviction and experience, it is the
assertion that very God, in all his mystery and in all his glory, is of «one substance with,» is the same reality as, that which in Jesus Christ we have been given to see and know and touch and feel.
As debate continues over President Obama's
assertion about the
religious nature (or lack thereof) of the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group, a new Pew Research Center study finds that more Americans across the board believe that Islam encourages violence more than other religions.
While your
assertion applies to those with
religious belief systems, it doesn't apply to (most) atheists.
DO NOT insist on
religious leaders making their case by reasoned argument, but by bald
assertion or authoritarian claims which are much easier to invent and promote.
The type of atheists, like most on this post, that continue with the ridiculous
assertion that there can be nothing greater than us that exists above or outside of our little physical realm, are simply either intellectually stunted individuals, or more likely, bitter people who have gotten their panties in a bunch because some
religious text contains some apparent condemnation of their lifestyle.
You may feel the world is antichristian... but that's simply because the world, in it's entirety, doesn't accept the
assertions of your unsupported
religious beliefs.
One way of viewing the
religious crisis of our time is to see it not in the first instance as a challenge to the intellectual cogency of Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, or other traditions, but as the gradual erosion, in an ever more complex and technological society, of the feeling of reciprocity with nature, organic interrelatedness with the human community, and sensitive attention to the processes of lived experience where the realities designated by
religious symbols and
assertions are actually to be found, if they are found at all.
The usual
assertions are (1) that this kind of religion is today on the defensive; (2) that the defensive posture is occasioned by the flourishing of «conservative churches» (although the alleged liberal enervation is also seen in more autonomous terms); (3) that the growth in
religious conservatism and conservative churches is itself the result of widespread reaction against «secular humanist» values and against those who hold such values; (4) that our society as a whole has been experiencing a breakdown in moral consensus, a loss of moral coherence somehow connected with a decline in oldline Protestant dominance; and (5) that some or all of these happenings have been quite sudden, so that the early 1960s can be taken as a kind of benchmark — as a time before the fall.
She casts doubt on the
assertion that there is an intrinsic affinity between certain
religious ideas and political orientations by showing how similar ideas lead to different outcomes in different settings.
Baseless
assertions are the trademark of
religious people that rely on blind faith, not skeptics.
Your
assertion is just as incorrect as me saying all
religious freaks are d cks!
Examining the demography and cultural influence of evangelicals, Noll and Kellstedt observe that «there may be a grain of truth to at least the first two - thirds of Michael Weisskopf's
assertion in the Washington Post that the grassroots supporters of the
Religious Right are «largely poor, uneducated, and easy to command.
However, the canons of logic may not be suitable for judging this statement; for this
assertion, just because of its logical oddity or paradoxical form, may trigger a disclosure that is essential to the possibility of a
religious commitment.
If the constitutive
assertion of this witness, however expressed or implied, is specifically christological, in that it is the
assertion, in some terms or other, of the decisive significance of Jesus for human existence, the metaphysical implications of this
assertion are specifically theological in that they all either are or clearly imply
assertions about the strictly ultimate reality that in theistic
religious traditions is termed «God.»
Niebuhr quoted with approval a comment that most «religion» is unbridled human self -
assertion in
religious disguise.
It is the
assertion of the
religious meaning of the secular life.
DO insist on
religious leaders making their case by reasoned argument not by bald
assertion or authoritarian claims.
Now, as we have seen, the
assertion of this fact seems to many Christians to involve a disparagement of the value of the Gospels and hence to raise an acute
religious question.
By conceiving God as eminently relative, he is not only able to conceive God as also eminently nonrelative or absolute but is further able, without falling into contradiction, to make the symbolic or analogical
assertions about God that are essential to theistic
religious faith and worship.
They gave me tools to interpret every
religious, altruistic, and in any way ideal
assertion or action by others as merely a tactic of ego.
His
assertion that mainstream
religious orthodoxy presents a standard too high for ordinary folk is dispiriting, although nothing in today's
religious landscape refutes it.
The purpose of all of these
religious messages is to make the spiritual
assertion that our lives are devoid of security, truth, and meaning unless and until we become a part of God — in other words, until we become part of that which is really real.
It quoted the
assertion of National
Religious Broadcaster «s Ben Armstrong that broadcasting is shifting power from the clergy to the layman «with his hand on the dial....
Nevertheless, as little inclined as he is to connect the pre-ontological with the metaphysical, the
religious «experience» with cognitive
assertions, Taylor can not avoid make certain claims about the way things are, or at least the way human things are.