Moderate interest rates were associated with a whole range of subsequent
returns over the following decade, and we know that those outcomes were 90 % correlated with the level of valuations at the beginning of those periods (on reliable measures such as market cap / GDP, price / revenue, Tobin's Q, the margin - adjusted Shiller P / E, and others we've presented over time - see Ockham's Razor and the Market Cycle).
Following the worst 10 - year returns for the S&P 500, the average cyclically - adjusted P / E was just 12, GDP growth over the following decade average 10.5 %, earnings growth averaged 8.63 %, and the S&P 500
return over the following decade averaged 11.33.
The most extreme among those points are 1964 (when actual market
returns over the following decade were lower than expected), 1988 - 1990, and 2005 (when actual market
returns over the following decade were higher than expected).
Not exact matches
How's this for a gripping corporate story line: Youthful founder gets booted from his company in the 1980s,
returns in the 1990s, and in the
following decade survives two brushes with death, one securities - law scandal, an also - ran product lineup, and his own often unpleasant demeanor to become the dominant personality in four distinct industries, a billionaire many times
over, and CEO of the most valuable company in Silicon Valley.
When you look back on this moment in history, remember that S&P 500
returns had never materially exceeded zero
over the
decade following similar valuations.
Depressed interest rates were typically associated with weak market outcomes
over the
following decade, largely because investors reacted to depressed interest rates with yield - seeking speculation - driving valuations up and driving subsequent prospective
returns down.
That undershoot created a point of enormous undervaluation for the market (resulting in projected and actual total
returns for the S&P 500 above 15 % annually
over the
following decade).
The chart below presents the two versions of the «equity premium» along with the annual total
return of the S&P 500
over the
following decade.
For example, if we choose to believe that long - term investors will be sustainably happy to achieve long - term
returns of 3.5 % annually
over the coming
decade, then it
follows that the S&P 500 is fairly valued here.
It subsequently rose 10-fold
over the
following decade, netting Berkshire 26 % annual
returns on that investment
over that time.
On a cyclically adjusted earnings basis (where profits are averaged
over the prior
decade), the average cyclically adjusted P / E ratio
following periods of poor long - term
returns was 12.
The chart below presents the two versions of Hussman's calculation of the equity risk premium along with the annual total
return of the S&P 500
over the
following decade.
Note that there are a few points where the estimate of prospective market
returns would have differed from the actual market
returns achieved by the S&P 500
over the
following decade.
In our view, your goal as an investor, particularly if you
follow a conservative investing strategy like the one we recommend, is to make an attractive
return on your investments
over a period of years or
decades, but with lower risk.
The title has gained somewhat of a cult
following over the
decades, but it has never
returned to the spotlight in an official manner.