Sentences with phrase «returns over the subsequent year»

Not exact matches

Further, looking across all eight past instances, the BBIT has provided an average return of 6.32 % over the subsequent year, according to the firm.

Actual results, including with respect to our targets and prospects, could differ materially due to a number of factors, including the risk that we may not obtain sufficient orders to achieve our targeted revenues; price competition in key markets; the risk that we or our channel partners are not able to develop and expand customer bases and accurately anticipate demand from end customers, which can result in increased inventory and reduced orders as we experience wide fluctuations in supply and demand; the risk that our commercial Lighting Products results will continue to suffer if new issues arise regarding issues related to product quality for this business; the risk that we may experience production difficulties that preclude us from shipping sufficient quantities to meet customer orders or that result in higher production costs and lower margins; our ability to lower costs; the risk that our results will suffer if we are unable to balance fluctuations in customer demand and capacity, including bringing on additional capacity on a timely basis to meet customer demand; the risk that longer manufacturing lead times may cause customers to fulfill their orders with a competitor's products instead; the risk that the economic and political uncertainty caused by the proposed tariffs by the United States on Chinese goods, and any corresponding Chinese tariffs in response, may negatively impact demand for our products; product mix; risks associated with the ramp - up of production of our new products, and our entry into new business channels different from those in which we have historically operated; the risk that customers do not maintain their favorable perception of our brand and products, resulting in lower demand for our products; the risk that our products fail to perform or fail to meet customer requirements or expectations, resulting in significant additional costs, including costs associated with warranty returns or the potential recall of our products; ongoing uncertainty in global economic conditions, infrastructure development or customer demand that could negatively affect product demand, collectability of receivables and other related matters as consumers and businesses may defer purchases or payments, or default on payments; risks resulting from the concentration of our business among few customers, including the risk that customers may reduce or cancel orders or fail to honor purchase commitments; the risk that we are not able to enter into acceptable contractual arrangements with the significant customers of the acquired Infineon RF Power business or otherwise not fully realize anticipated benefits of the transaction; the risk that retail customers may alter promotional pricing, increase promotion of a competitor's products over our products or reduce their inventory levels, all of which could negatively affect product demand; the risk that our investments may experience periods of significant stock price volatility causing us to recognize fair value losses on our investment; the risk posed by managing an increasingly complex supply chain that has the ability to supply a sufficient quantity of raw materials, subsystems and finished products with the required specifications and quality; the risk we may be required to record a significant charge to earnings if our goodwill or amortizable assets become impaired; risks relating to confidential information theft or misuse, including through cyber-attacks or cyber intrusion; our ability to complete development and commercialization of products under development, such as our pipeline of Wolfspeed products, improved LED chips, LED components, and LED lighting products risks related to our multi-year warranty periods for LED lighting products; risks associated with acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures or investments generally; the rapid development of new technology and competing products that may impair demand or render our products obsolete; the potential lack of customer acceptance for our products; risks associated with ongoing litigation; and other factors discussed in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including our report on Form 10 - K for the fiscal year ended June 25, 2017, and subsequent reports filed with the SEC.

Normalized P / E - our preferred valuation metric - has explained 80 - 90 % of returns over the subsequent 10 - 11 years.»

Normalized P / E — our preferred valuation metric — has explained 80 - 90 % of returns over the subsequent 10 - 11 years.»

«Valuations have historically explained 60 - 90 % of subsequent returns over a 10 - year horizon.

As we've demonstrated repeatedly, the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent returns, particularly over a 7 - 15 year horizon, are those that normalize for profit margin variability in some way.

The red line (right scale) is the average annual nominal total return of the S&P 500 over the subsequent 12 - year period.

At present, the valuation measures we find most strongly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns suggest zero total returns for the S&P 500 over the coming 10 years, and total returns averaging only about 1 % annually over the coming 12 - year period.

The only alternative to this view is to imagine that the collapses that followed valuation extremes like 1929, 1973, 2000, and 2007 somehow emerged entirely out of the blue, ignoring the fact that valuations accurately projected likely full - cycle losses, and remained tightly correlated with total returns over the subsequent 10 - 12 year horizons.

The red line shows the actual total returns for this portfolio mix over the subsequent 12 - year period.

The mapping between valuations and subsequent returns is typically most reliable over a 10 - 12 year horizon.

Valuations in 1949 and 1982 were like paying $ 13.70 for the future $ 100 cash flow, as valuations were consistent with subsequent annual S&P 500 total returns averaging 18 % over the following 12 - year period.

1954 and 1992 were like paying $ 25.60, and were followed by 12 % annual S&P 500 total returns over the subsequent 12 - year period.

Based on the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent total returns (and those correlations are near or above 90 %), we continue to estimate that the S&P 500 will achieve zero or negative nominal total returns over horizons of 8 years or less, and only about 2 % annually over the coming decade.

Last week, the most historically reliable equity valuation measures we identify (having correlations of over 90 % with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns) advanced to more than double their reliable historical norms.

On valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 nominal total returns, we presently expect negative total returns for the S&P 500 on a 10 - year horizon, and total returns averaging only about 1 % annually over the coming 12 - year period (chart).

On the basis of valuation measures most tightly related to actual subsequent long - term market returns, we also estimate that the S&P 500 is likely to be lower 12 years from now, compared with current levels, though dividend income may push the total return just over zero on that horizon.

Looking back through history, whenever value stocks have gotten this cheap, subsequent long - term returns have generally been strong.3 From current depressed valuation levels, value stocks have in the past, on average, doubled over the next five years.4 Not that we necessarily expect returns of this magnitude this time around, but based on the data and our six decades of experience investing through various market cycles, we believe the current risk / reward proposition is heavily skewed in favor of long - term value investors.

We find that the positive returns at announcement are not reversed over time, as there is no evidence of a negative abnormal drift during the one - year period subsequent to the announcement.

The violet line (left scale) measures the difference in performance between small cap stocks and large cap stocks over the subsequent 5 year period (the line ends in 2000 with the last 5 - year return calculation).

Each percentage point of unemployment rate translates into 78 basis points (bps) of stock market excess return compared to cash for each year, on average, of the subsequent two years; in other words, each 1 % jump in unemployment is associated with 1.56 % of incremental stock market return over the two - year period.

For each level of profit margins, the table shows the median P / E of the 500 largest stocks, their median annual return over the subsequent 3 - year period, and their median return over the subsequent 5 - year period.

He uses Tobin's Q to value a market and compares past valuations with subsequent returns using a hindsight value (the average of the returns over the next 1 to 30 years).

But these don't explain away or eliminate the strong cyclical relationship between the gold / XAU ratio and subsequent returns on the XAU over the following 3 - 4 year periods.

On the contrary, since the 1940's, the ratio of equity market value to GDP has demonstrated a 90 % correlation with subsequent 10 - year total returns on the S&P 500 (see Investment, Speculation, Valuation, and Tinker Bell), and the present level is associated with projected annual total returns on the S&P 500 of just over 3 % annually.

John Hussman at Hussman funds is careful to qualify the value of this analysis: «Rich valuation is strongly associated with weak subsequent returns, but only reliably so over periods of 7 - 10 years.

[I] nvestors must recognize that buying stocks at very expensive valuations will necessarily lead to future returns over the subsequent 10 — 20 years that are far below average.

DeBondt and Thaler then calculated the investment return against the equal weighted NYSE Index over the subsequent four years for all of the stocks in each selection period.

Instead, hedge fund targets earn an additional 11.4 % abnormal return during the subsequent year, and other activist targets realize a 17.8 % abnormal return over the year following the activists» interventions.

Still, it is worth noting that, over the past 15 years, the advisers making it onto each year's honor roll on average over the subsequent 12 months went on to make 1.2 percentage points more a year than those who didn't, while nevertheless incurring 25 % less risk, as measured by volatility of returns.

However, over half of them never return to the vet in subsequent years.