Based on our analysis, the split between sectors that benefited from
rising nominal yields and those that suffered was clear: Defense - oriented sectors — those that are income - driven but light on growth — fared worse as the opportunity cost for holding them grew.
Not exact matches
We see higher inflation expectations, rather than
rising real
yields, driving
rises in
nominal bond
yields.
Medium - term inflation expectations of financial market participants, as implied by the difference between
nominal and indexed bond
yields, have
risen to around 3 per cent in October, from less than 2 per cent at the beginning of the year.
Inflation expectations, as measured by the difference between
yields on 10 - year
nominal Treasury notes and Treasury inflation protected securities (Tips), have
risen to 2.25 per cent from a low of around 2.10 a month ago.
Despite the sharp
rise in inflation expectations, 10 - year breakevens (the difference between the
yield on a
nominal fixed - rate bond and the real
yield on TIPS) remain depressed relative to their long - term history.
At a 10 - year Treasury
yield of 1.7 %, interest on reserves of 0.25 %, and a monetary base now at about 18 cents per dollar of
nominal GDP (see Run, Don't Walk), further purchases of long - term Treasury securities by the Fed would produce net losses for the Fed in any scenario where
yields rise more than about 20 basis points a year, or the Fed ever has to unwind any portion of its already massive positions.
Think of 1979 - 82: by the time bond
yields were nearing their peak levels, bond managers were making money in
nominal terms with rates
rising because the income from the coupons was so high, and it set up the tremendous rally in bonds that would last for ~ 30 years or so.
In this situation, the real
yield would
rise on both
nominal Canadas and RRBs.