For Whitehead the physical prehension is the object inasmuch as it reenacts
the same subjective form — or at least one aspect of it.
Not exact matches
But the prehensions of each phase must be different from those of the other phases by virtue of different
subjective forms, just as on Whitehead's view the prehensions of each occasion differ from those of each other by virtue of the
same reason.
He wants an eternal object to be «the
same for all actual entities» (Process 23), and yet needs each creating subject to have its own
subjective form of that object (Process 227, 232, 246), in other words, to create its own, novel «eternal» object.
To say that «the world is my body» is to say that the world
forms me in the
same way that my body
forms part of the content of my immediate
subjective experience.
What this means is that the initial feeling derives its character, or
subjective form, from the object felt, and insofar as it assumes the
same form it reproduces the object: «In the conformal feelings the how of feeling reproduces what is felt» (PR 249).
«E.g., that the feelings which arise in various phases of a concrescence be compatible for integration; that no element in a concrescence can finally (in the «satisfaction») have two disjoined roles; that no two elements can finally have the
same role; that every physical feeling gives rise to a corresponding conceptual feeling: that there is secondary origination of variant conceptual feeling; and that the
subjective forms (valuations) of the conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their aptness for being joint elements in the satisfaction aimed at.
Insofar as the
subjective forms of prehensions in the
same phase are determined with reference to this
same common
subjective end, they are mutually sensitive.
Let it suffice to say that the
same state of affairs in the case of self - referential feeling can also be analyzed without recourse to eternal objects, namely, in view of the «
subjective form» and the «concept of the actual world.»
They expressed views ranging from Platonic claims about the ultimate reality of eternally perfect
Forms (Ideas), including the Idea of the Good, to the claims of Heraclitus that change is so common that «one can not even step into the
same river twice» and of Epicurus, the hedonist, that intrinsic value consists in momentary,
subjective, pleasant feeling.
Just because it is in a slate
form - factor does not mean that its degree of attraction to consumers can be measured using the
same metrics and
subjective assessments that can be applied to other slate
form - factor devices.