Sentences with phrase «second appellant»

Expert evidence is particularly prevalent where inferences must be drawn from a wide variety of human behaviour: see, for example, R. v. McIntosh (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), at pp. 101 - 103, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused R. v. McCarthy, [1998] 1 S.C.R. xii [leave sought by second appellant in McIntosh, Mr. McCarthy]; David M. Paciocco, «Coping With Expert Evidence About Human Behaviour» (1999) 25 Queen's L.J. 305, at pp. 307 - 308; S. Casey Hill et al. at para. 12:30.10; R. v. Olscamp (1994), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 466 (Ont.

In this case the first and second appellant appealed against a decision refusing them permission to instruct independent experts in care proceedings regarding their child.

The second appellant, Ruttle Contracting Limited, was the principal contractor on site.

It found the second appellant's involvement to have been more limited and not dishonest.

The proceedings arose out of a possession order obtained against the second appellant and an anti-social behaviour injunction against both appellants, in December 2004, which they appealed.

The second appellant was an assured tenant of property belonging to the respondent.

From 24 December until 10 February 2005, the first appellant was represented by RJH but the second appellant instructed a different firm SWL.

It followed the Court of Appeal in rejecting the second appellant's ground of appeal based on alleged unfairness as the Secretary of State had not failed to publicise the change of fees.

The secretary of state sought to exclude the second appellant under Art 1F (a).

That was in our view sufficient to justify the requirement that the first and second appellants should have the burden of proving that they had done all that was reasonably practicable to protect against that risk.»

Not exact matches

The word second oath is a contrivance of the appellants.»

Even though the Appeal Court is well aware of the status of S. 140 (2) of the Electoral Act 2010, it, nevertheless, acted to the contrary, given its own observation in its judgment that: «Whether Section 140 (2) of the Electoral Act is extant or not, no advantage can be conferred on the Appellants by declaring the 1st Appellant as a winner on the grounds of his obtaining the second highest votes as elected.»

In addition to my last comment, let's add the Second Circuit case PEPSICO, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant, v.

An interim injunction was pronounced a few days later, and a second injunction, pronounced in May 2009, further enjoined the Appellant from attending at or near Salt Spring Island, BC.

UBC also swept the Peter Cory prizes for best factum, winning first place for their appellant factum and second place for their respondent's.

4 The second conspiracy count alleged that D had conspired with other named but unindicted co-conspirators, including the other appellants as well as Rhodes and Dam, during a three - month period ending in late June 2002 «to commit the indictable offence of robbery by conspiring to plan, prepare and execute a series of home invasion style robberies».

But in circumstances where the appellant accepted the invitation to participate in an oral hearing before the first reviewer, and in the absence of any evidence to suggest that he would have responded differently if invited to attend a further interview before the second respondent, I would infer that it is more likely than not that the appellant would have sought an oral hearing before the second respondent if he had been told that the first reviewer by whom he was originally interviewed had been replaced (pars.

Accordingly, the tribunal in this case should have asked itself two questions when deciding the issue of dishonesty: first, whether the first appellant had acted dishonestly by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people; and, second, whether he had been aware that by those standards he was acting dishonestly.

Second, the appellants submitted that even if eligibility for overtime pay was not a common issue, there were other common issues that warranted certification of the action.

Second, the moving parties argued that Justice Newbould erred in finding that an agreement which addressed transfer pricing tax issues between certain Nortel debtors while they were engage in ongoing operations (the «Master R&D Agreement» or «MRDA»), and which had formed the basis of the appellants» theory of allocation at trial, was never intended to and did not govern the allocation of the Lockbox Funds.

Third does the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence for second degree murder constitute «cruel and unusual punishment» in this case, so that Mr. Latimer («the appellant») should receive a constitutional exemption from the minimum sentence?»

This case offers clarification with respect to the second part of the test for granting an interim injunction — in this case, whether the building of a three storey duplex (in breach of a «clear negative covenant») would cause the Appellant to suffer irreparable harm.

Laskin J.A. for the Court of Appeal accepts the Appellant's second issue; sets aside the Motion Judge's order, and concludes the termination clause contravenes the Employment Standards Act for two reasons:

In its 78 - page decision, the appeal court said that the combination of verdicts «presents an unusual, if not unique, result... In effect, the appellant has been convicted of attempting to murder the very same person he was found to have justifiably fatally shot just 5.5 seconds earlier.»

Second, the appellant argues that the trial judge failed to provide legally adequate Reasons for Judgment in dismissing the appellant's Charter motion and in convicting the appellant on the «over 80» charge, by failing to reconcile the conflicting testimony of the two police officers who testified as to the appellant's indicia of impairment.

With respect to the second issue, whether the Trial Judge erred in «misapprehending the evidence», the Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Judge's finding there was simply no evidence beyond «mere conjecture» that an early warning would have prevented the loss suffered by the Appellants; their physical and psychological injuries (see at para. 30).

Justice Doherty described them, at para. 50: «The initial pat down search of the appellant, the second more intrusive search of his person beside the cruiser, and the very intrusive strip search at the police station all struck at the core of the appellant's most basic right to personal privacy.»

The appellant was unlawfully detained and remained so when Constable Greenwood returned from the bar and decided to conduct the second search.

The further intrusion upon the appellant's privacy by way of the second search of his person could not be justified by Constable Greenwood on the grounds that he reasonably suspected that his safety was in jeopardy.

If it is found to be a federal undertaking, then the second question arises, namely whether the labour component of the appellant's operations forms an integral part of whatever it is that makes the undertaking of the appellant federal.

[9] In respect of the second requirement, the material facts pleaded in the statement of claim against the personal respondent indicate that he was acting on behalf of the corporate respondent when he terminated the appellant's employment.

Second, that the complainants had been drinking alcohol (which the Appellant supplied from his backpack) before a heated argument erupted between Abdi and Calcines.

To succeed in setting aside a trial verdict on the basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show «first, that counsel's acts or omissions constituted incompetence and second, that a miscarriage of justice resulted»: R. v. G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520, at para. 26.

On the second ground, the majority of the Court of Appeal found the appellant failed to establish the trial judge erred in assessing the claim for loss of future income earning capacity.

Second, the appellants» submission was inconsistent with the position they took at trial on their counterclaims.

The second was an action against Maroun and Cobra Hanna («Hanna») in relation to which the appellant claimed that the lawyers failed to take proper steps to enforce a payment agreement relating to a prior judgment against Hanna and failed to advise the appellant of the requirement to make full and frank disclosure when applying for a Mareva injunction, leading to the appellant having to accept an improvident settlement.

I respectfully dissent as to the majority holdings that the erroneous admission of Kay Thomas's testimony was harmless error and that the appellants were not entitled to an instruction on second - degree manslaughter as a lesser - included offense.

The appellant argues that the motion judge erred in denying the request for a second adjournment of the respondent's motion for summary judgment.

At a second pre-trial, the appellant sought and was granted an adjournment to afford him further time to retain counsel.

Second, appellants» trial counsel did not suggest in his cross-examination of De Los Rios that he was not qualified to give those opinions.

A second consent order, made on January 7, 2014, provided that the Respondents would be at liberty to argue in the action that when the court is determining the issue of equalization between the parties, the Appellant should be required to pay interest on the Roberts Creek mortgage.

The Appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the parties had agreed she could take interest into account in the equalization process, and that this agreement was embodied in the second consent order.

The Appellant initially sought to challenge both decisions by way of judicial review, the first in the Upper Tribunal and the second in the Administrative Court.

[25] Turning then to the substance of the second ground of appeal, the appellants submit that granting partial summary judgment on the misrepresentation issue provides minimal, if any, efficiency as the action is proceeding to trial on the negligence, breach of contract, and Arthur Wishart Act claims.

As events happened, however, the outbreak of the second Gulf War was then an accomplished fact, which was highly relevant to the amount of damages, and the arbitrator was correct to take it into account in assessing the appellants» loss.

Criminal law: The appellant was tried for the second - degree murder of his father by a judge sitting with a jury.

the appellants continued to post the respondent's pleading and his second notice of libel on their website up to and after the commencement of trial;

The second point of collision was the attempt by the appellants, Vice Media, to gain access to the information the police had relied on to obtain the production order.

The second germane fact was revealed by the AIT: «In the revised reasons for deportation letter it is noted that it is unlikely that the appellant will re-offend... [The points made are that] the court has deemed that the appellant's crime is of such severity that he will always continue to be a threat to the community, the appellant's notoriety might make him feel excluded from society as he had been before and there was a significant risk that his previous disregard for authority and the law might resurface and result in him coming to adverse attention.

This is the second appeal since Leanne Tran, the appellant, issued a statement of claim on January 11, 2013.