Sentences with phrase «see any evidence of bias»

I read and reread this roundup and don't see evidence of any bias or untruths.

However, I fail to see any evidence of bias in them.

Not exact matches

People who resist them will compile and present evidence proving their Or model correct and the And model wrong, which those of us who see opportunity to grow, learn, and improve our lives will see as showing their confirmation bias.

And the hand of DH will be recognized: we know something of the character of his piety and we shall see evidence now of his strong bias in favor of the southern, Judean half of the short - lived united monarchy.

We saw cases like McCleskey in 1987 where the Court upheld the death penalty despite overwhelming evidence of racial bias.

Our attempts to see the natural revelation God has installed in the Creation act includes what «Science» discovers, but knowing we need to filter worldly bias in the presentation of such «scientific» evidences since the ideas of the world are driven by another mindset.

Those of us that have seen evidence of the gifts in operation would interpret the same scriptures differently because of our underlying assumptions and bias.

We see evidence from this bias or angst regularly by FIFA or UEFA and with performances of some of the officials chosen.

We examined plots visually to see whether there was any evidence of asymmetry that might suggest different treatment effects in smaller studies, which may indicate publication bias (Harbord 2006).

Every society will be more interested in propagating and understanding itself first and foremost, I don't see that as unexpected, nor evidence of bias.

Neighbors and activists in Ozone Park, Queens see religious bias in the recent killing of an imam from Bangladesh, but the NYPD has no evidence to support that theory yet.

Sometimes I have some studies that show that bias may be a potential explanation, but in much of the data that we present here, we don't see a lot of evidence of bias in careers.»

«Our findings provide evidence that the stereotypes we hold can systematically alter the brain's visual representation of a face, distorting what we see to be more in line with our biased expectations,» explains Jonathan Freeman, an assistant professor in NYU's Department of Psychology and the senior author of the paper, which appears in the journal Nature Neuroscience.

He spoke, primarily, about the out - of - school factors that impact student performance in schools and how this impacts and biases all estimates based on test scores (often regardless of the controls uses — see a most recent post about this evidence of bias here).

Following - up on two prior posts about potential bias in teachers» observations (see prior posts here and here), another research study was recently released evidencing, again, that the evaluation ratings derived via observations of teachers in practice are indeed related to (and potentially biased by) teachers» demographic characteristics.

In fact, and rather, we have evidence directly from the state of Ohio contradicting this claim that he calls a «myth» — that, indeed, bias is alive and well in Ohio (as well as elsewhere), especially when VAM - based estimates are aggregated at the school level (see a post with figures illustrating bias in Ohio here).

Detractors of post-normal science, conversely, see it as a method of trying to argue for a given set of actions despite a lack of evidence for them, and as a method of trying to stifle opposing voices calling for caution by accusing them of hidden biases.

If you don't understand the psychological biases and heuristics that technical experts, policy - makers, and the general public, use in thinking about uncertain risks, you won't be able to communicate effectively because people will unconsciously distort what you say to fit their preconceived (possibly faulty) mental model of the issue (see M. Granger Morgan, «Risk Communication: A Mental Models Approach» (Cambridge, 2001) for solid empirical evidence of this problem and how to avoid it.

I will say this; I little no doubt that just as is true of everyone else, including you, Dan's work is influenced by cultural cognition, or other manifestations of motivated reasoning (I think I have seen evidence of confirmation bias, for example).

Tell me, too, how someone who sees things as you do — all built into Bayesianism; no need to address whether the problem is different priors or different sources of information relevant to truth - seeking likelihood ratios vs. a form of biased perception that opportunisitcally bends whatever evidence is presented to fit a preconception; no need apparently either for empirical study on any of this — can straighten out someone who says the key to dispelling public conflict over climate change is just to disseminate study findings on scientific consensus.

I would like to see just one put forth some scientific evidence in support of one of the main claims made in this post... that confirmation bias is «peculiar to the left.»

Until the roots are cleared of a bias towards European style authoritarian modes of economic / social / political action as evidenced by what we saw in Europe / Soviet Union / PRC in the late 19th and all of the 20th centuries, then PNS is stillborn wrt to future climate matters.

In order to «prove» (a), evidence has to be fabricated — literally — in the sense of using computer simulations with a preordained bias towards the hypothesis (see Judith Curry's series of articles: «Overconfidence in IPCC's detection and attribution», which discusses «bootstrapped plausibility» of models).

To name a few: Dr Nina Pierpont, USA, author of «The Wind Farm Syndrome»; Dr Sarah Laurie, Australia, Medical Director of the Waubra Foundation; Dr Bob Thorne, Australia, Psychoacoustician; and Dr Carl Phillips, a Harvard - trained epidemiologist specializing in public health policy, formerly tenured professor in the School of Public Health, University of Alberta, who wrote about governments denying the health problem: «The attempts to deny the evidence can not be seen as honest scientific disagreement and represent either gross incompetence or intentional bias.»

I see the fact that the mean and stdev of the adjustments to the USHCN station as quite similar to the mean and stdev of the «ground truth» adjustments based on the USCRN station as evidence that they are doing a reasonable job of correcting for tobs - associated biases in the mean.

I have not seen any convincing / plausible evidence of AGW, mostly propaganda, dogma, confirmation bias and hand waving.

We also see evidence of this same sort of siting problem around the world at many other official weather stations, suggesting that the same upward bias on trend also manifests itself in the global temperature record.»

The combination of apophenia (the tendency to see patterns in random data), confirmation bias (the tendency to focus on evidence that is in line with our expectations or favoured explanation) and hindsight bias (the tendency to see an event as having been predictable only after it has occurred) can easily lead us to false conclusions,

The principle in R v Sussex Justices [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER Rep 233 — justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done — requires that, even where a tribunal shows no actual evidence of bias, it must also satisfy the «apparent bias test» in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 676 [2002] 2 AC, para 103 «whether the fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased».

At this point, relevance, necessity, reliability and absence of bias can helpfully be seen as part of a sliding scale where a basic level must first be achieved in order to meet the admissibility threshold and thereafter continue to play a role in weighing the overall competing considerations in admitting the evidence.

Relevance, necessity, reliability and absence of bias can helpfully be seen as part of a sliding scale where a basic level must first be achieved in order to meet the admissibility threshold and thereafter continue to play a role in weighing the overall competing considerations in admitting evidence.

Confirmation bias rears its ugly head, where evidence of innocence is disregarded because it doesn't fit the «truth,» and facts whose meaning is open to interpretation are only seen as confirming that «truth.»

We see case after case in which the preponderance of the evidence as to the children's better interests seemed obviously in favor of the mother, but the judges appeared to view it through a lens of bias against the mother (often using the very malleable «parental alienation» or «uncooperative parent» technique.)

Evidence from behavioural genetics indicates that the S allele of the serotonin transporter gene (5 - HTTLPR) is associated with increased negative emotion, including heightened anxiety (Sen et al. 2004; Munafò et al. 2005), harm avoidance (Munafò et al. 2005), fear conditioning (Lonsdorf et al. 2009), attentional bias to negative information as well as increased risk for depression in the presence of environmental risk factors (Caspi et al. 2003; Taylor et al. 2006; Uher & McGuffin 2008; see also Munafò et al. 2009).