Shareholder proposals regarding shareholders» ability to nominate director candidates to management's proxy («proxy access») took center stage during the 2012 proxy season.
As a result, the previous two annual general meetings («AGMs») have featured
shareholder proposals regarding officer training.
The Company also elected to place two management proposals in direct opposition to
shareholder proposals regarding proxy access and special meeting rights for shareholders.
A shareholder proposal regarding diversity among our senior management and board of directors 7.
A shareholder proposal regarding diversity among our senior management and Board of Directors (Proposal No. 6);
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL:
Shareholder Proposal regarding the requirement that all directors stand for election annually.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL:
Shareholder Proposal regarding the vote standard for director elections.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REGARDING DIVERSE BOARD CANDIDATES SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS (PROPOSALS 4 THROUGH 6): For Against Abstain For Against Abstain 6.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL REGARDING A POLICY TO REQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT BOARD CHAIR 4.
Not exact matches
See «Submission of
Shareholder Proposals» on page 35 for information regarding how shareholders may bring business before Walmart's annual shareholders» meetings, either through the shareholder proposal process or pursuant to the advance notice provision of Walmar
Shareholder Proposals» on page 35 for information
regarding how
shareholders may bring business before Walmart's annual
shareholders» meetings, either through the
shareholder proposal process or pursuant to the advance notice provision of Walmar
shareholder proposal process or pursuant to the advance notice provision of Walmart's Bylaws.
Review and recommend to the Board for approval the frequency with which the Company will conduct «Say on Pay» votes, taking into account the results of the most recent
shareholder advisory vote on frequency of Say on Pay votes required by Section 14A of the Exchange Act, and review and approve the
proposals regarding the Say on Pay vote and the frequency of the Say on Pay vote to be included in the Company's proxy statement.
This year,
shareholders will have an opportunity to weigh in on the eventual changes amidst a backdrop of continued multi-billion dollar settlements for allegations of misconduct
regarding a litany of issues (including the «London Whale» trading fiasco, evidence of collusion to rig CDS and foreign exchange markets, and continued mortgage - backed security litigation), along with the Fed and FDIC's decision to label the Company's «living will»
proposal as «not credible.»
A: When a company receives low support for its say - on - pay
proposal (generally less than 75 %), we believe at a minimum the company should provide some level of disclosure
regarding the company's response to
shareholder opposition; such disclosure, which often includes a discussion of engagement meetings and feedback received, should be accompanied by relevant changes and / or rationale intended to address outstanding concerns.
The
proposals would instruct the board to develop further safeguards with
regard to related party transactions with the majority
shareholder, and to provide assurances for keeping the company's business operations in Spain.
In its paper, the BPP Group raises a number of concerns
regarding the hard regulatory approach suggested by the Directive
proposals and calls upon the European Commission, Parliament and national governments to support the proportionate, principles - based approach to service supplier oversight overwhelmingly supported by
shareholders that is embodied in the Best Practice Principles for
Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis, stating that «unwarranted or disproportionate legislation may inhibit the provision of independent information and services that assist investors in the exercise of the very rights and responsibilities that the Directive aims to foster and support.»
For additional information
regarding the deadlines and procedures for submitting such recommendations for the 2016 Annual Meeting of
Shareholders, please see the discussion below under «
Shareholder Proposals and Director Nominations for the 2016 Annual Meeting of
Shareholders.»
Regarding the Stockholder
Proposal, Marathon Partners argued in its supporting statement that the Rights Agreement served no other purpose than to arbitrarily limit the number of shares a current or prospective
shareholder could own at 10 % of the combined classes of stock.
Pursuant to my last Zamano post, I want to thank Ross for responding to the
shareholders who contacted the company
regarding my annual dividend
proposal.
Therefore, CSIM will typically not support
proposals requiring an independent chair unless CSIM has concerns
regarding the board's accountability or responsiveness to
shareholders.
CSIM generally defers to management's recommendation for classified board
proposals unless CSIM has particular concerns
regarding the board's accountability or responsiveness to
shareholders.
CSIM typically does not support proxy access
proposals unless CSIM has particular concerns
regarding the board's accountability or responsiveness to
shareholders.