Sentences with phrase «shareholder value here»

I continue to maintain my position & to pursue an enhancement / realisation of shareholder value here — there are potential buyers for the business out there.

And since I estimate DCP's intrinsic value to be well in excess of the current NAV / share price, a tender offer / share redemption is an obvious way to enhance shareholder value here.

The destruction of shareholder value here has been a terrible shame.

We've detailed ways in which ROIC is directly correlated to changes in shareholder value here.

Not exact matches

Here I'm going to examine a few metrics to demonstrate that Brookfield's management has historically delivered value to shareholders.

«Cushman's power move was a way to have the footprint here and [increase] shareholder value,» the source said.

We've been following AVGN (see earlier posts here and here) because it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and it has a specialist biotechnology activist fund Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholvalue of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and it has a specialist biotechnology activist fund Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholValue Fund (BVF) pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

We've been following AVGN (see earlier posts here, here, here, here, here and here) because it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology activist fund BVF has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

We've been following AVGN (see earlier posts here, here and here) because it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and it has a specialist biotechnology activist fund Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholvalue of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and it has a specialist biotechnology activist fund Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholValue Fund (BVF) pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

We started following IKAN (see our post archive here) because it was trading at a discount to its net cash and had retained a financial adviser to «assist it in exploring and evaluating strategic alternatives to maximize shareholder value.»

So, whatever the company's motives were, shareholder value creation clearly was not driving the ship here over the past few years....

Value here is a combination of P / E, P / S, EBITDA / EV, FCF / EV and Shareholder Yield (deciles rebalanced annually).

We have 3 classes of shareholders here — let's summarize: i) The smart / non-activist money: Alpine Woods at 4.0 %, and Taube Hodson Stonex (again) with 3.4 %, ii) The in - betweeners: The Oppenheims (9.6 %), with no activist history but obviously with a v personal / vested interest in SRE's strategy and market value, and iii) The activists: Good Lord, the register's a veritable orgy of activists..!

Second, it's got a veritable roster of large shareholders & activists on its board / share register, so I'd be less than surprised here to see an ultimate push for a wind - down, or other value - realization strategy.

And as promised, a good time to kick - off The Great Irish Share Valuation Project, with the ISEQ on a breather for the past year (down 0.6 %)(but still over 40 % off its all - time high, as set nearly a decade ago now), and the Celtic Phoenix offering more opportunity than ever... Long - time readers will be familiar with TGISVP (here's my kick - off posts from 2012, 2013 & 2014), where I attempt to analyse & value every listed Irish stock out there (and usually piss off some tired & emotional shareholders in the process).

Management's obvious inability to stabilise & increase AUM, plus its wilful neglect of shareholder value, are clearly to blame here for the 50 % collapse in Argo's share price just in the last 3 years.

Here are the relevant adjustments and pro forma «Shareholders equity», which equates to our Net Asset Value as of March 31, 2010.

It's hard to make a recommendation as to whether or not to buy here because the exact value that a shareholder will end up with when everything closes is still not completely clear.

While I never expected significant operational growth potential here, this reversal still came as a shock — but my primary error was to presume management would actually focus on shareholder value & sensible capital allocation, despite having no real skin in the game... i.e. no vested interest in the current share price.

We've been following AVGN (see archived posts here) because it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology investor Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholvalue of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology investor Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholValue Fund (BVF) has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

Considering the history here & the huge share price discount, it's certainly NOT wishful thinking for shareholders to expect a decent IR effort from management, and (more importantly) an enhancement & realisation of shareholder value... and whatever it takes to achieve that, up to and including a sale of the company.

Seems like there may be a more serious / ongoing effort to rationalise / improve the portfolio, but obviously there's no indication when (if ever) substantial value might actually be realised here & returned to shareholders.

But I'm also conscious another of my holdings here — Fortress Investment Group (FIG: US), also a cash - rich & under - valued alternative asset manager — is actually TFG's largest shareholder (controlling a 14 - 15 % stake).

iii) A substantial return of capital: At the recent AGM, the board stated it's now «actively considering, subject to the requirements of the Group's businesses, a return of capital to its shareholders» — share tender offer (s) & an expansion of its ongoing buyback programme are the best way to enhance value here.

Which will leave shareholders with a stub investment in old NTR — and yes, at this point, the implied stub value doesn't reflect what I'd consider the potential value still to be realised here...

However, management now owns a 53 % + controlling stake in the company (so I have little hope governance / investor relations / shareholder value will suddenly improve from here on), and there's still no sign of a potential turn - around in the business / AUM.

Plus there's the small fact any resulting value will never end up in shareholders» wallets anyway... It's very tempting to say Minco's worthless, but let's be somewhat rigorous here — it's reasonable to presume it's currently worth cash, less cash burn, plus the value of its 30 M Xtierra (XAG: CN) shares:

If you are unfamiliar with the concept of Book Value, check out our definition page on Book Value and Shareholder Equity here:

-LSB-...] to «improve [INFS]'s financial condition and increase shareholder value» (see our first post here).

Because management's compounding value here: Tetragon's return on equity was 9 % last year & it's averaged 12.4 % pa since its 2007 IPO, it has a progressive dividend policy, it's launched serial tender offers, and overall it's returned a cumulative $ 1.2 billion (in dividends & share repurchases) to shareholders (since the IPO).

We've been following INFS because it is a deeply undervalued asset situation with two activist investors, Nery Capital and Lloyd I. Miller, III, pushing the company to «improve [INFS]'s financial condition and increase shareholder value» (see our first post here).

I was wrong here to hold out for my fair value estimate (which proved more theory than fact), wrong to hold out for a takeover offer that never quite materialised, wrong to assume the board & major shareholders could still reliably line up an exit & extract value before it evaporated.

We've been following AVGN (see archived posts here) because it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology investor BVF has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

Read the full paper here: The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value (February 17, 2010 version on SSRN)

We've been following AVGN (see archived posts here) because it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology activist fund BVF has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

-LSB-...][INFS]'s financial condition and increase shareholder value» (see our first post here).

We've been following INFS recently (see earlier posts here, here, here and here) writing that it is a deeply undervalued asset situation with two activist investors, Nery Capital Partners and Lloyd I. Miller, III, pushing the company to «consider the views expressed by its shareholders and pursue new alternatives to increase shareholder value.»

All I can do really is put a valuation on it — with the Russians firmly in charge here, I can't predict if minority shareholders will ever actually realize that value.

And I certainly didn't paint some glowing operational upside here, in terms of revenue / profits — the upside was actually premised on the market ultimately recognising Zamano's intrinsic value at the time, and / or management actively seeking to enhance & realise shareholder value.

Shareholders may face a dilemma here — should they endure some potential near - term share price volatility, (ideally) in return for a substantial increase in the company's (recurring) revenues & intrinsic value in the next few years?

Filed Under: Investing Tagged With: 2014, Berkshire Hathaway, BRK - A, BRK - B, Energy, Heinz, letter to shareholders, Value Investing, Warren Buffet Editorial Disclaimer: Opinions expressed here are author's alone, not those of any bank, credit card issuer, airlines or hotel chain, or other advertiser and have not been reviewed, approved or otherwise endorsed by any of these entities.

Here, I outline the strategic value of voting power — a measure of a shareholder's true influence — via two examples: a simplified hypothetical and a real world company.

We've previously posted about INFS here, here and here, writing that it is a deeply undervalued asset situation with two activist investors, Nery Capital Partners and Lloyd I. Miller, III, pushing the company to «consider the views expressed by its shareholders and pursue new alternatives to increase shareholder value.»

[I won't do it here, but if you're a preference shareholder you'll obviously need to take a fresh look at Raven's current balance sheet values & leverage.

We've been following AVGN (see archived posts here) for exactly the reason that Pollack identifies: it's a net cash stock (i.e. it's trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology activist fund BVF has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders.

With a nearly 50 - year track record of creating value for shareholders, a conservative management, steadily rising dividends, and a highly recession - resistant business model (see seven other recession - resistant businesses here), Welltower deserves consideration to be a core holding in every diversified dividend portfolio.

For example, here's a power statement that quickly hones in on the candidate's value: Catalyzed $ 3B + in Online Revenue while Generating 5X Shareholder Value in Industry - Leading Start value: Catalyzed $ 3B + in Online Revenue while Generating 5X Shareholder Value in Industry - Leading Start Value in Industry - Leading Start - Up.