Sentences with phrase «simple physical feeling»

Since these supplementary pure conceptual feelings only acquire temporality through their integration with physical feelings, no time elapses between the simple physical feeling of a particular actual occasion and its integration within the divine satisfaction.

When the eternal object selected for this purpose was embodied in the physical pole of the actual occasion felt or prehended, that is, when it expresses how that actual occasion prehended its predecessors, then the simple physical feeling is» pure.»

Negative prehensions transform the «initial datum» for each simple physical feeling into the «objective datum for that feeling.

It is important to realize that a simple physical feeling does not choose the perspective of its initial datum independently of the perspectives chosen by the other simple physical feelings which belong to the first phase of concrescence.

In the case of a simple physical feeling X belonging to a new actual entity A, the feeling Y by which X objectifies the past actual entity B is called the «objective datum» of X. Whitehead describes this second subphase in the following passage:

The important thing to notice at this point is that Whitehead claims that a simple physical feeling has as its initial datum another single actual entity.

Christian focuses his attention on the simplest case in which one actual entity prehends only one other actual entity in its immediate past by a simple physical feeling.

The next thing we should notice about the first subphase of the initial phase of concrescence is that Whitehead holds that all actual entities in the actual world of a new occasion have to be felt by some simple physical feeling (PR 41 / 66, 239/366).

Thus, a simple physical feeling is a special kind of feeling, and, as such, it can have a single actual entity as its «initial datum».

A simple physical feeling, indeed, according to Whitehead, is an act of efficient causation.

-LSB-...] The integration of each simple physical feeling with its conceptual counterpart produces...» (PR 248F).

Rather than, as usual, assign the hybrid prehension of God to the first phase, with the conceptual derivation in the second phase (which would deprive the initial phase of simple physical feeling of any guidance by the subjective aim), we should think of these two terms as referring to the same feeling.

With much fanfare, the first section (III.2.1 F) introduces the «simple physical feeling», which is mentioned later in the same chapter, but not in the very next section.

It should be realized that Whitehead's conception of «simple physical feeling» is more elaborate.

For instance, in the two simple nexus, B has a simple physical feeling of A, and D has a simple physical feeling of C.

In this second part of my paper, I shall focus on the relation of simple physical feeling.

Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I shall usually abbreviate «simple physical feeling» as «feeling.»

This claim should be understood in terms of Whitehead's conception of «simple physical feeling.»

Subsequently, I rewrote the fourteenth category of explanation in terms of the conception of «simple physical feeling.»

the relation of simple physical feeling is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.

This temporal ordering of durations presupposes only the relation of simple physical feeling.

However this problematic question is answered, there can not be a simple physical feeling of a future actual entity.

Clearly, the A-B nexus — in which B coheres concretely with A by means of a simple physical feeling — is different from the B - C unison — in which B and C come into being independently.

An immediatist might claim that no simple physical feeling comes into being earlier than any other, or that earlier actual occasions are felt earlier than later ones.

No matter how remote an actual occasion may happen to be in the causal past, there is a simple physical feeling of it even if it comes into being in the first second of our expanding universe.

Accordingly, a nontemporalist can revise the mirroring thesis (roughly) as follows: one simple physical feeling (nontemporally) precedes another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the former comes into being (temporally) later than the actual occasion felt by the latter.

To summarize, the mediatist accepts the following mirroring thesis: one simple physical feeling comes into being earlier than another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the former comes into being later than the actual occasion felt by the latter.15 (It is assumed that the two feelings are in one and the same process of concrescence.)

For example, in the above illustration, F is immediately later than G. And E both feels F directly and feels G through the medium of F. Thus, during E's process of concrescence, E's simple physical feeling of G is immediately later than E's simple physical feeling of F. To generalize, the mediatist accepts the following thesis, which follows from the mirroring thesis and the definition of «immediately later»: one simple physical feeling is immediately later than another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the latter is immediately later than the actual occasion felt by the former.

The process of concrescence of an actual occasion begins with a «first phase» that consists of the coming into being of a «multiplicity of simple physical feelings» (236).

For the sake of illustration, I shall now state an account of the temporal order of simple physical feelings.

I want now to show how this discrete - order principle holds of concrescing simple physical feelings.

There is an order - isomorphism between the following two sets: the set (ordered by later) of the actual occasions in the causal past of a given subject actual occasion, and the set (ordered by earlier) of the simple physical feelings in the process of concrescence of that subject actual occasion.

For nexus come into being when actual entities have simple physical feelings of one another.

Concretely, then, the integration of simple physical feelings into a complex transmuted feeling provides for the various actual entities of the nexus being felt as separate entities requiring each other.

Why, then, are simple physical feelings temporally ordered?

In this way, the temporal order of concrescing simple physical feelings mirrors the temporal order of past actual occasions.

Simple physical feelings are but «the transmission of a form of energy from event to event in the physical world» (PW 123/131).

In summary, my view is that a nexus is composed of actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another.

Let me rephrase this essential point in the language of the fourteenth category of explanation: A set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities does not have a «unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions [i.e., simple physical feelings] of each other» (Process 24).

According to the fourteenth category of explanation, a nexus is a multiplicity of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their simple physical feelings of one another.

The main claim illustrated by the B - A-C nexus is that two actual entities in a nexus may be interrelated indirectly by means of simple physical feelings.

To review, a nexus is constituted by actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another.

My paper can still be read as a discussion of an important type of nexus, namely, those nexus that are interrelated by means of simple physical feelings.

Therefore, my view is that, when Whitehead used the term «prehensions» in the fourteenth category of explanation, what he meant was «simple physical feelings.»

The first phase of concrescence involves a «multiplicity of simple physical feelings» of antecedent actual entities (Whitehead, Process 236).

Simple physical feelings were also termed by Whitehead» «causal» feelings»: «A simple physical feeling is an act of causation» (Process 236).

Let us assume that there are two durations that satisfy the following three conditions: (1) One is later than the other; (2) they do not have members in common; and (3) the set containing all of the actual entities from both durations is a nexal set.20 In that nexal set, there are chains of actual entities, linked together by simple physical feelings, that span the entire universe.

The term «physical feeling» seems to be absent from «The Theory of Feelings» (III.1), except for one section (III.1.9), which could be a later insertion.9 Sometime during or just after writing «The Theory of Feelings» we may infer that Whitehead introduced the notion of «causal feelings» (III.2.2), which was then overruled by the more developed theory of «simple physical feelings» (III.2.1).

In the first place, Whitehead claims that the initial phase in concrescence contains a multiplicity of simple physical feelings.

As we noted earlier, Whitehead says that the initial phase is composed of «a multiplicity of simple physical feelings» (PR 236 / 362).