This point would seem to be especially applicable to Whitehead's theory of propositions
since false propositions are not condemned to the dust - heap as logicians would have it.
And
since any false proposition of the form «It is (logically) possible that...» is contradictory, Premise X is logically false.
Not exact matches
Propositions — which are not Entities in the primary sense — appear also to satisfy the characteristic, supposedly peculiar to Entities, of admitting contrary qualities,
since the
proposition that someone is sitting passes from true to
false when the person stands up.
Since it is more important for a
proposition to be interesting than true, the traditional regard for
propositions as the matter for judgments and the bias towards truth (even the expression «truth - value» is prejudiced against
false propositions) has nearly dealt a fatal blow to the understanding of
propositions» dynamic role in the universe.
-- The theory of true and
false propositions — Epicurus — tends only to confuse the issue here,
since essence and not being is reflected upon, and in this way no help is given with respect to the characterization of the future.)
But if the reason to do so is the claim that it uniquely identifies individuals who are vulnerable to ideologically motivated reasoning, or identifies ones who are disproportionately vulnerable (clearly Jost is espousing something like this), then that
proposition is, in my view, demonstrably
false,
since individuals whose outlooks are negatively correlated w / «authoritarian personality» — «liberals,» «egalitarians» & so forth — are plainly, obviously, indisputably subject to ideologically motivated reasoning.
Since at most all but one of the mutually contradictory
propositions will be
false, the assignation of probability close to one of the others being true is shown to be erroneous.