Not exact matches
Each concerned a growingly contentious
issue in politics, each sought to take it out of politics by deciding it judicially
on constitutional grounds, and each did
so by basing the decision
on the due process clause of the Constitution.
So,
on the biggest
constitutional, economic, social, cultural and geopolitical
issue of the day, Labour had nothing to say to voters in a council area greatly affected by leaving Europe.
«I understand that the
constitutional position is that he remains prime minister and that's an
issue so he needed to stay
on in that role.
You have in your packet a blue sheet that gives you the order of the day,
so I won't belabor that too much, but I will just remind you that we're going to start out with a session
on history this morning; then go to a lunchtime segment that will focus
on some of the relevant federal
constitutional issues, including evaluations of the federal attacks
on and defenses of the Blaine amendments; then we will finish off the day with a session that will focus
on litigation strategy related to these amendments and some of the arguments being made for and against them in that litigation, as well as a focus
on how debates over faith - based initiatives and school vouchers are affected by these particular state
constitutional restrictions.
The case's procedural history is very complex (the Advocate General referred to it as either Kafkaesque or tilting windmills like Don Quixote, depending
on your point of view),
so after only a brief factual discussion I will focus
on the two major
constitutional issues that the Court had to deal with:
This is the third time (yes, indeed) that Turkey's
Constitutional Court dealt with this case — each time with identical facts (a woman asking to keep her name upon marriage)-- and the second time it has done
so since the European Court of Human Rights delivered a violation judgment against Turkey
on the very same
issue.
2) apart from the fact that CJEU stated that even before EU exercising its power, the MS must still act - when they have the power to do
so - in a matter which does not jeopardise or prejudice the EU,
so that the mere «potential» competence does have an effect, limitating the MS action, the parallel is that a negative rule is still a rule,
so that the existence of the rule makes the matter «regulated»: - as for the JHA, I must say that whilst I agree with you
on the merits, I can see the
issue raised by the CJEU, since it is quite the same raised by some national
Constitutional Courts, i.e. that ECHR standards may be in conflict with national standards and formally speaking the ECHR is a treaty and therefore has a lower rank that national Constititions, and the decision of the ECHR
on the interpretation of such standards within the context of the Convention does not bind the national
Constitutional Court in interpreting the national Constitution standards: e.g..
1) we agree to disagree:) 2) supremacy of EU law for the EU system is the equivalent of the hard core of
constitutional values that some national Courts defend against EU (and ECHR)- it is not a matter of «legitimacy» or «patriotism» but of using a «lower rank» instrument (accession treaty) to interfere with a treaty rule: the identical issue is for States who have a «rigid» constitution (alike the Treaty binds the CIEU): the accession treaty to ECHR or EU has a «lower rank» than the Constitution itself, so that the national Constitutional Court can not accept it can derogate to a higher ranking rule - usually they will find a way to reconcile the «construction» of the two set of rules, but if they are requested of an opinion on the point of principle, they will always say that in the very end, if all other paths have been explored to avoid the conflict, eventually it is the Constitution and neither ECHR nor EUw
constitutional values that some national Courts defend against EU (and ECHR)- it is not a matter of «legitimacy» or «patriotism» but of using a «lower rank» instrument (accession treaty) to interfere with a treaty rule: the identical
issue is for States who have a «rigid» constitution (alike the Treaty binds the CIEU): the accession treaty to ECHR or EU has a «lower rank» than the Constitution itself,
so that the national
Constitutional Court can not accept it can derogate to a higher ranking rule - usually they will find a way to reconcile the «construction» of the two set of rules, but if they are requested of an opinion on the point of principle, they will always say that in the very end, if all other paths have been explored to avoid the conflict, eventually it is the Constitution and neither ECHR nor EUw
Constitutional Court can not accept it can derogate to a higher ranking rule - usually they will find a way to reconcile the «construction» of the two set of rules, but if they are requested of an opinion
on the point of principle, they will always say that in the very end, if all other paths have been explored to avoid the conflict, eventually it is the Constitution and neither ECHR nor EUwhich prevails.
Only a few days after the Court of Justice of the European Union buried the hatchet in the
so - called Taricco saga (reported step by step
on Verfassungsblog by Bassini and Pollicino — here, here, here — and by myself here), the Italian
Constitutional Court
issued its decision no. 269 of 2017 (an English translation of the decision is available here).