But this specified expertise can not be imputed to
all sorts of administrative decision - makers, and so the precedential value of Pezim and Southam is limited.
Not exact matches
While punting issues to the membership may be appropriate where the
decision involves matters
of policy (say, in establishing a rule on how many hours
of CPD time lawyers are required to obtain or in approving new rules
of professional conduct or bylaws) rather than
administrative decisins involving a weighing
of Charter values, in these
sort of circumstances, it's hard to see how the
decision in BC or NB can survive judicial scrutiny (even if one doesn't believe that the earlier SCC decisionin TWU doesn't govern).
From the perspective
of any
administrative decision - maker, isn't the import
of this
sort of decision that it is better to provide coherent reasons to survive substantive judicial review?
In particular, it is very doubtful that the right
of access to superior courts constiutionalized in Trial Lawyers extends to provincial court and to
administrative tribunals (which is to say, to the
sort of decision - maker at issue in Unison!)
I think prof. Daly is right to remind us about the links that exist between the two
sorts of judicial review — that
of legislation and that
of administrative decisions — and to invite us to think about whether our approach to them makes sense when we consider them together, and not only in isolation.