Not exact matches
It is certainly true that the countries
at the centre
of the Asian
crisis — Thailand, Indonesia and Korea — had rates that were de facto soft fixes — a high degree
of stability in the good
times, but not any serious institutional defences when they came under pressure.
When banks were the main providers
of credit, the financial
stability mandate
of central banks could be summarised as their lender
of last resort function: in
times of crisis, lend freely,
at a penalty rate and against collateral that would be good in normal
times but may be impaired in
times of crisis.
At the same
time, our ability to make effective monetary policy and to promote financial
stability depends vitally on the information, expertise and authorities we gain as bank supervisors, as demonstrated in episodes such as the 1987 stock market crash and the financial disruptions
of Sept. 11, 2001, as well as by the
crisis of the past two years.