breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally
the standard of a reasonable person),
Not exact matches
@Barmar the weasel word opens up the possibility
of a
reasonable person standard, meaning that jurors wouldn't have to determine whether they actually think the accused had such an intention, but only whether a «
reasonable person» might make such a determination.
«There are no
reasonable standards of quality
of training for
people who take on essentially counselling roles in the school situation,» spokesman and psychologist David Stokes said.
Within this document, section 17 maintenance states that where equipment is «provided and installed to a British
Standard; it is reasonable to expect that the standard be met by the responsible person in terms of maintenance and recording systems
Standard; it is
reasonable to expect that the
standard be met by the responsible person in terms of maintenance and recording systems
standard be met by the responsible
person in terms
of maintenance and recording systems».
The real problem with this rhetoric isn't that some
people believe it, or that Tony Perkins, the president
of the Family Research Council who wrote the fund - raising letter, is not the only Core opponent spewing such garbage, but that such sentiments are bleeding into the mainstream conversation and drowning out
reasonable criticism
of the
standards and / or their development and / or their implementation.
In another post, Ravitch blasted the Times report that characterized Common Core opposition as primarily a Republican political issue, noting the paper's tendency to report on the
standards «as though no
reasonable person could possibly doubt the claims made on behalf
of the Common Core.»
Sony have done a
reasonable job
of optimizing Sony apps and gaming capabilities for the screen but there are some issues with
standard apps and text input which mean the Sony Tablet P may only be interesting for
people wanting the Sony media and gaming experience.
The government
of Canada has set net monthly income thresholds for a
person or family to maintain a
reasonable standard of living.
I am not a lawyer but I think there are two general approaches to meeting that: (A) The
reasonable person standard, applied to the same circumstances
of the trader, or (B) showing that the trader had a duty to know (for instance, if he was required to protect non-public information
of said company, he'd have to make a habit
of researching the disclosure status
of everything he heard)
In a legal context, and in any dispute that you might have with a retailer or company over
standards of service, it means the level
of service must be one that you or any other normal
reasonable person would also consider to be
reasonable.
The Canadian government has set net monthly income thresholds for a
person or a family to maintain a
reasonable standard of living in Canada.
(e) Any
person making inspections under this section shall be trained by the commissioner in
reasonable standards of animal care.
Lots
of vague language in there, like «
reasonable person,» and «prevailing
standards in the community.»
Oh, and btw, (lol), the test used in U.S. courts
of law for whether some one was «threatened» or not is the «
reasonable person standard.»
Secondly, involvement
of local
people is essential to make every project attain success within the timeline set and to
reasonable quality
standards.
Ultimately, the defendant was convicted and appealed, arguing that the «trial court's remarks during voir dire trivialized the
reasonable doubt
standard, diluted the concept
of reasonable doubt and lowered the
People's burden
of proof, constituting structural error.»
In this case, the Chief Justice found that the 9 month delay «would not create, in a
reasonable person with the full knowledge
of the justice system, the sort
of shock or sense
of alarm that would cause that
reasonable person to conclude that the nine - month judicial delay is significantly in excess
of acceptable
standards».
This is a flexible
standard: whether a
person has the ability to pay the fees depends not only on wealth and income, but also on the amount
of their
reasonable, necessary expenses and the magnitude
of the fees.
The failure to exercise the requisite
standard of care toward others which a
reasonable or prudent
person would exercise in the circumstances, or taking action that a
reasonable person would not.
(2A) For the purposes
of this Act, goods are
of satisfactory quality if they meet the
standard that a
reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account
of any description
of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances.
In Lord Simon's opinion, such an interpretation was borne out by the purpose
of the legal rule, ie «that
reasonable people may venture out in public without the risk
of outrage to certain minimum accepted
standards of decency».
The
standard of care for medical professionals is defined as the level
of care that a
reasonable person, in this case a doctor, would exercise in similar circumstances.
In the case
of R. v. Roy, the Supreme Court
of Canada found that the trial judge erred in law by inferring from the fact that Roy had committed a dangerous act while driving that his conduct displayed a marked departure from the
standard of care expected
of a
reasonable person in the circumstances.
It presages a law captured by the rhetoric
of the right to freedom
of expression without due regard to the value underlying the particular exercise
of that right; a law in which, under the guise
of the right to freedom
of expression, the «right» to offend can be exercised without responsibility or restraint providing it does not cause a disruption or disturbance in the nature
of public disorder; a law in which an impoverished amoral concept
of «public order» is judicially ordained; a law in which the right to freedom
of expression trumps — or tramples upon — other rights and values which are the vital rights and properties
of a free and democratic society; a law to which any number
of vulnerable individuals and minorities may be exposed to uncivil, and even odious, ethnic, sexist, homophobic, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Islamic taunts providing no public disorder results; a law in which good and decent
people can be used as fodder to promote a cause or promote an action for which they are not responsible and over which they have no direct control; a law which demeans the dignity
of the
persons adversely affected by those asserting their right to freedom
of expression in a disorderly or offensive manner; a law in which the mores or
standards of society are set without regard to the
reasonable expectations
of citizens in a free and democratic society; and a law marked by a lack
of empathy by the sensibilities, feelings and emotional frailties
of people who can be deeply and genuinely affronted by language and behaviour that is beyond the pale in a civil and civilised society.
Accordingly, the tribunal in this case should have asked itself two questions when deciding the issue
of dishonesty: first, whether the first appellant had acted dishonestly by the ordinary
standards of reasonable and honest
people; and, second, whether he had been aware that by those
standards he was acting dishonestly.
The law and juries may then consider that
person contributorily negligent by not using a
reasonable standard of care by failing to wear a helmet.
Reasonable person standard — An adult is guilty
of negligence if he or she fails to act the way a
person of ordinary intelligence and judgment would have acted in similar circumstances.
Thus, although an objective
standard must be used to evaluate whether a
reasonable person in the employee's position would have accepted the employer's offer (Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880), it is extremely important that the non-tangible elements
of the situation — including work atmosphere, stigma and loss
of dignity, as well as nature and conditions
of employment, the tangible elements — be included in the evaluation.
The
standard that is applied is whether a
reasonable person exercising ordinary care would have been aware
of the condition and fixed it or warned about it.
When applying an objective
standard, the court determines whether a
reasonable third
person would consider the employee to have been constructively dismissed as a result
of the employer's unilateral actions.
The determination
of whether a given
person has met the «ordinary
reasonable person»
standard is often a matter that is resolved by a jury after presentation
of evidence and argument at trial.
The
reasonable person is a fictive member
of the community — an amalgamation
of community
standards — whose judgment a jury is told to apply.
There is a difference between the
standard of care that an ordinary «
reasonable person» owes to any other
person, and the
standard of care owed by a professional in an area.
This
standard of care has been defined as the same level
of care that a
reasonable health care provider would provide, based on that
person's specialty and based on the accepted
standards and practices within the same geographic region.
Further, in reviewing all the evidence, the trial judge concluded that the defendant's driving was not a marked departure from the
standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in his circumstance (paras. 59, 61).
Many
people think that medical malpractice claims can only be brought against doctors; however, in Ontario, all professionals that provide healthcare services and treatment to the public must meet a
reasonable standard of care.
Acting with «criminal negligence» means that the driver failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and the failure to perceive that risk was a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a
reasonable person would have observed in the situation.
The
standard a court will apply is whether a
reasonable person would accept the offer
of re-employment having regard to all the surrounding circumstances.
Arguably, if the driver operates a motor vehicle while under the influence
of drugs, including medical marijuana, it violates the «
reasonable person»
standard of care.
General
Standard 2
of the IBA Guideline states that an arbitrator shall decline to accept an appointment or refuse to continue to act where facts or circumstances exist, or have arisen since the appointment that, from a
reasonable third
person's point
of view the facts or circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence.
Reasonably is an objective
standard applied by the courts as to what a
reasonable person in the defendant / plaintiffs position would do and depends on the state
of statute law, case law and community law
of the time.
The
standard is what the perception
of a «
reasonable person» would be, considering the perspective
of both a
reasonable person in the applicant's position and in the respondent's position.
It is useful to quote key observations by Stadlen J [at paras 126 - 129]: «In my view, notwithstanding the absence in the FTPP proceedings
of some
of the statutory and non-statutory safeguards which apply to criminal proceedings... [I] n deciding whether it would be fair to admit the hearsay evidence, the requirements both
of Article 6 and
of the common law obliged the FTPP to take into account the absence
of all those [safeguards]... [I] n my judgment, no
reasonable panel in the position
of the FTPP could have reasonably concluded that there were factors outweighing the powerful factors pointing against the admission
of the hearsay evidence... The means by which the claimant can challenge the hearsay evidence are... not in my judgment capable
of outweighing those factors... The reality would appear to be that the factor which the FTPP considered decisive in favour
of admitting the hearsay evidence was the serious nature
of the allegations against the claimant coupled with the public interest in investigating such allegations and the FTPP's duty to protect the public interest in protecting patients, maintaining public confidence in the profession and declaring and upholding proper
standards of behaviour... However, that factor on its own does not in my view diminish the weight which must be attached to the procedural safeguards to which a
person accused
of such allegations is entitled both at common law and under Article 6... The more serious the allegation, the greater the importance
of ensuring that the accused doctor is afforded fair and proper procedural safeguards.
In medical malpractice lawsuits, doctors are held to a higher
standard than that
of an ordinary
person: that
of the
reasonable doctor having the specialized skills and knowledge
of a licensed physician.
My aforementioned niggle relates to the practical application
of the universal
reasonable person standard.
The Crown argued that new developments in the case law support the view that, if the content
of a telephone call initiated by an undercover police officer reveals that the
person on the other end understands drug jargon and seems prepared to deal in drugs, the
reasonable suspicion
standard can be met during the call before the opportunity is provided.
The property owner will normally be held to the
standard of care
of a
reasonable person acting under the same or similar circumstances.
The
standard is practically the same, and it simply asks how a
reasonable person in that situation would respond to that kind
of treatment.
``... before there can be a finding
of dishonesty it must be established that the defendant's conduct was dishonest by the ordinary
standards of reasonable and honest
people and that he himself realised that by those
standards his conduct was dishonest.»
Assuming no other evidence than what you cite, however, while the charge might possibly survive (it is extremely weak) it would be incredibly unlikely for the
person to be convicted on those facts, since a conviction has to meet the higher
standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt.