Not exact matches
Before joining DFAIT, he worked
at the Department of Finance, including from 1983 - 1990 with the Financial Sector Policy Branch where he served as Project Director, Financial Institutions Reform Project, and chaired the Inter-Departmental Legislative
Review Committee, which guided the development of the 1992 reforms that overhauled the federal financial institutions
statutes (the Bank Act, the Insurance Companies Act, the Trust and Loan Companies Act and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act).
Jennifer Rodgers, former assistant U.S. Attorney and current executive director of the Center For The Advancement of Public Integrity
at Columbia University, told Gotham Gazette that after
reviewing the state
statutes and Sugarman's report, she thinks there is good reason to believe the law was violated, but admitted there is enough discretion that a district attorney may decide there is not enough hard proof of intent.
Interested parties should
review the
statute (available
at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114s1177enr/pdf/BILLS-114s1177enr.pdf) for complete information on the amendments made to the ESEA by the ESSA.
My comments start from three propositions which are rooted in constitutional theory: (1) absent constitutional objection, legislation binds; (2) administrative decision - makers enabled by
statute can only go so far as their home
statute allows (3) it is a court's job, on any standard of
review, to enforce those boundaries; in American terminology, to «say what the law is» (Marbury v Madison; Edmonton East,
at para 21).
Then in 2011 Justice Rothstein, this time writing for the majority in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers» Association, 2011 SCC 61, wrote that the principle of judicial deference asserted in Dunsmuir had evolved to the point where there is a presumption the standard of
review is reasonableness where a statutory decision - maker applies and interprets its home
statute (
at para 39).
Now, the Supreme Court's decline to
review this holding establishes that,
at least in the Seventh Circuit, employers do not have to provide significant additional leave following expiration under the FMLA because doing so would convert the ADA to a medical leave entitlement
statute.
[5] During the first stage of the analysis,
reviewing courts were charged with examining four factors: whether there was a privative, or conversely an appeal, clause in the decision maker's home
statute; [6] whether the decision maker was relatively more expert than the
reviewing court in respect of the decision under
review; what the purpose of the statutory scheme and of the particular provision or provisions
at issue was; and what the nature of the question in dispute was.
While a tribunal's substantive decision - making under its home
statute may survive a judicial
review merely by being reasonable, a tribunal must still be correct about questions of general law, and must still reach decisions on a foundation of procedural fairness; legislatures do not authorize tribunals to decide matters through unjust processes (Dunsmuir
at 128 - 129).
Pursuant to Harder and Sterling O & G International Corp v Director of Employment Standards Division (Man), 2012 MBCA 18 (CanLII), 275 ManR (2d) 280 (
at para 19), the law is ``... essentially settled that a question of statutory interpretation by a tribunal of its own
statute will be
reviewed on the standard of reasonableness».
The lawyers
at Parker Waichman LLP diligently
review incoming personal injury cases to arrive
at the appropriate
statute of limitations and be sure we have enough time to file a claim in court.
Then in McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67 (CanLII), Justice Moldaver reinforced the presumption of deference by asserting the onus lies on an applicant in judicial
review to establish the statutory interpretation given by a decision - maker to its home
statute is unreasonable (McLean
at paras 40, 41).
Unless the jurisprudence has already settled the applicable standard of
review (Dunsmuir,
at para. 62), the
reviewing court should begin by considering whether the issue involves the interpretation by an administrative body of its own
statute or
statutes closely connected to its function.
Furthermore, unless otherwise prescribed by
statute, the content of input rights (i.e. written submissions vs. oral hearing) is
at the discretion of the decision - maker subject to the supervisory role of the court to
review the propriety of that choice.
(a) With regard to judicial
review of an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question
at issue, the question for the court is whether the
Another interesting aspect (solely from a Canadian point of view) is that Mactavish J. suggested (
at para. 43) that the standard of
review should be reasonableness, given that the Commission was interpreting its governing
statute and should therefore be accorded deference.
Why would Justice Khullar hedge somewhat on the standard of
review applicable to a decision by a Tenancy Dispute Officer, particularly in light of the precedent in Hetland and the presumption (
at para 17) most recently articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47 (CanLII)(
at paras 22 — 24) that the standard of
review will be reasonableness where a statutory decision - maker applies and interprets its home
statute?