If they climb much further,
stock valuation extremes lose their low rate «justification» and real estate affordability could get tossed to the wolves.
I don't know if U.S. stocks will power ahead from here, dismissing everything from Trump troubles to
stock valuation extremes to collapsing retailers.
Not exact matches
That's the one signal that has been favorable during most of the recent advance, and it is why, despite
extreme valuations, I left as much as 20 % of our
stocks unhedged until the interest rate climate turned hostile a couple of weeks ago.
Stock prices are up and
valuations are at
extreme levels despite faltering earnings, Fed rate hikes and a slowing economy.
I've noted before that while the bubble peak in 2000 was the most
extreme level of
valuation in history on a capitalization - weighted basis, the recent speculative episode has actually exceeded that bubble from the standpoint of speculation in individual
stocks.
Deep Value investors employ a more
extreme version of value investing that is characterized by holding the
stocks of companies with extremely low
valuation measures.
Again, if our measures of market internals were to improve, we would allow for the possibility that reliable measures of market
valuations could surpass their 2000
extreme, and we would not place a «cap» on how high
stock prices could move.
The S&P 500 registered a record high after an advancing half - cycle since 2009 that is historically long - in - the - tooth and already exceeds the
valuation peaks set at every cyclical
extreme in history but 2000 on the S&P 500 (across all
stocks, current median price / earnings, price / revenue and enterprise value / EBITDA multiples already exceed the 2000
extreme).
Back in October, I noted «investors clearly are approaching the current market with every belief that the
extreme valuations of 2007 represent the sustainable norm to which
stocks should return.
The
extreme valuation premiums afforded to defensive, high - quality and high - growth
stocks means that their inverse corollaries — cyclically geared value
stocks — are historically cheap and under - owned.
While none of these portfolios is likely to produce particularly inspiring returns — a function of already elevated
valuations for both U.S.
stocks and bond — the difference between the two
extremes is still important.
The
extreme valuation premiums afforded to defensive, high - quality and high - growth
stocks means that their inverse corollaries — cyclically geared value
stocks — are historically cheap and under - owned.
The market's
valuation in 2000 was so
extreme that the resulting secular bear has the potential to be more extended than others, unless the market was suddenly to collapse to
valuations near those where historical secular bulls have started (where
stocks have typically been priced to achieve 10 - year prospective returns near 20 % annually).
Stock markets are maintaining their momentum but buyers should beware of the
extreme valuation gap between the highest and lowest - priced
stocks.
My goal is to use the historical data to develop an approach to investing that avoids the negatives at both
extremes of
valuation: (1) being too heavy in
stocks at times of overvaluation; and (2) being too light in
stocks at times of undervaluation.
My view is that it is best to maintain a moderate position in
stocks at times of high
valuation and that it is also best not to go too
extreme on the high side in one's
stock allocation at times of low
valuation (because in the short - term
stocks may drop sharply even from a starting point at which
valuations are low).
* Accounting issues: in one sense this takes the fourth point to an
extreme - the
stock market's
valuation of a company is flawed, not because it's focusing on the wrong metrics but because profits or other key financial data are being flattered or even fabricated by company management.
As a result, it can be very easy to fall so much in love with a great company that you can't resist investing in the
stock even when the
valuation is
extreme.
The manager will make tactical shifts in the fund's asset mix when he feels that
stock or bond
valuations are at an
extreme.
Like Wal - Mart, but not as
extreme, Colgate's
stock price went sideways until October of 2004 until once again it touched its True Worth ™
valuation line.
Deep Value investors employ a more
extreme version of value investing that is characterized by holding the
stocks of companies with extremely low
valuation measures.
Meanwhile,
stock valuations are at historical
extremes in terms of price - to - earnings ratios, dividend yields, book values and projected corporate earnings.
«Momentum (growth)
stocks trade at an
extreme premium to value
stocks, with the
valuation spread the highest since 1980, except for during the tech bubble,» JPMorgan strategist Dubravko Lakos - Bujas wrote recently.
It may seem implausible that
stocks could have gone this long with near - zero returns, and yet still be at
valuations where other secular bear markets have started — but that is the unfortunate result of the
extreme valuations that
stocks achieved in 2000.
As well, I have reported on my blog about whether the
extreme market
valuations Japan experienced in the late 1980s work for or against the idea of reducing
stock allocations when
valuations become extremely high.
In both cases,
stock valuations were pushed to historical
extremes as all - time market highs occurred on a seemingly weekly basis (roughly one - fourth of 2017's trading days ended at a new all - time high!).
Combine that fact with today's
extreme stock valuations and it's easy to see why our investing narrative has gradually shifted away from a primary focus on maximizing growth to preserving capital.
First,
extreme stock valuations challenge the notion that you should always follow the central banks (e.g., Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, etc.).