Shiller's research showed that CAPE ratios do not predict future growth rates; he found that some of
the strongest mean reversion in the capital markets is between past and future earnings growth rates.
Economic volatility exhibits
strong mean reversion.
Relative valuation levels for most factors exhibit
strong mean reversion.
That's pretty
strong mean reversion, though admittedly, noise is always stronger in the short run.
Not exact matches
If there is
mean reversion in the difference between the two yields, the effect is not a
strong one.
Looking at this data, at least, the evidence seems
strong that a high CAPE today goes with lower stock returns in future periods, with the
mean reversion becoming
stronger for longer time periods.
I don't see the VIX being a
strong predictor to
mean reversion returns.
Apparently your results reflect the
strong uptrend of the market and can not be used to support
mean reversion unless the series are properly detrended.
The further we are away from the
mean, the
stronger the tendency toward
mean -
reversion.
Mauboussin's research seems to suggest that, while there exists a
strong tendency towards
mean reversion, some companies do «post persistently high or low returns beyond what chance dictates.»
When we explain the intuition behind half - life of valuation
mean reversion in this article, we assume the second effect is significantly
stronger.
If
mean reversion does occur in the years ahead, the regression will begin to show a
strong relationship.
The first rally in every bull market is ALWAYS very fierce because there's a
strong mean -
reversion theme going on.
Mauboussin's research supports Graham's view that, while some businesses do generate persistently high or low returns on invested capital beyond what chance dictates, there exists a
strong tendency toward
mean reversion in most businesses.
The outstanding Shadowstock blog has identified five «
strong candidates for
mean reversion.»
Kinnaras is a
strong advocate of
mean reversion and has found that pessimistic valuations, and thus attractive investment opportunities, often manifest when the broader investment community disregards
mean reversion and impounds overly pessimistic expectations into security prices.
Though the momentum anomaly (weak as it has been recently) usually favors portfolios with
stronger price momentum, the relationship breaks down over longer periods of time, and more severe moves, where
mean -
reversion tends to take over.
More generally, as first documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1987), a stock, on average, experiences short - term
mean reversion on a monthly horizon, then momentum on the horizon of up to a year, and then
mean reversion on the horizon larger than a year and
strongest over 2 to 3 years.
It is probably better described as an Ornstein - Uhlenbeck type of red noise model with a
strong reversion to the
mean, i.e. 0C.